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There is an epistemic problem in animal consciousness research

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Abstract

Which non-human animals are phenomenally conscious? In this paper I argue that the distribution of phenomenal consciousness in the animal world is ultimately an unsolvable issue, because of an underlying problem inherent in the field: what I call the Kinda Hard Problem. The Kinda Hard Problem arises because the grounds on which we base our consciousness attributions to humans third-personally are either unavailable or ambiguous once we move to the animal case. Its nature is that of an epistemic problem: we cannot collect enough evidential grounds to justify attributions of phenomenal consciousness (and attributions of its lack) to non-human animals. Thus, it is impossible to ground rational belief one way or another regarding animal consciousness. This paper presents the problem and explains how it differs from other problems of consciousness.

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Notes

  1. The distribution question has also been referred to as “the Who Problem” (Prinz, 2005) and “the other species of mind problem” (Allen and Bekoff, 1997).

  2. This point can be presented using counterfactuals. Laws of nature, grounding claims, and causal relations can be cashed out in terms of counterfactuals. The truth of a certain scientific theory (let’s say, Global Workspace theory) can be cashed out in terms of the truth of counterfactuals on what persons would have experienced under certain conditions. The fact I myself didn’t participate in the experiments supporting e.g. Global Workspace theory doesn’t undermine the theory, because a world where I was the subject in those experiments is close by. There is a truth-value to the counterfactual “if I were the subject in this experiment, I would have experienced such-and-so in these circumstances”. However, once we move to worlds that are far apart -that is, worlds were essential facts about my personal identity do no longer hold, worlds where I could be a mouse or a boar- the truth-value of the counterfactual is indeterminate.

  3. By animal, I mean the standard or representative individuals of the species.

  4. Abnormal cases (like cases of individuals in a vegetative state, comma, or who have non-standard nervous system composition) require a different treatment (see Shea & Bayne 2010 for discussion).

  5. I thank two anonymous reviewers for encouraging me to make this point explicit.

  6. Tools include (but are not limited to) behavioral experiments (like those using reaction times, eye tracking, psychophysical responses), brain imaging (like PET or fMRI), computational models or neurobiological methods like direct brain stimulation.

  7. I will be using “states” and “events” interchangeably; we don’t need to commit to whether states or events are the relevant ontological units.

  8. “Most often” because nothing prevents us, in principle, from having a cognitive scientific account of consciousness that presents non-physical qualia as partly constitutive of phenomenally conscious mental states.

  9. This seems a consequence of Human Consciousness, Nomological Character of Physical-Phenomenal Relations, and Phenomenal Realism.

  10. I use the term “combination” to be neutral of whether PSERTT1, PSERTT2 and the forth are specified as a conjunction or a disjunction. I will talk more about this on section 5.

  11. In this footnote, I will list some of the variations. What I say in sections 3 and 4 applies to all of these. Some of these variations can be combined.

    • Restricting the scope of [phenomenally conscious mental states]. On occasions, the Naturalistic Strategy is not run over phenomenal consciousness in general, but for a particular kind of experience (e.g. pain). In that case, there will also be an explicit mention of some external conditions (e.g. a limb being recently stubbed) that go into the PSERTTs. That would make the empirical finding of some of the PSERTTs in premise (ii) trivial (since we created the circumstances), but not others (i.e. those that are internal to the animal, and which we haven’t intervened upon).

    • Broadening the scope of [this animal]. Sometimes the Naturalistic Strategy is not run over particular specimens, but over a certain taxonomical category –e.g. individuals of a species, genus, family or order. This would change the formulation of (ii) and (C), but the structure of the argument remains the same.

    • Looking for reliable indicators of [the absence of conscious mental states]. Suppose that we find a chemical compound (say, a certain sedative) that in humans appears to trump phenomenally conscious states –i.e. the presence of this chemical compound is a reliable indicator, in humans, of the absence of phenomenally conscious states (note: there is nothing special about chemical compounds; maybe an inhibitive cognitive process can play the same role). We can reformulate (i) as: “PSERTTs (or a combination of PSERTT1, PSERTT2, PSERTT3…) are a reliable indicator of the absence of phenomenally conscious mental states, in humans”. We can reformulate (C) as: “the animal probably lacks phenomenally conscious mental states”. We can reformulate consideration (v) (not yet introduced in the main text) as: “we cannot know whether PSERTTs are reliable indicators for the lack of phenomenal consciousness in all creatures”. The structure of the argument, and the way the considerations run, remains unchanged.

    • Strengthening [the link] between PTs and consciousness. A physicalist might want to run the strategy by considering that PSERTTs are identical to, or are constitutive of, phenomenally conscious mental states. The Naturalistic Strategy for the identity claim can be reformulated as: (i) “PSERTTs (or a combination of PSERTT1, PSERTT2, PSERTT3…) are identical to phenomenally conscious mental states in humans”; (C) “this animal has phenomenally conscious mental states”. Since the PSERTTs the Naturalistic Strategy is about are those expressible in theoretical terms, the identity claim (i) might turn out to be false or only approximately accurate. Ditto for the whole thing, in the case of claims about constitutive relations.

    • Restricting the sorts of physical states that might go into [PSERTT]. For instance, a functionalist might want to emphasize that only functional roles can go on the PSERTT. The Naturalistic Strategy, as formulated in the main text, can accommodate this move without further changes.

    Two final remarks: this list is not exhaustive. (Also, any variations might face additional problems that threaten their inductive strength.) The point is that they would also face the Kinda Hard Problem.

  12. I thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to incorporate Staley’s notion of secure evidence to the discussion.

  13. A reminder for the reader. (i) is: “PSERTTs (or a combination of PSERTT1, PSERTT2, PSERTT3…) are reliable indicators of phenomenally conscious mental states in humans”.

    (ii): “PSERTTs are also present in this animal (e.g. as found empirically)”.

  14. In footnote 10, I explain how the Naturalistic Strategy can be modified to accommodate to arguments defending the lack of consciousness in animals.

  15. For example, by adopting a “precautionary principle”, such that we extend protection to animals in the absence of certainty as to whether they feel pain (see Bradshaw 1998, Birch 2017).

  16. E.g., susceptibility to psychological harm or suffering; see Carruthers 1999, 2004.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Peter Carruthers for his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to an audience at the University of Maryland’s Philosophy Department work in progress, an audience at the Philosophy of Science Association’s 2018 meeting, and an audience at the American Philosophical Association’s 2022 Central meeting. Thanks as well to Eric Saidel, Amber Polk, Aiden Woodcock, Andew Knoll, Julius Schoenher, Chris Masciari, Shen Pan, Andrew Fyfe and Julia Janczur. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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The author is grateful for a Fulbright-Spain fellowship.

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    Aida Roige

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Roige, A. There is an epistemic problem in animal consciousness research. Phenom Cogn Sci (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09912-3

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