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Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization

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Abstract

Opponents to consciousness in fish argue that fish do not feel pain because they do not have a neocortex, which is a necessary condition for feeling pain. A common counter-argument appeals to the multiple realizability of pain: while a neocortex might be necessary for feeling pain in humans, pain might be realized differently in fish. This paper argues, first, that it is impossible to find a criterion allowing us to demarcate between plausible and implausible cases of multiple realization of pain without running into a circular argument. Second, opponents to consciousness in fish cannot be provided with reasons to believe in the multiple realizability of pain. I conclude that the debate on the existence of pain in fish is impossible to settle by relying on the multiple realization argument.

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Notes

  1. In this article, the term “fish” will refer to bony fish, since the debate focuses mostly on this group. The case of cartilaginous fish such as sharks is particularly interesting nonetheless, as it shows that some animals exhibiting pain-like behaviors are poor candidates for feeling pain when considered from a neurophysiological perspective.

  2. For a thorough analysis of the decapitated frog cases, See Klein (2017).

  3. Reductive representationalists such as Tye (1995, 2000), Carruthers (2000) or Prinz (2012) would certainly disagree with this definition. Providing a detailed argument against this view is not the object of this paper and would likely require a paper of its own. For now, I remain agnostic on whether or not pain could be reduced to a set of functions. Below, I explain what proponents of the multiple realization argument would have to do in order to demonstrate the existence of pain experiences in fish if a functional definition of pain was found. Although this view could provide a way forward in this discussion, I will assume that we do not currently have a functional definition of pain and, for this reason, I will set the reductive representationalist view aside.

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    Matthias Michel

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Michel, M. Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization. Philos Stud 176, 2411–2428 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1133-4

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