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  1. No Access

    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Sketching for Big Data Recommender Systems Using Fast Pseudo-random Fingerprints

    A key building block for collaborative filtering recommender systems is finding users with similar consumption patterns. Given access to the full data regarding the items consumed by each user, one can directl...

    Yoram Bachrach, Ely Porat in Automata, Languages, and Programming (2013)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Agent Failures in Totally Balanced Games and Convex Games

    We examine the impact of independent agents failures on the solutions of cooperative games, focusing on totally balanced games and the more specific subclass of convex games. We follow the reliability extensio...

    Yoram Bachrach, Ian Kash, Nisarg Shah in Internet and Network Economics (2012)

  3. No Access

    Chapter and Conference Paper

    The Least-Core of Threshold Network Flow Games

    Network flow games model domains where a commodity can flow through a network controlled by selfish agents. Threshold Network Flow Games (TNFGs) are a form of such games where an agent coalition wins if it man...

    Yoram Bachrach in Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2011 (2011)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Proof Systems and Transformation Games

    We introduce Transformation Games (TGs), a form of coalitional game in which players are endowed with sets of initial resources, and have capabilities allowing them to derive certain output resources, given certa...

    Yoram Bachrach, Michael Zuckerman in Mathematical Foundations of Computer Scien… (2010)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative Games

    We study safety level coalitions in competitive games. Given a normal form game, we define a corresponding cooperative game with transferable utility, where the value of each coalition is determined by the safety...

    Yoram Bachrach, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings in Internet and Network Economics (2010)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Collusion in VCG Path Procurement Auctions

    We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in some cases they can extract any ...

    Yoram Bachrach, Peter Key, Morteza Zadimoghaddam in Internet and Network Economics (2010)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games

    The core of a cooperative game contains all stable distributions of a coalition’s gains among its members. However, some games have an empty core, with every distribution being unstable. We allow an external p...

    Ezra Resnick, Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir in Mathematical Foundations of Computer Scien… (2009)