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    Article

    Approximating power indices: theoretical and empirical analysis

    Many multiagent domains where cooperation among agents is crucial to achieving a common goal can be modeled as coalitional games. However, in many of these domains, agents are unequal in their power to affect ...

    Yoram Bachrach, Evangelos Markakis in Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (2010)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games

    The core of a cooperative game contains all stable distributions of a coalition’s gains among its members. However, some games have an empty core, with every distribution being unstable. We allow an external p...

    Ezra Resnick, Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir in Mathematical Foundations of Computer Scien… (2009)