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Article
Strategic behavior and learning in all-pay auctions: an empirical study using crowdsourced data
We analyze human behavior in crowdsourcing contests using an all-pay auction model where all participants exert effort, but only the highest bidder receives the reward. We let workers sourced from Amazon Mecha...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Simple Pricing Schemes for the Cloud
The problem of pricing the cloud has attracted much recent attention due to the widespread use of cloud computing and cloud services. From a theoretical perspective, several mechanisms that provide strong effi...
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Article
Market manipulation with outside incentives
Much evidence has shown that prediction markets can effectively aggregate dispersed information about uncertain future events and produce remarkably accurate forecasts. However, if the market prediction will b...
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Article
Optimizing scrip systems: crashes, altruists, hoarders, sybils and collusion
Scrip, or artificial currency, is a useful tool for designing systems that are robust to selfish behavior by users. However, it also introduces problems for a system designer, such as how the amount of money i...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Impersonation Strategies in Auctions
A common approach to analyzing repeated auctions, such as sponsored search auctions, is to treat them as complete information games, because it is assumed that, over time, players learn each other’s types. Thi...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion
Game-theoretic analyses of distributed and peer-to-peer systems typically use the Nash equilibrium solution concept, but this explicitly excludes the possibility of strategic behavior involving more than one a...