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  1. Article

    Open Access

    Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes

    Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of m alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gib...

    Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, René Romen in Social Choice and Welfare (2024)

  2. Article

    Open Access

    An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes

    Maximal lottery ( \( ML \) ML ) schem...

    Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Christian Stricker in Social Choice and Welfare (2022)

  3. No Access

    Chapter

    Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox

    A large part of the social choice literature studies voting paradoxes in which seemingly mild properties are violated by common voting rules. In this chapter, we investigate the likelihood of the Condorcet Los...

    Felix Brandt, Christian Geist in Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability… (2021)

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    Chapter

    Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions

    An important and surprising phenomenon in voting theory is the No-Show Paradox (NSP), which occurs if a voter is better off by abstaining from an election. While it is known that certain voting rules suffer from ...

    Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer in Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability… (2021)

  5. No Access

    Chapter

    Collective Choice Lotteries

    Randomization is playing an ever increasing role in economic design with examples ranging from fair allocation to matching markets to voting. I propose and briefly discuss three interdisciplinary and interrela...

    Felix Brandt in The Future of Economic Design (2019)

  6. No Access

    Article

    Extending tournament solutions

    An important subclass of social choice functions, so-called majoritarian (or C1) functions, only take into account the pairwise majority relation between alternatives. In the absence of majority ties—e.g., when t...

    Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein in Social Choice and Welfare (2018)

  7. No Access

    Article

    On the structure of stable tournament solutions

    A fundamental property of choice functions is stability, which, loosely speaking, prescribes that choice sets are invariant under adding and removing unchosen alternatives. We provide several structural insigh...

    Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Hans Georg Seedig, Warut Suksompong in Economic Theory (2018)

  8. No Access

    Chapter and Conference Paper

    On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions

    Tournament solutions constitute an important class of social choice functions that only depend on the pairwise majority comparisons between alternatives. Recent analytical results have shown that several conce...

    Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig in Operations Research Proceedings 2014 (2016)

  9. No Access

    Article

    A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality

    We consider the notion of Pareto optimality under the assumption that only the pairwise majority relation is known and show that the set of necessarily Pareto optimal alternatives coincides with the McKelvey u...

    Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Paul Harrenstein in Social Choice and Welfare (2016)

  10. No Access

    Article

    Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness

    This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly’s preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only ...

    Felix Brandt in Social Choice and Welfare (2015)

  11. No Access

    Article

    Minimal retentive sets in tournaments

    Tournament solutions, i.e., functions that associate with each complete and asymmetric relation on a set of alternatives a nonempty subset of the alternatives, play an important role in the mathematical social...

    Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein in Social Choice and Welfare (2014)

  12. No Access

    Article

    A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz

    In 1990, motivated by applications in the social sciences, Thomas Schwartz made a conjecture about tournaments which would have had numerous attractive consequences. In particular, it implied that there is no ...

    Felix Brandt, Maria Chudnovsky, Ilhee Kim, Gaku Liu in Social Choice and Welfare (2013)

  13. No Access

    Article

    Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games

    McGarvey (Econometrica, 21(4), 608–610, 1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a relation induced by majority rule. We address the analogous issue for dominance rel...

    Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein in Theory and Decision (2010)

  14. No Access

    Article

    A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set

    A recurring theme in the mathematical social sciences is how to select the “most desirable” elements given a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Schwartz’s tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) ranks a...

    Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, Maximilian Mair in Social Choice and Welfare (2010)