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Collective Choice Lotteries

Dealing with Randomization in Economic Design

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The Future of Economic Design

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Design ((DESI))

Abstract

Randomization is playing an ever increasing role in economic design with examples ranging from fair allocation to matching markets to voting. I propose and briefly discuss three interdisciplinary and interrelated research questions that deserve further attention: (i) when are collective choice lotteries acceptable, (ii) how do agents compare lotteries, and (iii) how can randomized rules be implemented.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For further philosophical discussions of using lotteries to achieve fairness, see, for example, Broome (1991); Nissan-Rozen (2012).

  2. 2.

    For a related discussion of the benefits and challenges of randomization, see Haris Aziz’s piece in this volume (Aziz 2019).

  3. 3.

    For other approaches to come up with coherent collective decisions when individual decision-makers violate traditional decision-theoretic assumptions, see Regenwetter et al. (2009) and Danan et al. (2016).

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Acknowledgements

This material is based on work supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under grant BR 2312/12-1. I am grateful to Florian Brandl, Ashley Piggins, Marcus Pivato, and Bill Zwicker for helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institut für Informatik, Technische Universität München, Munich, Germany

    Felix Brandt

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  1. Felix Brandt
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Correspondence to Felix Brandt .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. CNRS - Paris School of Economics, Paris, France

    Jean-François Laslier

  2. University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Hervé Moulin

  3. Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE, Paris, France

    M. Remzi Sanver

  4. Union College, Schenectady, NY, USA

    William S. Zwicker

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Brandt, F. (2019). Collective Choice Lotteries. In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_9

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