Abstract
Objectives
This study seeks to further strengthen extant knowledge regarding terrorist group involvement in organized criminal activity through two means. First, it measures a set of environmental and organizational characteristics for a sample of well-known terrorist organizations based on the crime-terror literature. Second, it illustrates the utility of inductive research designs for examining patterns in the criminal behavior of terrorist groups for theory building and the potential risk classification of new terrorist organizations in the future.
Methods
The authors utilize a random forest classification algorithm to examine three sources of information about a broad set of environmental and organizational factors determined to be of potential importance in predicting when a terrorist organization will engaged in organized criminal behavior. First, it examines out-of-sample accuracy through bootstrap cross-validation estimation. Second, it quantifies the predictive efficacy/importance of each measured factor. Finally, it utilizes partial dependence functions to examine the relational trend between the most important predictive factors and variation in the presence of organized criminal behavior.
Results
The study finds three results. First, predictive accuracy using readily quantifiable factors about the criminal behavior of terrorist organizations is good but could be improved upon. Second, organizational factors such as group size, ideology and attack behavior out perform environmental factors in terms of predictive performance. Third, it finds that the most important predictor variables have a predominately non-linear relationship with whether the algorithm would classify a group as engaging in organized criminal behavior or not.
Conclusions
The study finds that theory building should seek to examine temporal variation in the organizational structure of terrorist groups as a fruitful way forward for further understanding when a group is likely to engage in organized criminal behavior. It also suggests that scholars should seek to engage more critically with concepts surrounding the potential non-linear pathways in which groups end up engaging in organized crime. Finally, the results illustrate the utility of modern machine learning algorithms and inductive research processes for both academic and practitioner needs alike. Especially when dealing with a complex phenomenon with imperfect data.
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Notes
Some terrorist groups do not only carry out attacks but also have a broader functional repertoire. Hezbollah, for example, has a political wing and provides social services to their supporters (Berman and Laitin 2008).
To sell arms internationally an end-user certificate is required. It certifies that the buyer is in fact the final recipient of the arms. It is meant to ensure that arms and ammunition are not sold to an unnamed third party or embargoed states. Forging or altering end-user certificates allows shipments of arms to be transported via official channels and routes.
As discussed later in the paper, weak states support the development of criminal actors as well as terrorism. Their interaction is more likely due to their co-existence (Freeman 2011).
We include the results of a logistic regression “Appendix A” for comparison by the reader.
Within the quantitative study of terrorism, logistic regression remains the workhorse methodology for analyzing binary dependent variables. We argue that the random forest method is likely to be better for the analysis of complex problems due to its ensemble methodology and the absence of strict functional form assumptions.
There are two different types of organized crime. There are those activities that provide goods and those that provide protection. Often, the same actor provides both types of criminal activity. The Italian Mafia, for example, is providing a range of criminal activities that generates funds and deals contraband on the black market (Europol 2013). The FARC in Columbia, for example, is engaged in the production and distribution of drugs, but also provides protection to the local population against other violent actors in the area (Felbab-Brown 2010).
Cited in Forest (2013: 175).
These two examples especially highlight the puzzling nature of crime-terror cooperation. The Taliban have an explicit moral agenda that is embodied by Shari’a law yet aids the production and trade of narcotics that are considered forbidden in Islam. In Colombia, the FARC seek to establish a socialist state that would conduct land and wealth reform to aid marginalized socio-economic groups (agriculture and urban labor) yet cooperates with extremely violent and destructive drug trafficking organizations that often inflict harm on the poorest of Colombian citizens.
On the resource extraction in short-term collaborations see Saab and Taylor (2009), or Williams (2002). Of course, short-term collaboration can be a repeated event, thus resulting in long-term collaborations. The logic, however, is still operational, not motivational.
In contrast to develop causal processes underlying the terrorist group’s behavior.
Cited in Costigan and Gold (2007: 29).
Put into practice we use, for example: National Socialist Council of Nagaland + (trafficking or production) + (drugs or weapons or humans or money laundering).
For information on the operationalization of both the organizational and environmental variables see Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013).
Because our predictors are aggregated from panel measures into cross-sections, it is possible that important variation is lost during the aggregation. “Appendix B” compares the panel means and variance to the cross-sectional measures. Only transnational casualties/attack substantively deviates from the panel measure. We believe that on a whole, our aggregation procedure does not fundamentally change the distributional structure of the measures used here.
The authors practiced measurement by re-coding randomly selected cases from Kilberg’s data. This was meant to ensure coding consistency.
By aggregating organizational and environmental measures at the group level, we concede a loss of temporal information. This is problematic in that we cannot parse out time-serial structures that may be important for understanding engagement with organized crime and may mask a problem of reverse causality or a temporal lag structure that characterizes engagement. While these limitations must be acknowledged, there are two reasons for which it does not decrease the merit of this study. First, multiple indicators at the panel level are essentially time invariant in their original measurements for the group’s entire history or sizable amounts of their history (group ideology, group size, structure, etc.). Even if it was feasible to produce true time series measures of engagement, these problems would not necessarily be solved by maintaining the original panel structure. The second reason concerns our strategy. We make no attempt to estimate causal effects and instead focus on how aggregated factors at the group level may be used to accurately predict engagement between different groups and not when groups adopt or discard engagement opportunities. While these questions are important, we believe that the results here could aid in the formulation of more nuanced theories of engagement by focusing first on between group variation on engagement.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Logistic Regression Coefficients
Three logistic regression models were fit to examine variable significance and importance. Table N below displays the results. The first model uses every variable outlined in the data and operationalization section. The second model uses only organizational factors, and the third model uses only environmental factors. Comparing model log likelihood, the organizational model explains a greater amount of variation when compared with the environmental factor model. The AIC statistics also indicates that organizational variables are substantively better than environmental variables for explaining variation concerning criminal activity.
Examining the fully fitted model, the logistic regression results in three statistically significant predictors. The centralized group structure dummy variable is significant at the 10% level. Substantively, the logit coefficient indicates a positive relationship between centralized organizational structure and involvement in criminal activity. The coefficient estimates a 1.82 increase in the odds of a terrorist organization being classified as having involvement in criminal activity when it has a centralized organizational structure. This finding is interesting as it contradicts theoretical and anecdotal expectations about the relationship between decentralized organizational structure and criminal involvement. Namely the expectations concerning the strategic incentive of centralized structures to avoid high-risk activities.
Group size is statistically significant and conforms to the expectations held in the literature. Group size has a positive relationship with involvement in criminal activity. The regression coefficient indicates an average classification odds increase of 1.44 as organizations increase in group size. Finally, the religious ideology dummy variable is statistically significant and indicates a strong positive relationship with criminal involvement, with religious groups having a 14.8 odds increase in being classified as having criminal involvement. This finding is difficult to reconcile with both intuition and theoretical expectations. One would expect religious groups to shy away from illicit activities, yet this finding would suggest the opposite. While not statistically significant, the nationalist ideology dummy indicates the expected relationship as found in the literature. Interestingly, none of the environmental variables are statistically significant in the full model, but military spending and logged GDP are significant in the environment model (Table 3).
Appendix B: Distributional Comparison Between Panel Measures and Aggregated Cross-sections
See Table 4.
Appendix C: Tenfold Cross Validation Estimation of Out of Sample Accuracy
Equation used for estimating tenfold cross validation accuracy. K is for each fold, while Err represents the classification error rate for each fold. The results corroborate the comparison in the main text (bootstrap validation). The random forest (75.2%) is roughly 6% more accurate in classifying out of sample cases when compared to the logistic regression (68.9%) (Figs. 5, 6).
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Semmelbeck, J., Besaw, C. Exploring the Determinants of Crime-Terror Cooperation using Machine Learning. J Quant Criminol 36, 527–558 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-019-09421-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-019-09421-0