Abstract
Understanding how firms cope with economic crises is of great importance, particularly in this period of rising interest rates coupled with a severe pandemic crisis. This study conducts an empirical analysis of firms in distress based on a large firm-level panel dataset containing detailed micro-level information on Chinese manufacturing firms. We study economic distress rather than financial distress. Moreover, we identify survival tactics adopted by distressed firms and the factors driving their choice of tactics. We show that three particular survival tactics help distressed firms recover, namely, reliance on fixed assets, reliance on intangible assets, and cost reduction. Furthermore, we show the critical role of institutional development in emerging economies, where institutions include product markets, financial markets, and legal institutions.
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Data Availability
The data is available upon request.
Notes
According to Sun and Tong (2003), two-thirds of SOEs were profitable in 2000, with a 140% increase in profits over 1999. However, much of this improvement was achieved by heavy government interventions, such as money injections, interest rate cuts, debt–equity swaps, and debt write-offs.
In addition to the required board of directors and information disclosure, listed firms also face stringent government regulations. For example, the Company Law of China stipulates that a listed firm will become a special treatment firm if its net profits are negative or net asset per share is less than the book value of stock for two consecutive years. Furthermore, it will be unlisted if it continues to make a loss in the third year.
This 2 + 1 sampling rule means that economically distressed firms are identified based on a panel from 2001 to 2006. However, the analysis on these firms’ survival tactics extends to 2007. Therefore, our data usage covers the period 2001–2007.
The definition of the profitability dummy is opposite to that of the state dummy, which is for technical convenience when using an ordinal-choice model.
The sales expenses were reported only after 2001; hence, this item has fewer observations than other items. In addition, with some data on income from new products missing, the number of observations for this item is also smaller.
Our results are robust if we extend the period to 2007.
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Jiang, K., Wang, S. Survival tactics for distressed firms in emerging markets. Asia Pac J Manag 41, 823–866 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-023-09873-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-023-09873-w
Keywords
- Firms in distress
- Survival tactics
- Emerging markets
- Institutional development
- Ownership structure
- Political connections