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Proportional representation in matching markets: selecting multiple matchings under dichotomous preferences
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding k matchings fairly representing everyone’s preferences....
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Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences: Using Heuristics to Improve Properties of Stable Matchings
Two-Sided Matching is a widely used approach to allocate resources based on preferences. In Two-Sided Matching problems where indifferences are...
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Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
In the one-sided assignment game, any two agents can form a trade; they can decide to form a partnership and agree on how to share the surplus...
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The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with...
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Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
In a many-to-one matching model with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of...
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Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
The theoretical literature on public school choice proposes centralized mechanisms that assign children to schools on the basis of parents’...
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A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
We present a two-sided one-to-one market setting where one side of the market is objectively ranked. Constraints prevent agents on the other side...
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Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
For a many-to-many matching model with contracts, where all the agents have substitutable preferences, we provide an algorithm to compute the full...
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A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms
Classical roommate problems define individual rationality by conceiving remaining single as the “outside option”. This conception implicitly assumes...
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Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core
This paper studies the one-to-one two-sided marriage model (Gale and Shapley
1962 ). If agents’ preferences exhibit mutually best (i.e., each agent is...
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Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms: experimental evidence
We present experimental evidence on the interplay between strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in stable matching mechanisms. In...
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The minimum set of \(\mu \)-compatible subgames for obtaining a stable set in an assignment game
This study analyzes von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in an assignment game. Núñez and Rafels (
2013 ) have shown that the union of the extended...
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A fair procedure in a marriage market
We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields a...
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A simple sufficient condition for a unique and student-efficient stable matching in the college admissions problem
Consider the college admissions problem. Let us say that (student and college) preferences are student-oriented iff whenever two students disagree...
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The roommate problem with externalities
This paper extends the roommate problem to include externalities, allowing preferences for a partner to depend on the situation of others. Stability...
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Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
We provide a school choice model where the student priority orders for schools are allowed not to be total. We introduce a class of algorithms, each...
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Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show...
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Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
We analyze a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of an extensive game with perfect information induced by the firm-oriented deferred acceptance (DA)...
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Partitionable choice functions and stability
We consider the two-sided many-to-one matching problem and introduce a class of preferences reflecting natural forms of complementarities. For...
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Dorm augmented college assignments
In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes...