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Unionized duopoly, market competition with differentiated products, and welfare

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Abstract

Conventional wisdom associates high social welfare levels with more competitive product markets. Adopting a conjectural variation model in a unionized duopoly with differentiated products and right-to-manage bargaining, the present work finds that the impact of market competition on social welfare crucially depends on the degree of differentiation and the union’s disagreement utility.

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Acknowledgments

I am extremely indebted to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions that have substantially improved the quality of the paper. I would also like to thank the Kozminski University in Warsaw for the support provided. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Kozminski University, Jagełłonska Street, 57/59, 03301, Warsaw, Poland

    Domenico Buccella

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  1. Domenico Buccella
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Correspondence to Domenico Buccella.

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Buccella, D. Unionized duopoly, market competition with differentiated products, and welfare. Econ Polit Ind 42, 455–473 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40812-015-0018-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40812-015-0018-1

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