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Towards a More General Theory of Franchise Governance

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Economics and Management of Franchising Networks

Part of the book series: Contributions to Management Science ((MANAGEMENT SC.))

Abstract

This chapter examines the nature of franchising and various business practices in terms of economic governance systems. Markets versus hierarchies, problems of collective action, and tournaments and adaptive imitation are linked to alternative types of franchise organization using established franchising taxonomies and previous research on franchise organization. Common activities of franchised operations are examined in light of governance systems. The chapter highlights some of the comparative advantages of alternative governance systems. The chapter also includes some implications for marketing channel strategy.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Business and Economics, Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL, 60187, USA

    Seth W. Norton

Authors
  1. Seth W. Norton
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Business Studies, University of Vienna, Brünner Straße 72, 1210, Vienna, Austria

    Josef Windsperger

  2. Center for Research on Economics and Management, University of Rennes 1, 11 rue Jean Macé, CS 70803, 35708, Rennes Cedex, France

    Gérard Cliquet

  3. Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam School of Management, Office F3-51 Burg. Oudlaan 50, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    George Hendrikse

  4. School of Business & Economics, University of Jyväskylä, P.O. Box 35 (MaE), 40351, Jyväskylä, Finland

    Mika Tuunanen (Research Fellow) (Research Fellow)

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Norton, S.W. (2004). Towards a More General Theory of Franchise Governance. In: Windsperger, J., Cliquet, G., Hendrikse, G., Tuunanen, M. (eds) Economics and Management of Franchising Networks. Contributions to Management Science. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2662-3_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2662-3_2

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0202-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-7908-2662-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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