What does it mean to live the good life? Although many scholars conceive of the good life as one that is happy, meaningful, and morally virtuous (King & Napa, 1998; Solomon, 2008; Wolf, 1997), the science of positive psychology has emphasized the study of happiness and meaning considerably more so than that of morality (Wong, 2011). Indeed, some positive psychologists have either not included morality in their conceptualization of the good life (e.g., Park & Peterson, 2009; Seligman, 2002), or have struggled with contradictory claims about the role of morality in the good life (Fowers, 2008). This relative lack of attention to morality reflects positive psychology’s, and the broader discipline of psychology’s, embrace of an acontextual, neoliberalist ideology—one that underscores individuals’ personal responsibility for living the good life, personal blame for failure, self-reliance, as well as personal growth and fulfillment (Adams et al., 2019; Prilleltensky, 1997; van Zyl et al., 2023; Yakushko & Blodgett, 2021). By contrast, some scholars have asserted that positive psychologists should broaden the perspective of the good life to include collective well-being, by focusing more on other people, groups, and systems (Hogan, 2020; Kern et al., 2020; Lomas et al., 2021). Encompassing morality, a core element contributing to these ideals (Leach et al., 2015), will likely become a crucial future task in positive psychology. In this article, we offer a corrective to this imbalanced conceptualization of the good life by focusing on the moral significance of one specific domain of positive psychology—gratitude.

The study of gratitude is an interesting microcosm of this imbalance because of the gulf between the way philosophers and psychologists have approached the concept of morality. Philosophers tend to analyze the moral implications of gratitude (e.g., when is gratitude owed, and in what ways is it a moral virtue?; McConnell, 1993; McConnell, 2016), whereas psychologists have focused more on its connections with people’s personal well-being (e.g., Wood et al., 2010). In fairness, this scholarly disparity reflects a relative, not an absolute, difference in emphasis. Psychologists have engaged in some conceptual and empirical work on the morality of gratitude (Gulliford & Morgan, 2021), such as the moral functions of gratitude (Mccullough et al., 2001), the prosocial consequences of gratitude (Ma et al., 2017), and the effects of gratitude expressions on relationship partners (Algoe et al., 2010, 2013, 2016). However, the preponderance of theorizing and research conducted by psychologists remains focused on the psychosocial benefits for people experiencing and expressing gratitude (Cregg & Cheavens, 2021; Emmons & Mishra, 2011; Kirca et al., 2023; Portocarrero et al., 2020; Wood et al., 2010).

What is lost in this relative neglect of the moral significance of gratitude? Here, we briefly outline two implications. For one thing, the most widely used measures of gratitude used by psychologists (e.g., the Gratitude Questionnaire-6; McCullough et al., 2002) are based on generalized conceptions of gratitude that do not address its moral significance (Navarro & Tudge, 2020). For another thing, research on gratitude interventions tends to focus on self-help activities that seek to improve the personal well-being of individuals experiencing and expressing gratitude (Cregg & Cheavens, 2021; Kirca et al., 2023). However, researchers and practitioners have not fully tapped into the potential for gratitude to be a force for good that benefits others and society, not just one’s personal well-being. Simply put, the psychology of gratitude has emphasized feeling good over doing good.

1 The Contextualist Morality Model

Against this backdrop, the purpose of this article is to present a model that synthesizes philosophical, conceptual, and empirical insights on the interface of morality and gratitude. In this model—the contextualist morality model of gratitude—we elucidate three facets of morality relevant to gratitude: (a) the moral bases of gratitude, i.e., moral virtues that facilitate the development of gratitude; (b) the moral sensitivity of gratitude, i.e., moral concerns that influence people’s experience of gratitude and their assessments of the appropriateness of gratitude; and (c) the moral functions of gratitude, i.e., the moral consequences of experiencing and expressing gratitude (see Fig. 1). We offer a contextualist view of gratitude by situating it within a constellation of other related virtues—that is, other virtues facilitate the development of gratitude, provide boundary conditions for the experience and perceived appropriateness of gratitude, and emerge from the cultivation of gratitude. Through this model, we sketch a moral vision that can inspire future research and practice in the psychology of gratitude.

Fig. 1
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Contextualist morality model of gratitude

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1.1 Meta-Theoretical Perspectives: Conceptualizing Morality and Gratitude

Before discussing these three facets, we articulate two meta-theoretical perspectives that underpin our model—the meaning of morality and the notion of gratitude as a hierarchically nested concept. First, what is morality? While morality is difficult to define (Gert & Gert, 2002), here, we follow the lead of philosopher Iris Murdoch (2013) and psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2008) by emphasizing that morality is concerned with restraining individuals’ selfishness, transcending self-interests, and develo** authentic concern for the welfare of other people and society. Additionally, the moral philosophy of gratitude can be categorized according to three major approaches (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2023), namely, the deontological approach, which conceptualizes gratitude as a moral duty or obligation (McConnell, 1993), the consequentialist approach, which foregrounds the positive consequences of gratitude (e.g., Sidgwick, 2019), and the virtue ethics approach, which conceives of gratitude as a moral virtue that people can cultivate (e.g., Kristjánsson, 2015). Although all three approaches have value, the contextualist morality model is most closely aligned with the virtue ethics approach, which foregrounds the moral character of a person. That is, the morally virtuous person is not simply one who frequently experiences and expresses gratitude but does so appropriately and for the right reason (Kristjánsson, 2013; Navarro & Tudge, 2020).

Second, we conceive of gratitude as a hierarchically nested concept that can be analyzed at three different levels: generalized gratitude, targeted gratitude, and actionable gratitudeFootnote 1 (see Fig. 1). Each level builds on the other but includes additional conditions and a greater degree of moral significance than the previous level. At the first and most basic level, generalized gratitude is the awareness and appreciation of goodness in one’s life and the acknowledgement that such goodness originates at least partially from sources outside the self (Lambert et al., 2009; Lomas et al., 2014). Importantly, we argue that the perceived sources of goodness do not have to be moral agents and can include inanimate objects, nature, or good luck (McAleer, 2012)Footnote 2. Examples of generalized gratitude include being grateful for good weather or for narrowly avoiding an automobile accident due to good luck. At the second level, targeted gratitude includes all the elements of generalized gratitude, but also requires the attribution of one’s benefits to the benevolent, intentional actions of morally agentic benefactors (human beings, God, and perhaps some animals), as well as positive thoughts and emotions about one’s benefactors (Lambert et al., 2009; Roberts, 2014). At the third level, actionable gratitude encompasses all the elements of generalized and targeted gratitude, as well as actions (or at least the desire to enact actions) that convey gratitude to one’s benefactors; such actions include verbal expressions and non-verbal, behavioral expressions of gratitude, such as gifts and acts of service (Navarro & Tudge, 2020)Footnote 3. To illustrate, a child who receives a birthday present from their grandparents may feel grateful toward their grandparents for this gift (targeted gratitude) and respond by saying “thank you” to them and giving them a hug (actionable grateful). Importantly, since actionable gratitude incorporates all the elements of generalized and targeted gratitude, saying “thank you” to another person does not count as actionable gratitude if the expresser does not actually feel grateful to the recipient.

As noted above, we propose that each of these three levels of gratitude reflects varying levels of moral significance. The connection between generalized gratitude and morality is the most tenuous. Of the three levels of gratitude, generalized gratitude has the fewest elements as it does not necessitate attribution to a moral agent. Given the absence of a moral agent, there is no anchor for moral attributions in generalized gratitude; after all, people who do not feel grateful for beautiful scenery or good weather are not typically considered morally reprehensible (Carr, 2013; Navarro & Tudge, 2020). Targeted gratitude is more closely tied to morality than generalized gratitude. Consider a scenario in which Sung is deeply in debt, has no money, and urgently needs $5000 to pay his bills. His good friend José hears about his predicament and genuinely wants to help Sung. José offers to lend him $5000 to be paid back at any time with no interest. If Sung takes José’s money, but feels absolutely no gratitude toward José (i.e., he lacks targeted gratitude), most people would consider Sung morally blameworthy. However, among the three levels of gratitude, only actionable gratitude has the potential to be considered a moral virtue (Tudge & Navarro, 2020). Actionable gratitude has the highest level of moral significance because moral judgments about gratitude are most tightly linked to one’s actions or inaction. Navarro and Tudge persuasively argued that the term ingratitude is typically reserved for situations in which people do not reciprocate their benefactors if the opportunity arises. Put differently, they fail to enact actionable gratitude. Returning to the earlier scenario, suppose that Sung feels grateful to José for his help. Nonetheless, when José subsequently needs a simple favor from him (e.g., to give José a 15-minute ride home when José’s car broke down), Sung flatly refuses, even though he has ample time, energy, and resources to do so. In this scenario, many people would consider Sung’s refusal morally problematic. Sung would be likely characterized as ungrateful even if he feels grateful. Again, we propose that these three levels of gratitude lie on a continuum of moral significance from low (generalized gratitude) to medium (targeted gratitude) to high (actionable gratitude). In the penultimate section of this article, we explore the implications of these differing levels of moral significance for the teaching of gratitude to children.

1.2 Moral Bases of Gratitude

As stated at the beginning of this article, the contextualist morality model consists of three facets, the first being the moral bases of gratitude. By this, we hold that the cultivation of gratitude is supported by a constellation of other moral virtues. In other words, people who possess a certain set of moral virtues are more likely to develop, experience, and express gratitude. We postulate that a specific moral virtue is distinctively relevant for the development of each level of gratitude—namely, humility, empathy, and altruism are uniquely salient to the cultivation of generalized, targeted, and actionable gratitude, respectively. However, since the three levels of gratitude are hierarchically nested (e.g., all the conditions for generalized gratitude are necessary but not sufficient for targeted and actionable gratitude), humility would also be useful for the cultivation of targeted and actionable gratitude, while empathy would also be helpful for the development of actionable gratitude.

1.2.1 Humility and Generalized Gratitude

The moral virtue of humility, which corrects people’s propensity to only prize their own needs by recognizing that others’ interests are as worthy of concern as their own (Wright et al., 2017), is salient to the development of generalized gratitude. Simply put, humble people are more predisposed to feeling grateful for the good things they have received in their lives. Indeed, the close links between gratitude and humility has been supported by both philosophical analysis (McAleer, 2012; Roberts, 2016) and empirical research (Kruse et al., 2014). Several scholars have observed that humility is characterized by an accurate sense of self, including an awareness of one’s limitations, a lack of arrogance and self-focus, and an outward orientation that values others (McElroy-Heltzel et al., 2019; Wright et al., 2017). Other scholars have argued that humble people acknowledge the contributions of good luck to their lives (Murphy, 2017) and their lack of self-sufficiency (Roberts, 2016). Given these perspectives on humility, it is not difficult to see how humility contributes to gratitude. When a person experiences generalized gratitude by appreciating the benefits that originate from sources outside the self (e.g., good luck or nature), they are, at least, implicitly recognizing their finitude and dependence on external sources, which communicates humility (McAleer, 2012). Several studies provide preliminary empirical support for humility’s role in fostering generalized gratitude. In a series of studies, Kruse and colleagues (2014) tested the connections between gratitude and humility. Pre-activity state humility was positively linked to subsequent generalized gratitude after writing a gratitude letter. Likewise, a 14-day daily diary study showed that same-day humility and generalized gratitude mutually predicted each other, while accounting for the prior day’s levels of humility and generalized gratitude. By the same token, Exline (2012) demonstrated that humility was positively related to feeling grateful after participants recalled and described an act of kindness from someone else. Taken together, these findings suggest that people with higher levels of humility may experience an enhanced capacity to experience gratitude (Kruse et al., 2014).

1.2.2 Empathy and Targeted Gratitude

Next, we posit that the moral virtue of empathy uniquely nurtures the development of targeted gratitude (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). In other words, people who are empathic are more likely to feel grateful to others. Empathy consists of both an affective component, in which a person experiences some of the emotions that another person feels, and a cognitive component, whereby a person uses social perspective taking to discerns the thoughts, emotions, and motivations of another person (Gehlbach & Mu, 2023; Simmons, 2014). Moreover, Simmons has argued that empathy is a moral virtue because it is essential for feeling concerned for other people’s welfare and for living an ethical and flourishing life. Empathy facilitates feelings of gratitude to others, because when a benefactor helps another person, they do not always spell out in detail their intentions, motives, and effort expended to provide help. Accordingly, such situations often require the beneficiaries of help to draw inferences about their benefactor and the context surrounding the provision of help.

Several studies have documented a positive association between empathy and gratitude, although these studies used measures of generalized gratitude rather than targeted gratitude (Kim et al., 2018; Lasota et al., 2022). Further empirical evidence for the relevance of empathy can be found in research supporting the social-cognitive theory of gratitude—the idea that people’s targeted gratitude depends on the attributions they make about the help received from others (Tesser et al., 1968; Wood et al., 2008). Correlational and experimental research show that people who believe the benefit they receive is valuable, costly to their benefactor, and altruistically intended by their benefactor, tend to experience more generalized gratitude and targeted gratitude (Wong et al., 2017a, b; Wood et al., 2008). To illustrate, Aaliyah is more likely to be grateful to Cintia for a gift if she strongly values the gift, perceives that Cintia sacrificed a lot to make or buy the gift, and believes that Cintia’s sole motivation for giving the gift is to make Aaliyah happy. Strikingly, among these three attributions, two of them—perceiving the benefactor’s altruistic intentions and cost incurred—appear to reflect the beneficiary’s empathy for their benefactor. When the beneficiary places themselves in the position of the benefactor to experience what the latter might have felt, what could have motivated them to provide the benefit, and the sacrifices they incurred in the process, the beneficiary is essentially demonstrating empathy toward their benefactor, manifested through their experience of targeted gratitude.

1.2.3 Altruism and Actionable Gratitude

If humility and empathy are uniquely salient facilitators of generalized gratitude and targeted gratitude, respectively, we posit that the moral virtue of altruism could be distinctively helpful for the development of actionable gratitude. Altruism refers to a motivation to help others driven by genuine concern for their welfare rather than one’s self interests (Kraut, 2020). Indeed, this definition of altruism closely mirrors the conceptualization of morality used in this article (Haidt, 2008; Murdoch, 2013). Among the three virtues identified in the moral bases of gratitude, empirical support for the facilitative role of altruism is the weakest. One cross-sectional study found a positive correlation between altruism and gratitude, although the authors used a multicomponent measure of gratitude that did not disaggregate among generalized, targeted, and actionable gratitude (Parhi & James, 2023). Indirect conceptual support for the relevance of altruism can be found by analyzing instances in which targeted gratitude fails to translate to actionable gratitude. In this regard, Manela (2019) observed that even when a beneficiary is keenly attuned to the benefactor’s benevolence (targeted gratitude), they sometimes fail to develop the long-term behavioral dispositions that enable them to respond to such benevolence (actionable gratitude). As an analogy, Manela noted that it is not uncommon for people to empathize with abused animals when watching a television commercial, yet they might not develop the long-term dispositions to help such animals that a genuinely altruistic individual possesses. In the same vein, some people who feel grateful to their benefactors might lack the motivational sustenance to translate their positive and empathic regard for their benefactors into action. Accordingly, we theorize that the moral virtue of altruism bridges the gap between grateful feelings and action. People who are highly altruistic are not simply attuned to people’s thoughts, emotions, and motivations, but are strongly and genuinely motivated to do something to promote their welfare. Even in the absence of receiving a benefit from their benefactor, altruistic people seek out opportunities to selflessly help others (Monroe, 2001). Hence, when they feel grateful to someone who has helped them, they can more easily act upon their altruistic disposition to express gratitude in ways that promote their benefactor’s welfare.

1.3 Moral Sensitivity of Gratitude

The second facet of the contextualist morality model addresses the moral sensitivity of gratitude, namely, moral concerns shape people’s (a) experiences of gratitude and (b) their judgments of the appropriateness of gratitude. People’s levels of gratitude in response to receiving help from others are shaped by the perceived morality of the help offered to them and of their helper. A recent study (Yu et al., 2022) revealed that participants felt less grateful when offered immoral help (hel** the beneficiary obtain a medical appointment by canceling the appointment of another patient) or morally neutral help from an immoral benefactor (someone who was unfaithful to their romantic partner). On a similar note, several studies have evinced that the presence of an ulterior or less charitable motive for rendering help (e.g., intention to harm the beneficiary or when the benefactor expects a return favor) undermines the beneficiary’s experience of gratitude (Morgan et al., 2022; Tsang, 2006; Watkins et al., 2006). When benefactors demand that their beneficiaries express gratitude to them, they might, ironically, be signaling that their motives for offering help are not entirely altruistic; correspondingly, their actions are likely to be perceived by their beneficiaries as less morally admirable.

Not only do moral concerns influence people’s experiences of gratitude, but they also shape people’s assessments of the appropriateness of such gratitude. Research has demonstrated that people view those who feel grateful when offered help of an immoral nature as less likeable and more immoral (Yu et al., 2022). Indeed, several scholars have cautioned against the idea that all forms of gratitude are morally good and have recently explored the “dark side” of gratitude (Zhu et al., 2020). Gratitude—especially actionable gratitude—could potentially be conceived as morally inapt under various circumstances, such as, when (a) it promotes or sustains extreme servility (e.g., when a person remains in an abusive relationship because of gratitude to the relationship partner); (b) grateful people incorrectly rank their moral priorities by committing immoral acts to help their benefactors; and (c) gratitude for one’s blessings leads to a form of contentment that engenders a failure to challenge an oppressive system (Jackson, 2016; Löschke, 2021; Manela, 2019; Wood et al., 2016). It is, however, not always easy to assess the moral appropriateness of gratitude when one is faced with conflicting moral virtues (e.g., when reciprocating one’s benefactor would unfairly favor one’s benefactor over another person, thus violating the moral virtue of justice). On this point, Kristjánsson (2022) has promoted the Aristotelian virtue of phronesis, or practical wisdom, to help people identify a moral conflict and to adjudicate between competing moral demands by examining one’s moral identity and deepest held values. From a different cultural standpoint, Yu (2013) has argued that, in contrast to the Aristotelian virtue of phronesis, Confucius’s notion of practical wisdom is based on prioritizing social harmony and interpersonal relations. Future research could address how people from diverse cultures make sense of moral conflicts between gratitude and other moral virtues.

Coming to terms with the moral sensitivity of gratitude is important for understanding the moral virtue of gratitude. A person who strongly exhibits the moral virtue of gratitude does not simply practice indiscriminate gratitude (e.g., I’m grateful for anything and everything!) but is able to discern the moral context of a situation to determine the appropriateness of gratitude experiences and expressions (Emmons, 2020; McConnell, 2021).

1.4 Moral Functions of Gratitude

The third facet of the contextualist morality model explicates the moral functions of gratitude by articulating the moral consequences of experiencing and expressing gratitude. Here, we build on McCullough and colleagues’ (2001) moral affect theory of gratitude, which conceptualizes gratitude as a moral affect, because it is frequently elicited by and fosters moral behavior. McCullough and colleagues proposed three moral functions of gratitude—as a moral barometer, a moral motivator, and a moral reinforcer. Gratitude is a moral barometer because it is a reaction to the perception that one has benefited from another person’s moral actions. As earlier indicated, there is accumulating research indicating that both generalized and targeted gratitude strengthens in tandem with a beneficiary’s increased perceptions that their benefit is valuable, costly to their benefactor, and altruistically intended by their benefactor (Bridger & Lally, 2022; Wong et al., 2017a; Wood et al., 2008).

Additionally, gratitude is a moral motivator in that it motivates grateful people to behave prosocially (McCullough et al., 2001). People who experience gratitude may have increased capacity to return goodness to others even when doing so is costly, perhaps because they are already aware of goodness in their lives, which might generate a form of contentment that enables them to be generous with others (Watkins, 2014).There is compelling evidence indicating that generalized and targeted gratitude (but especially targeted gratitude) is positively associated with prosocial behaviors toward both one’s benefactors (arguably a form of actionable gratitude) and even toward non-benefactors, such as strangers (Bartlett et al., 2012; DeSteno et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2017). More recent research has suggested that the prosocial benefits of gratitude extend beyond the benefactor and beneficiary to witnesses of a gratitude expression. Algoe and colleagues (2020) showed that participants who had witnessed an expression of gratitude became more helpful toward the grateful person.

Gratitude—in particular, actionable gratitude—also functions as a moral reinforcer for benefactors who have received expressions of gratitude from their beneficiaries (McCullough et al., 2001). Because receiving gratitude from another person is typically experienced as pleasant and a social recognition of one’s social worth, research has found, not surprisingly, that people who receive expressions of thanks for their work or help are more likely to assist the person who expressed gratitude to them as well as a different beneficiary (Grant & Gino, 2010; Ni et al., 2022). Beyond the three moral functions of gratitude elucidated by the moral affect theory of gratitude (McCullough et al., 2001), we theorize that gratitude has three additional moral functions—as a moral cultivator, a moral regulator, and a moral blessing.

1.4.1 Gratitude as a Moral Cultivator

We surmise that gratitude functions as a moral cultivator of other moral virtues for both beneficiaries who experience gratitude and benefactors who receive gratitude from their beneficiaries. The distinction between moral behaviors and moral virtues is critical in delineating the differences between the functions of gratitude as a moral motivator and reinforcer, on the one hand, and its role as a moral cultivator, on the other hand. Virtues are habitual ways of being, not just one-time actions (Tudge & Navarro, 2020). Put differently, the salutary moral effects of gratitude might extend beyond the immediate situation involving the benefactor and beneficiary to other contexts. Some evidence for this positive ripple effect is seen in our earlier review of research showing that experiences of gratitude is positively associated with prosocial behaviors, not just toward one’s benefactors, but even toward strangers (also, see Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006). Repeated experiences and expressions of as well as exposure to receiving gratitude may build long-term social-cognitive resources that enable people to engage more consistently in prosocial behaviors with the right motives (Fredrickson, 2004). In this context, Gulliford and Roberts (2018) postulated an other-centered, “allocentric quintet” of moral virtues—gratitude, generosity, compassion, and forgiveness. They theorized that that these virtues are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Perhaps people who repeatedly experience and receive gratitude, might over time, also become more generous, forgiving, and compassionate. In line with this theorizing, Ma and colleagues’ (2017) meta-analysis identified positive links between trait gratitude (typically, generalized gratitude) and prosocial traits in 30 studies (r =.30). Although some of the studies in the meta-analysis included prosocial personality traits (e.g., agreeableness), which are not virtues, other studies included prosocial virtues, such as forgiveness. More research is needed to identify evidence for the role of gratitude as a cultivator of other moral virtues.

1.4.2 Gratitude as a Moral Regulator

Beyond its role in cultivating other moral virtues, we theorize that gratitude also serves as a moral regulator by restraining immoral, especially uncivil, behavior (Wong, 2023). Several experimental, experience sampling, cross-sectional, and longitudinal studies provide evidence that targeted gratitude is tied to lower levels of aggression (Deng et al., 2022). Within romantic relationships, research has indicated that the more individuals perceive their partners express gratitude to them, the weaker the negative effects of attachment avoidance on their relationship satisfaction, suggesting that the receipt of gratitude from partners could be meaningful for insecurely attached individuals in romantic relationships (Park et al., 2019). In another study, palliative professionals reported that receiving gratitude expressions (e.g., through thank-you cards and letters) from their patients and patients’ families was deeply meaningful and enabled them to feel seen and valued (Aparicio et al., 2022). In light of these findings, we argue that the underlying goodness conferred on people who receive authentic expressions of gratitude is the gift of mattering, which involves feeling significant in the eyes of other people (Flett, 2018). People who experience mattering tend to feel valued by others and perceive that they can add value to the lives of others (Prilleltensky, 2020). Put differently, the expression of gratitude, when authentically and effectively communicated, provides recipients of gratitude with a psychological boost by enabling them to feel valued by their beneficiaries and to believe their contributions make a positive difference in the lives of others.

2 Implications of the Contextualist Morality Model for Gratitude Research and Practice

In this penultimate section, we offer several research and practice implications arising from the contextualist morality model. First, several of the propositions we proposed remain untested hypotheses that we encourage researchers to address. To examine the moral bases of gratitude and gratitude’s function as a moral cultivator of other moral virtues, we encourage researchers to use longitudinal analyses to disentangle the temporal sequence of gratitude and other moral virtues. It is quite possible that gratitude and another moral virtue mutually reinforce each other in an upward spiral, such that another moral virtue can be both an antecedent and an outcome of gratitude (Kruse et al., 2014).

Second, to the degree that notions of morality are inherently linked to culture (Wong, 2011), it behooves researchers to investigate cross-cultural differences in how the moral virtue of gratitude is understood. In what contexts is gratitude considered morally appropriate or inapt, and do such judgments vary across culture? How do people in diverse cultures adjudicate conflicts between gratitude and other moral virtues (e.g., justice)? Moreover, although Aristotelian perspectives on virtues have been influential in Western philosophers’ understanding of the moral virtue of gratitude (Kristjánsson, 2015; Navarro & Tudge, 2020), philosophical frameworks from other cultures, such as Confucianism (Yu, 2013), could shed new insights on the interface of gratitude and morality.

Third, the contextualist morality model presents several salient implications for the measurement of gratitude. The most popular measures of gratitude, the Gratitude Questionnaire-6 and the Gratitude Adjective Checklist (McCullough et al., 2002), primarily assess generalized gratitude (although the former includes a few items that seem to address targeted gratitude). However, among the three levels of gratitude, generalized gratitude has the weakest links to morality (Navarro & Tudge, 2020). We, therefore, encourage the development of new measures of actionable gratitude and of people’s receipt of gratitude from others, both of which have stronger levels of moral significance.

Nevertheless, assessing the moral virtue of gratitude presents added complexities because virtues, from an Aristotelian viewpoint, cannot be measured simply as broad tendencies since the moral appropriateness of an action depends on specific contexts—gratitude might be considered inadequate in some situations and excessive in others (Ng & Tay, 2020). Expressing gratitude by showing favoritism to one’s a benefactor might be considered excessive and morally inapt. Unfortunately, conventional Likert-type self-report scales cannot distinguish between a higher level of trait gratitude and too much or inappropriate gratitude (Ng & Tay, 2020). In contrast to this traditional measurement approach, respondents could be asked to rate their own and others’ gratitude-relevant behaviors in a variety of situations using a too-little/too much rating scale, ranging from − 4 (much too little) to 4 (much too much), with 0 representing the optimal amount of gratitude (Kaiser & Kaplan, 2005). Perhaps this methodological strategy could be used to develop new measures of the moral virtue of gratitude.

Fourth, in terms of implications for education, we encourage educators to highlight the status of gratitude as a moral virtue (Navarro & Tudge, 2020). This requires educators to not just explain gratitude’s instrumental value for one’s personal well-being (e.g., being grateful makes you a happier person!) but also its moral value (Gulliford & Morgan, 2021). Children could be taught not just to engage in activities that promote generalized gratitude (e.g., gratitude journaling), but also those that address targeted gratitude and actionable gratitude (e.g., writing gratitude notes to and performing acts of service for one’s benefactors). To illustrate, Froh and colleagues (2014) found evidence that a 5-session benefit appraisal curriculum increased elementary school children’s generalized gratitude, targeted gratitude, and actionable gratitude (writing thank-you cards). While this program is commendable because the curriculum trains children in the social-cognitive processes that elicit gratitude to other people, we believe it could be augmented by emphasizing gratitude’s function as a moral blessing—that is, expressing gratitude to one’s benefactors is the right thing to do because it contributes to their well-being. Moreover, consistent with our contextualist view of moral virtues, gratitude should be taught alongside other moral virtues (e.g., justice) and, at age-appropriate levels, children and adolescents could be invited to consider when gratitude is appropriate or inapt (Jackson, 2016).

Fifth, to effectively harness the functions of gratitude as a moral blessing, more work is needed on gratitude interventions that facilitate actionable gratitude. However, most gratitude interventions are self-help activities, which aligns with a neoliberalist ideology that accentuates people’s personal responsibility for their own well-being. Furthermore, the most widely studied gratitude intervention—gratitude journaling (Davis et al., 2016)—focuses mostly on cultivating generalized gratitude. By contrast, group-based gratitude interventions may provide an ideal forum for participants to practice promoting each other’s sense of mattering through authentic interpersonal expressions of gratitude (Li et al., 2024; Wong, 2023). In such interventions, participants meet on a regular basis in small groups (e.g., about eight group members), and group activities include opportunities for participants to practice expressing gratitude to each other (Wong et al., 2017). Moreover, if actionable gratitude functions as a moral blessing on gratitude recipients, then researchers need to study its impact on such recipients, not just on the expressers of gratitude. To illustrate, we know far more about the psychological effects of writing gratitude letters on the letter writers (Kirca et al., 2023) than on the recipients of such letters. It is crucial to understand how and when gratitude expressions optimally confer a sense of mattering and other psychological benefits on gratitude recipients (Pandelios & Wong, 2023).

Sixth, to the extent that people from marginalized backgrounds (e.g., people with low socioeconomic backgrounds) lack a sense of mattering (Scarpa et al., 2022), heartfelt expressions of gratitude to such people for their contributions could serve social justice ideals by communicating that they are valued and that their contributions have not been taken for granted. For example, in workplace settings, supervisors could be more intentional about expressing gratitude to their employees (Fehr et al., 2017), particularly those in lower-paid, non-managerial positions whose contributions are vital, yet often undervalued. Nonetheless, although many organizations incorporate institutionalized gratitude programs, they can backfire if they are perceived by employees as contrived or simply serving the instrumental aim of preventing employees from resigning (Fehr et al., 2017). By contrast, a socially just and morally virtuous gratitude initiative may include opportunities for supervisors to spend time observing the work of their employees, so that they can genuinely and empathetically appreciate their efforts and contributions. Supervisors could then practice actionable gratitude by verbally expressing authentic and personalized gratitude to their employees as well as providing tangible benefits to them (e.g., by nominating them for awards or advocating for higher salaries).

Finally, although our article addresses the psychology of gratitude, some of the propositions we have proposed can, with modifications, be applied to other virtues, especially prosocial virtues, such as forgiveness, empathy, and altruism. For example, there is a robust line of research showing that forgiveness is positively associated with the forgiver’s subjective well-being (Gao et al., 2022). On this basis, forgiveness has been promoted as a positive psychology activity that promotes the forgiver’s well-being (Lundahl et al., 2008). Yet if psychologists value the moral significance of forgiveness, then the goal of forgiveness is not simply to feel better but to do good. Accordingly, forgiveness research and interventions could emphasize communicating forgiveness as a means of promoting others’ welfare and seeking other people’s forgiveness for one’s own transgressions.

3 Conclusion

In this article, we proposed the contextualist morality model of gratitude to explore the interface of morality and gratitude. Our model foregrounds a contextualist view by situating gratitude within a constellation of other related virtues. Within the model, we elucidated the moral bases, moral sensitivity, and moral functions of gratitude. We hope this model will stimulate new and novel lines of research and practice that foreground the moral significance of gratitude. In essence, gratitude can be a force for good that benefits others and society, not just one’s personal well-being. If morality is concerned with transcending one’s self-interests and promoting other people’s welfare (Haidt, 2008; Murdoch, 2013), positive psychologists, by taking seriously the moral dimensions of the good life, can offer the world a positive vision of wellness characterized by mutual care and interconnectedness.