Abstract
The Reserve Bank of India often claims that the official intervention in the foreign exchange market primarily aims at minimizing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate and this study is an attempt to explore the success story of such interventions. Although the stylized facts seem to indicate that maintaining adequate amount of official reserves help reduce the volatility, the marginal benefit of adding reserves in terms of containing excessive volatility declines as the level of reserve holding increases beyond certain threshold level. The evidence from a threshold vector autoregression model suggest that the response of exchange rate volatility is conditional upon the size of intervention and whether the level of reserve holdings is above or below certain threshold level. While the official purchase of foreign exchange reduces the variability of exchange rate, official sale seems to trigger volatility irrespective of whether reserve holding is above or below the threshold level. Further, a positive shock to absolute official sale (purchase) could reduce the pace of depreciation (appreciation) although it could not revert the direction of exchange rate. These evidences exemplify the fact that intervention cannot prevent exchange rate volatility from rising rather it can only moderate.
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Data availability
The time series data are collected from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy published by the Reserve Bank of India.
Notes
The measure of reserves that we consider excludes gold.
First, there are monetary losses in opportunity cost sense and the possible loss arising out of valuation changes. Baker and Walentine (2001) report an opportunity cost of 10–20 percent while Rodrik (2006) report that it is 1 per cent of GDP for develo** countries. Rajan (2002) has produced some estimates ranging from 0.3 to 1 percent of GDP for five crises affected economies in East Asia in 1999. A recent study by Adler et al. (2021) reports estimates that ranges from 0.2 to 0.7 percentage of GDP per year in countries with limited intervention while reaching 0.3–1.2 percentage of GDP per year in heavy-intervening economies. The estimates for India indicate that there is a rise in the cost of holding reserves from 0.51 percent of GDP in 2001-02 to 1.24 percent in 2007–08 (Mishra and Sharma 2011). Second, there are certain macroeconomic adjustment costs associated with heightened reserve holdings; running down reserves, if warranted, might result in undue appreciation of domestic currency which can conflict with other economic objectives (Willett (1980) and as a consequence, countries cannot reduce them even if they move into a flexible exchange rate regime (Sula 2011). Further, there are cost arising out of sterilization of capital inflows; moral hazards; and also, high reserve holding might reflect insurance against weak domestic fundamentals and high political uncertainty (Kapur and Patel 2003). Moreover, Ramachandran (2004) demonstrates that the opportunity cost impacted the reserve demand more significantly than other conventional determinants.
See Heller (1968) for a detailed exposition of this issue.
See Flenders (1971) for a detailed discussion on the importance of all these factors that determine the transaction demand for reserves.
There are evidences to show that rise in the volatility of cross-border capital flows subject to sudden stops/reversal are largely responsible for reserve accumulation in emerging economies (Calvo,1998; Flood and Marion 2002; Edwards 2004; Aizenman and Marion 2004; Aizenman and Lee 2005; and Arslan and Carlos 2019).
Cumulatively, high reserve holding countries have run down reserves to 3 percent of GDP while reserve depletion with low reserve holding countries is found to be 0.98 percent of GDP.
Reserve as import cover is considered relevant for countries with least transactions on capital account and three months coverage was used as a benchmark. However, with growing integration of financial markets across the world, the relevance of this measure is questioned and as a result, six months import coverage is considered as a threshold level. The ratio of short-term external debt to reserves is used as an indicator of crisis risk and played significant role in determining the adequacy of reserves especially in those countries with larger short-term cross-border financial transactions. In this context, the adequacy is widely determined by Greenspan-Guidotti rule, which states that the stock of reserves at any point in time must be 100% of short-term external debt.
Albania, Argentina, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Gabon, Georgia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, North Macedonia, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Seychelles, South Africa, Thailand, Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay.
The relevance of a number of control variables which could have impacted the exchange rate volatility are tested using block exogeneity test and only those turned out to be important are consider in the model.
Monthly data on import is used as an indicator variable for interpolation.
The response of volatility to negative shocks in most cases is found to be symmetric to the responses of volatility to positive shocks.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dr. D. Sambandhan and Dr. N. R. Bhanumurthy for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks are also due to Dr. Hersch Sahay, Keerthana Sunny George and Namshad for technical support.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Objectives of Official Intervention
Name of the countries | Objectives |
---|---|
China | To keep the exchange rate stable at an adaptive and an equilibrium level |
Japan | To stabilize the value of the exchange rate |
Switzerland | To align the exchange rate in line with monetary policy to influence the monetary conditions |
Euro area | To maintain price stability |
India | To avoid undue fluctuations in exchange rate |
Taiwan | To avoid fluctuations in exchange rate arising out of seasonal and irregular events |
Russia | To support financial stability and to service external debt for several years, even in times of distress |
Hongkong | To fix the exchange rate |
Korea | To ensure stability in the foreign exchange market |
Saudi Arabia | To fix the exchange rate |
Singapore | To fix the exchange rate |
Brazil | To contain disorderly movements of the exchange rate |
US | To counter disorderly market conditions |
Thailand | To accumulate reserves which help in fulfilling the monetary and exchange rate policies |
Israel | To meet external obligations, counter forex market crises and improve the country’s financial credibility |
Mexico | To contain exchange rate volatility and thereby ensure financial stability |
United Kingdom | To check undue fluctuations in the exchange rate |
Czech Republic | To be used as an instrument of monetary policy |
Poland | To curtail excess exchange rate volatility |
Indonesia | To counter demand and supply mismatches in the forex market which help in achieving exchange rate stability as well as currency liquidity simultaneously |
United Arab Emirates | To fix the exchange rate |
Malaysia | To reduce undue exchange rate volatility, secure orderly conditions in the forex market |
Vietnam | To maintain stability and control inflation |
Canada | To promote orderly market conditions for the national currency |
Philippines | To bring in monetary stability, check excessive exchange market speculation and to reduce sudden and sharp capital movements |
Norway | To curb excess volatility of the exchange rate |
Appendix B
The construct of weekly time varying conditional volatility of percentage change in ₹/$ exchange rate is obtained using the following EGARCH specification:
where \({\widehat{\rm E}}_{t}\) is weekly percentage change in ₹/$ exchange rate. The p-values in parentheses indicate that all the coefficients, excepting constant in the mean equation, are found to be statistically significant. The estimated \({\chi }^{2}\) statistic is found to be 5.067 with a p-value of 0.16; suggesting that the null of no autocorrelation in the standardized residuals (\({\nu }_{t}\)) upto a lag order of 4 can be accepted. The F-statistic to test the null that there is no remaining ARCH effect upto 4th lag in the square of the standardized residuals is estimated to be 0.571 with a p-value of 0.68; suggesting that the EGARCH specification is appropriate to model exchange rate volatility.
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Ramachandran, M. Official Intervention, Reserve Accumulation and Exchange Rate Volatility. J. Quant. Econ. 21, 269–287 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40953-023-00344-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40953-023-00344-z