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To Get Rich is Glorious: Private Entrepreneurs in China’s Anti-Poverty Campaign

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Abstract

This article examines the role of private entrepreneurs in China’s state-sponsored poverty alleviation campaign. Focusing on the Guangcai Program (guangcai shiye), which was initiated in the early 1990s and rejuvenated in the **’s era, the article explores private entrepreneurs’ different motivations, resources and strategies to participate in the campaign as well as the state’s counter-measures. Based on field observations and surveys in Shandong for three years, the article demonstrates that the variety among China’s new rich, particularly in terms of business scale, family background, and political connection, has largely forged the approach entrepreneurs participate in the program and its divergent ultimate effects. It also shows that the Chinese state can timely adapt its tactics, according to the local environment and features of entrepreneurs, to mobilize all potential resources into the campaign. The findings of this article have great implications for understanding the success of China's recent poverty alleviation campaign and the complexity of state-business relations.

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Notes

  1. See http://www.acfic.org.cn/yw/qlyw/202011/t20201113_248054.html (accessed January 10, 2021).

  2. See http://www.xinhuanet.com/finance/2021-01/08/c_1126959237.htm (accessed January 10, 2021).

  3. See http://www.acfic.org.cn/yw/qlyw/202011/t20201113_248054.html (accessed January 10, 2021).

  4. For an important exception, see Kellee (2005).

  5. They are G County, L County and S County. In 2019, their basic socioeconomic situations were: G County (population: 793,100, GDP: 20.588 billion yuan), L County (population: 759,100, GDP: 23.325 billion yuan) and S County (population: 982,700, GDP: 21.321 billion yuan).

  6. See http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201911/t20191127_1712252.html (accessed January 10, 2021).

  7. See https://www.unido.org/our-focus/advancing-economic-competitiveness/competitive-trade-capacities-and-corporate-responsibility/corporate-social-responsibility-market-integration/what-csr(accessed January 10, 2021).

  8. China's first large-scale poverty alleviation campaign began in 1986. At that time, the central government identified 331 poor counties across the country, which received most of the transfer payments.

  9. Prior to this, the Chinese government had just released its first poverty alleviation plan, aiming to lift 80 million people out of poverty from 1994 to mid-2000. Therefore, by proposing Guangcai Program, these entrepreneurs signaled that they were responding to the needs of the government.

  10. Under the influence of orthodox socialist ideology, ordinary Chinese mass in the 1980s always discriminated against private entrepreneurs and regarded them as “disgraceful bourgeoisie.” See Susan (1995).

  11. See http://www.cspgp.org.cn/category/about/1(accessed January 10, 2021).

  12. As of 2019, there were 8 full-time staff in CSPGP, and the total expenditure for staff salary, welfare and daily administrative affairs was 3.3379 million RMB. See http://www.cspgp.org.cn/showtime/indexnewsshow/31066/97(accessed January 10, 2021).

  13. Usually, the party secretary of the ACFIC serves as the president of CSPGP, while the executive work is jointly undertaken by a vice president of ACFIC and a director of the Central United Front Department.

  14. See http://ccn.people.com.cn/n/2014/0425/c366510-24943962.html(accessed January 10, 2021).

  15. The official name of this project is “Ten thousand enterprises aiding ten thousand villages” (wanqi bang wancun, TEATV), which is the most important work of the CSPGP in recent years. For the details of this project, see http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/202012/24/c_578298.htm(accessed January 10, 2021).

  16. During the revolutionary period before 1949, L City was part of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan border area controlled by the Communist Party. As a compensation of some sort, after 1949, the CCP has always delivered more generous policies to the old revolutionary areas than other ordinary poor areas.

  17. Interview with a FIC official, in S County, June 25, 2018.

  18. Before 2016, the FIC in L City and each district had a staff member responsible for the Guangcai Program. After 2016, due to the increased workload and tight schedule, almost all staff of the FIC began to undertake the task of poverty alleviation.

  19. Interview with a FIC official, in L City, June 27, 2018.

  20. Interview with an owner of a construction material factory in S County, June 25, 2018.

  21. Interview with the owner of a real estate firm in L City, August 26, 2017.

  22. Interview with a FIC official, in G County, August 22, 2016.

  23. Internal case set compiled by the local FIC of L City in 2015 and interview with a united front department official in G County, June 26, 2018.

  24. Interview with the owner of a textile company, L County, August 11, 2017. Another entrepreneur has similar expressions – the owner of a fruit processing company, G County, May 28, 2019.

  25. Interview with the owner of a real estate firm in L County, August 26, 2017.

  26. Interview with the owner of a real estate firm in L County, August 26, 2017.

  27. Interview with the CEO of the tractor enterprise in S County, August 2, 2018.

  28. Interview with the manager of a dried vegetable firm in G County, February 25, 2019, and a FIC official of G County, February 25, 2019.

  29. Interview with a glasses manufacturer in L County August 22, 2018. The owner of a firefighting equipment firm in L City expressed similar feeling, December 7 2016. Both of them are local PPCC members.

  30. Interview with the owner of a software firm in L City, August 18 2017; interview with the manager of an auto repair company in S County, August 21 2017; interview with the CEO of a social service agency, May 26 2019.

  31. This expression was mentioned by both an entrepreneur in L County, and a local official in the municipal government.

  32. Interview with a supermarket owner in L City, August 23, 2018.

  33. Interview with a local ceramic tile producer in L City, May 26, 2019.

  34. Quite a number of young entrepreneurs of small-scaled firms mentioned “Buddhist-style” donation in the interviews in 2018 and 2019. e.g. a hotel manager in L City, August 21, 2017; the owner of a network support firm in S County, August 19, 2017; a glasses shop owner in L County, August 22, 2018.

  35. For example, in June 2017, President ** hosted a symposium in Bei**g on poverty eradication in deep poverty areas. Shortly after that, the FIC of L City organized a forum for local entrepreneurs studying **'s speech.

  36. During our fieldwork, many interviewed entrepreneurs complained that there were too many such meetings to attend, organized by the governments of different levels.

  37. Interview with the owner of a cement firm, in G County, January 26, 2019.

  38. In the full score of 100 points, whether to participate in the Guangcai Program accounts for 10 points.

  39. Interview with a glasses manufacturer in L County, January 22, 2019. Another entrepreneur of a cement firm attributed his failure of gaining any political post as “not knowing how to donate”, January 26, 2019.

  40. It could be as low as one tenth of the market price, according to the municipal FIC officials, August 20, 2017.

  41. Interview with a FIC official, in L city, June 27, 2018.

  42. For large-scale projects, there is usually a municipal leader responsible for contacting the enterprises. The leader would visit businesses regularly and help solve problems on the spot.

  43. Interview with a FIC official, in L city, June 27, 2018.

  44. Interview with the manager of a pharmaceutical firm in L County, July 30, 2018.

  45. Interview with the software producer in L City, August 18, 2017.

  46. Interview with the manager of a retail company in L City, June 22, 2018; interview with the owner of a bearing manufacturing factory in L County, February 22, 2019.

  47. See http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2020/0615/c1001-31746605.html(accessed January 5, 2021).

  48. Regarding the issue of the possible selection bias, first, as one of the first places to implement Guangcai Program in China, L municipal government has frequently organized charitable activities in the name of Guangcai in the past over two decades. Therefore, no matter the Guangcai Program, or the current TEATV program, over 90% of private enterprises have more or less attended. Second, what we focus on in this study is the diversified motives and behaviors of entrepreneurs who have attended the poverty-alleviation program, not the whole population of private entrepreneurs. Therefore, even we missed those who have never attended, the findings on the taxonomy would not be much affected. Lastly, although two thirds are contacted by FIC officials, not all of them are government-friendly. In the fieldwork, we find some talk as boldly as those contacted by us. However, since this survey only contains 30 entrepreneurs, we could not claim the percentage for each type is representative.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Professor Yan **aojun, the editor Dr. Wang Zhongyuan, and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful feedback and comments on the earlier draft of this article. All errors are our own.

Funding

The authors acknowledge the support of the National Social Science Fund of China (No. 19CZZ006) and Shanghai Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science (No. 2018EZZ003).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Government, Nan**g University, 163 **anlin Ave, Nan**g, P. R. China

    Jie Huang

  2. School of Public Economics & Administration, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics, 777 Guoding Road, Shanghai, P. R. China

    Ge **n

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Contributions

Jie Huang is an assistant professor of political science at the School of Government, Nan**g University. His research revolves around comparative political economy in transitional countries, especially Chinese business politics and youth politics. His works have been published or are forthcoming in The China Review, The Journal of Contemporary China and other Chinese journals. Ge **n is an associate professor of politics and public administration at the School of Public Economics and Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His research focuses on local governance, state-business relation, and comparative political institutions and has been published in journals such as The China Review, Corporate Governance, Democratization, Journal of Contemporary China and Policy and Politics.

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Correspondence to Ge **n.

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Appendices

Appendix

Note on Fieldwork

The empirical materials for this study mainly originate from our 3-year field work in L City of Shandong Province (2016–2019). The main part of the fieldwork was completed from August 2017 to August 2018, accompanied by several return visits. L City, which has 8 counties/districts, was selected mainly due to local contact and access. In North China, L City is a typical poor area in terms of economic growth, industrialization and private economic development. In order to improve the generality of our findings, we randomly selected three different counties as the main sites for field work: G County, L County, and S County. Fieldwork included archival research at the municipal archives, face-to-face interviews with private entrepreneurs and officials, and on-site visits to demonstrating projects. Among the 30 entrepreneurs interviewed, 2/3 were arranged by the local FICs, and 1/3 were contacted by ourselves.Footnote 48 The sample covered entrepreneurs of different ages, business sizes, industries and political connections. The complete list of interviewed entrepreneurs is shown in Table A1. The officials interviewed came from departments related to private economy, such as the FIC, the UFD, the Administration for Market Regulation, and the Taxation Bureau.

Table A1 The List of Interviewed Entrepreneurs
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Huang, J., **n, G. To Get Rich is Glorious: Private Entrepreneurs in China’s Anti-Poverty Campaign. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 27, 271–294 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-021-09773-0

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