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Rebuttal to Douglas and Elliott
In “Should We Strive to Make Science Bias‑Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis”, I argue that the problem of bias in...
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Bridgman and the normative independence of science: an individual physicist in the shadow of the bomb
Physicist Percy Bridgman has been taken by Heather Douglas to be an exemplar defender of an untenable value-free ideal for science. This picture is...
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Should We Strive to Make Science Bias-Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis
Recently, many scientists have become concerned about an excessive number of failures to reproduce statistically significant effects. The situation...
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The social contract for science and the value-free ideal
While the Value-Free Ideal (VFI) had many precursors, it became a solidified bulwark of normative claims about scientific reasoning and practice in...
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Science, responsibility, and the philosophical imagination
If we cannot define science using only analysis or description, then we must rely on imagination to provide us with suitable objects of philosophical...
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Addressing the Reproducibility Crisis: A Response to Hudson
In this response to Robert Hudson’s article, “Should We Strive to Make Science Bias-Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis,”...
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Objectivity, value-free science, and inductive risk
In this paper I shall defend the idea that there is an abstract and general core meaning of objectivity, and what is seen as a variety of concepts or...
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The Value-Free Ideal of Science: A Useful Fiction? A Review of Non-epistemic Reasons for the Research Integrity Community
Even if the “value-free ideal of science” (VFI) were an unattainable goal, one could ask: can it be a useful fiction, one that is beneficial for the...
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Epistemic Values from a Naturalistic Perspective
Explanations are in my view answers to explanatory questions. Such answers may deliver knowledge but also understanding which has a different...
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From epistemology to policy: reorienting philosophy courses for science students
Philosophy of science has traditionally focused on the epistemological dimensions of scientific practice at the expense of the ethical and political...
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Values, bias and replicability
The Value-free ideal of science (VFI) is a view that claims that scientists should not use non-epistemic values when they are justifying their...
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The Risks of Evolutionary Explanation
Evolutionary explanations of behavior are special in that they involve both proximate and ultimate components. Proximately, evolutionary accounts...
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Non-epistemic values and scientific assessment: an adequacy-for-purpose view
The literature on values in science struggles with questions about how to describe and manage the role of values in scientific research. We argue...
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Data Alteration
Data alteration requires consideration of: what are data, when should they be available and what is their quality. Alteration may be intended or...
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Scientific progress, normative discussions, and the pragmatic account of definitions of life
Discussions on the status of definitions of life have long been dominated by a position known as definitional pessimism. Per the definitional...