Abstract
In this response to Robert Hudson’s article, “Should We Strive to Make Science Bias-Free? A Philosophical Assessment of the Reproducibility Crisis,” we identify three ways in which he misrepresents our work: (1) he conflates value-ladenness with bias; (2) he describes our view as one in which values are the same as evidential factors; and (3) he creates a false dichotomy between two ways that values could be considered in science for policy. We share Hudson’s concerns about promoting scientific reproducibility and reducing bias in science, but we reject his view that the value-free ideal provides helpful guidance for addressing these issues.
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27 May 2022
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Douglas, H., Elliott, K.C. Addressing the Reproducibility Crisis: A Response to Hudson. J Gen Philos Sci 53, 201–209 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09606-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09606-5