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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    A Network Centrality Game for Epidemic Control

    Many epidemic networks admit the partition of the population into three compartments of respective susceptible, infected, and removed individuals. These epidemics involve a conflict between the agent who is pr...

    Olivier Tsemogne, Willie Kouam, Ahmed H. Anwar in Decision and Game Theory for Security (2023)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Asymmetric Centrality Game Against Network Epidemic Propagation

    The Mirai botnet network epidemic discovered in 2016 falls into the category of numerous epidemics propagated by attackers over a network to gain control over multiple devices. This particular epidemic has bee...

    Willie Kouam, Yezekael Hayel, Gabriel Deugoué in Decision and Game Theory for Security (2023)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Optimizing Intrusion Detection Systems Placement Against Network Virus Spreading Using a Partially Observable Stochastic Minimum-Threat Path Game

    Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are security tools that aim to detect tentative of virus propagation between two interconnected devices. As the propagation of a virus or malware is dynamic and can be strateg...

    Olivier Tsemogne, Yezekael Hayel, Charles Kamhoua in Decision and Game Theory for Security (2023)

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    Article

    A Partially Observable Stochastic Zero-sum Game for a Network Epidemic Control Problem

    The mathematical theory of epidemics borrows its fundamental notions from epidemiology. These notions encompass the division of the population of individuals into compartments and thereafter the classification...

    Olivier Tsemogne, Yezekael Hayel, Charles Kamhoua in Dynamic Games and Applications (2022)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Partially Observable Stochastic Games for Cyber Deception Against Network Epidemic

    A Decentralized Denial of Service is an attack done by an agent capable to control the spread of a malware. This is a combination of epidemiological and conflictual aspects between several decision makers. The...

    Olivier Tsemogne, Yezekael Hayel, Charles Kamhoua in Decision and Game Theory for Security (2020)