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  1. No Access

    Article

    Production, interest, and saving in deterministic economies with additive endowments

    Stationary equilibria are constructed for a series of nonstochastic production economies in which the decisions of producers, wage earners, shareholders, and savers modulate, via a “production function”, the e...

    I. Karatzas, M. Shubik, W. D. Sudderth in Economic Theory (2006)

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    Article

    A Stochastic Overlap** Generations Economy with Inheritance

    An overlap** generations model of an exchange economy with two sources of uncertainty is considered. Individuals have a finite expected life span and uncertain annual income. Conditions concerning birth, dea...

    I. Karatzas, M. Shubik, W. Sudderth in Journal of Economics (2002)

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    Article

    Book Reviews

    M. Shubik in Journal of Economics (2002)

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    Article

    Book reviews

    C. Seidl, D. Archibugi, M. Shubik, M. Peitz, D. Lévy, J. R. Lothian… in Journal of Economics (2001)

  5. No Access

    Article

    Book reviews

    M. Shubik, G. R. Uhlich, M. C. Kemp, W. Enders, U. Kamecke… in Journal of Economics (1997)

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    Book reviews

    B. P. Priddat, G. Tullock, M. Shubik, S. M. Sheffrin in Journal of Economics (1993)

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    Article

    Book reviews

    Karen Ehlers, M. Shubik, R. Gardner, G. Tichy, N. Van Long… in Journal of Economics (1993)

  8. No Access

    Article

    Classification of two-person ordinal bimatrix games

    The set of possible outcomes of a strongly ordinal bimatrix games is studied by imbedding each pair of possible payoffs as a point on the standard two-dimensional integral lattice. In particular, we count the ...

    I. Bárány, Dr. J. Lee, M. Shubik in International Journal of Game Theory (1992)

  9. No Access

    Chapter

    The Reconciliation of Micro and Macro Economics

    It is suggested that the appropriate structure for the reconciliation of micro and macroeconomics is an infinite horizon overlap** generations (OLG) model with many finitely lived natural persons and one inf...

    M. Shubik in Rational Interaction (1992)

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    Article

    Book reviews

    M. Shubik, G. van der Laan, I. Kubin, E. Dietzenbacher, K. Spremann… in Journal of Economics (1991)

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    Book reviews

    M. Shubik, K. Okuguchi, K. Borchardt, F. Schneider in Journal of Economics (1990)

  12. No Access

    Chapter

    The Uses, Value and Limitations of Game Theoretic Methods in Defence Analysis

    An overview of the applications of the theory of games to defence analysis is given. The important distinction is made between those models of conflict which can be adequately modelled as two-person constant-s...

    M. Shubik in Peace, Defence and Economic Analysis (1987)

  13. No Access

    Article

    A note on the “corelessness” or antibalance of a game

    M. Shubik, S. Weber in International Journal of Game Theory (1986)

  14. No Access

    Article

    Book reviews

    It is a pleasure to read this book. The state of art for Newton-type methods is given. It is strongly recommended also for teaching purposes. Numerical analysis is presented in an optimal way including both th...

    J. G. Shanthikumar, A. Luhmer, H. Kremar, U. Faigle… in Zeitschrift für Operations Research (1985)

  15. No Access

    Article

    Buchbesprechungen

    M. Shubik, Peter Schönfeld, K. Conrad, G. Tillmann… in Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie (1982)

  16. No Access

    Article

    Logrolling and budget allocation games

    In this paper we approach the concept of logrolling by examining a voting system where choices are made among sets of competing projects as a game in characteristic function form. We translate the question: “W...

    M. Shubik, L. Van der Heyden in International Journal of Game Theory (1978)

  17. No Access

    Article

    The assignment game I: The core

    The assignment game is a model for a two-sided market in which a product that comes in large, indivisible units (e.g., houses, cars, etc.) is exchanged for money, and in which each participant either supplies ...

    L. S. Shapley, M. Shubik in International Journal of Game Theory (1971)

  18. No Access

    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Welfare, Economic Structure and Game Theoretic Solutions

    The concept of solution to an n-person game is discussed. Six solutions are defined and interpreted in terms of social desiderata. These properties include efficiency, decentralization, social stability, fair ...

    M. Shubik in New Methods of Thought and Procedure (1967)