Scrutinizing Science
Empirical Studies of Scientific Change
Chapter
The philosophy of science is generally understood to have two broad branches, one dealing with the conceptual foundations of the sciences and the other with the certification of the knowledge claims of the sci...
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Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, scientific opinion concerning the structure of the cosmos was deeply polarized; numerous “systems of the world” found their advocates among prominent natura...
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(One of the recurrent foci in David Hull’s research has been the character of history, especially history of science. He has, indeed, been an eloquent defender of enlightened whiggism in history of science dur...
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During the last quarter century, the theory of scientific methodology has come in for more than its share of drubbing from a variety of sources. Polanyi, Quine, Hesse, Kuhn, Wittgenstein, and a host of others ...
Book
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This essay is written as a dialogue between a relativist and his critic. It does not focus on all species of relativism (e.g., I do not directly address here either ontological relativism, cultural relativism ...
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Science is accorded high value in our culture because, unlike many other intellectual endeavors, it appears capable of producing increasingly reliable knowledge. During the last quarter century a group of hist...
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Intuitionistic meta-methodologies, which abound in recent philosophy of science, take the criterion of success for theories of scientific rationality to be whether those theories adequately explicate our intui...
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For centuries, philosophers of science have regarded their primary role as that of identifying and justifying the methodological rules which inform and shape the learning and testing techniques of the sciences...
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After several decades of benign neglect, the content of science has once again come under the scrutinous gaze of the sociologist of knowledge. Aberrant Marxists, structuralists, Habermasians, ‘archeologists of kn...
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We live in a society which sets great store by science. Scientific ‘experts’ play a privileged role in many of our institutions, ranging from the courts of law to the corridors of power. At a more fundamental ...
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Book
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This short chapter addresses itself to two of the more puzzling features of the historical development of the philosophy of science; first, why did it take so long for philosophers of science to bring the tech...
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This book consists of a collection of essays written between 1965 and 1981. Some have been published elsewhere; others appear here for the first time. Although dealing with different figures and different peri...
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It has long been common for scholars to maintain that the science of Galileo posed most of the central philosophical and methodological problems for early modern philosophy. Historians as diverse in orientatio...
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It is difficult to find a problem area in the philosophy of science about which more rubbish has been talked and in which more confusion reigns than ‘the philosophy of discovery’. It is even hard to keep the c...
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In its most general form, the thesis of this chapter can be succinctly put: we have brought to the writing of the history of methodology certain preconceptions which jointly render it almost impossible to unde...