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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions

    In this paper we consider the problem of designing a mechanism for double auctions where bidders each bid to buy or sell one unit of a single commodity. We assume that each bidder’s utility value for the item ...

    Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline in Algorithms — ESA 2002 (2002)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    On the Many Faces of Block Codes

    Block codes are first viewed as finite state automata represented as trellises. A technique termed subtrellis overlaying is introduced with the object of reducing decoder complexity. Necessary and sufficient c...

    Kaustubh Deshmukh, Priti Shankar, Amitava Dasgupta, B. Sundar Rajan in STACS 2000 (2000)