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Chapter and Conference Paper
Value-Based Preference Aggregation Argument Framework and Its Application
In this paper, a value-based preference graph G of a decision-making problem is presented by using a method similar to Borda-counting to quantify the preferences of agents holding different values for the alterna...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
A Plausibility Model for Regret Games
In this paper we develop a plausibility model by defining a new notion of rationality based on the assumption that a player believes that she doesn’t play a regret dominated strategy. Especially, we show that ...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
A New Epistemic Logic Model of Regret Games
To many real-life games, the algorithm of Iterated Eliminating Regret-dominated Strategies (IERS) can find solutions that are consistent with experimental observations, which have been proved to be problematic...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
A Unified Epistemic Analysis of Iterated Elimination Algorithms from Regret Viewpoint
In this paper, we re-explain four types of players’ rationality from the viewpoint of strategy-choosing regret, and we provide a unified logic of epistemic characterization of the four iterated elimination alg...
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Article
A method for solving Nash equilibria of games based on public announcement logic
Describing the interactional behavior of rational agents and seeking equilibria are two main domains of game theory. The epistemic foundation of the above two domains is based on the assumption that all player...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Characterizations of Iterated Admissibility Based on PEGL
Iterated dominance is perhaps the most basic principle in game theory. The epistemic foundation of this principle is based on the assumption that all players are rational. The main contribution of this paper i...