-
Chapter and Conference Paper
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core—the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, so...
-
Chapter and Conference Paper
Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games
A key solution concept in cooperative game theory is the core. The core of an expense sharing game contains stable allocations of the total cost to the participating players, such that each subset of players p...
-
Chapter and Conference Paper
Reliability Weighted Voting Games
We examine agent failures in weighted voting games. In our cooperative game model, R-WVG, each agent has a weight and a survival probability, and the value of an agent coalition is the probability that its sur...
-
Chapter and Conference Paper
Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics
We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitio...
-
Chapter and Conference Paper
Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games with Super-Increasing Weights
Weighted voting games (WVGs) are a class of cooperative games that capture settings of group decision making in various domains, such as parliaments or committees. Earlier work has revealed that the effective ...