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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Reliability Weighted Voting Games

    We examine agent failures in weighted voting games. In our cooperative game model, R-WVG, each agent has a weight and a survival probability, and the value of an agent coalition is the probability that its sur...

    Yoram Bachrach, Nisarg Shah in Algorithmic Game Theory (2013)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics

    We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitio...

    Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos, Milan Vojnović in Algorithmic Game Theory (2014)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games with Super-Increasing Weights

    Weighted voting games (WVGs) are a class of cooperative games that capture settings of group decision making in various domains, such as parliaments or committees. Earlier work has revealed that the effective ...

    Yoram Bachrach, Yuval Filmus, Joel Oren, Yair Zick in Algorithmic Game Theory (2016)