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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Achieving Allocatively-Efficient and Strongly Budget-Balanced Mechanisms in the Network Flow Domain for Bounded-Rational Agents

    Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms are a well-known framework for finding a solution to a distributed optimization problem in systems of self-interested agents. VCG mechanisms have received wide attention ...

    Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein in Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Design… (2006)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games

    A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core—the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, so...

    Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii Pasechnik… in Algorithmic Game Theory (2009)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games

    A key solution concept in cooperative game theory is the core. The core of an expense sharing game contains stable allocations of the total cost to the participating players, such that each subset of players p...

    Reshef Meir, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein in Algorithmic Game Theory (2010)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Reliability Weighted Voting Games

    We examine agent failures in weighted voting games. In our cooperative game model, R-WVG, each agent has a weight and a survival probability, and the value of an agent coalition is the probability that its sur...

    Yoram Bachrach, Nisarg Shah in Algorithmic Game Theory (2013)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics

    We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitio...

    Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos, Milan Vojnović in Algorithmic Game Theory (2014)

  6. No Access

    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Analyzing Power in Weighted Voting Games with Super-Increasing Weights

    Weighted voting games (WVGs) are a class of cooperative games that capture settings of group decision making in various domains, such as parliaments or committees. Earlier work has revealed that the effective ...

    Yoram Bachrach, Yuval Filmus, Joel Oren, Yair Zick in Algorithmic Game Theory (2016)