Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering ((LNEE,volume 356))

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Abstract

There exist some problems in the recruitment process of the manipulator in the man-machine environment. We always hope to find high-quality personnel and make them bring greater benefits to the unit; however, high-quality personnel need more human resources cost. According to game theory, we have an analysis on recruitment screening mechanism from the perspective of benefit under the asymmetry information condition based on the signal mechanism between the cost of the benefit and the cost of HR. And we put forward some advice on how to determine a reasonable screening mechanism in accordance with the cost of human resources and the probationary period. We build a model to realize the conclusion and prove that it is feasible through the typical example. The conclusion can provide guidance for screening of the manipulator in all kinds of man-machine environment.

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Correspondence to Chunxin Wang .

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Wang, C., Liu, Z., Shen, Q., Han, P., Mu, S. (2015). An Analysis on the Screening Mechanism of the Manipulator Based on Game Theory. In: Long, S., Dhillon, B.S. (eds) Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Man–Machine–Environment System Engineering. MMESE 2015. Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, vol 356. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48224-7_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48224-7_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-662-48223-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-662-48224-7

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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