Abstract
Incomplete information and multiple-task incentive are the dilemma in offering incentives to mine operators. Adopting the game theory and related theories in information economics, first, this paper analyzes the dilemma, then based on Chinese national conditions and the characteristics of mine operators. It suggests that the salary incentive mechanism should be devised to create constrains on both participation and motivation, differentiated incentive contracts should be formulated from the angle of multiple-task incentive and competence-based selection, the role of academic title promotion in motivating mine operators should be brought into full play, and the mine operators should be considered to help improve their own competence in designing the incentive mechanism.
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Li, Nw., Zhou, Lr. (2013). An Analysis of the Dilemma in Offering Incentive to Mine Operators and Selection of the Ways to Its Solution. In: Qi, E., Shen, J., Dou, R. (eds) The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_39
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_39
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