Abstract
For a number of years we have been working towards the goal of automatically creating auction mechanisms, using a range of techniques from evolutionary and multi-agent learning. This paper gives an overview of this work. The paper presents results from several experiments that we have carried out, and tries to place these in the context of the overall task that we are engaged in.
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Phelps, S., Cai, K., McBurney, P., Niu, J., Parsons, S., Sklar, E. (2008). Auctions, Evolution, and Multi-agent Learning. In: Tuyls, K., Nowe, A., Guessoum, Z., Kudenko, D. (eds) Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems III. Adaptation and Multi-Agent Learning. AAMAS ALAMAS ALAMAS 2005 2007 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4865. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77949-0_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77949-0_14
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