A Genetic Algorithmic Approach to Automated Auction Mechanism Design

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Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets (AMEC/TADA 2015, AMEC/TADA 2016)

Abstract

In this paper, we present a genetic algorithmic approach to automated auction mechanism design in the context of cat games. This is a follow-up to one piece of our prior work in the domain, the reinforcement learning-based grey-box approach [14]. Our experiments show that given the same search space the grey-box approach is able to produce better auction mechanisms than the genetic algorithmic approach. The comparison can also shed light on the design and evaluation of similar search solutions to other domain problems.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    [14] is available at http://www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~jniu/research/publications/.

  2. 2.

    A taxonomy of policies in this domain of auction mechanisms is described in detail in [17].

  3. 3.

    The same solution was adopted in designing marketplace selection strategies for trading agents in cat games. However the two scenarios may need different parameter values. The market selection scenario should favor choices that give a good profit—a cumulative measure—while here we require effective exploration to find a good mechanism in the foreseeable future—a one-time concern.

  4. 4.

    As the Hall of Fame is empty at the beginning of each ga experiment, the first cat game includes four individuals from the population, so the total number of games to evaluate the 20 generations is actually 199. But the difference of one game can be negligible. In theory, it is possible to design the experiments to run exactly the same number of cat games as long as and , however the integer solutions—201 and 2, or 67 and 6—to this equation are not practical for the ga as is too small.

  5. 5.

    One example is that the scores of cda \(_h\) and ch \(_h\) flatten out much earlier during the experiments than the scores of cda \(_l\) and ch \(_l\) in all the three cases in Fig. 4.

  6. 6.

    A Hall of Famer may come from more than one run of the same experiment.

  7. 7.

    We actually ran additional sets of ga experiments with crossover, each with a different crossover rate, 0.1, 0.4, or 1.0, in contrast to 0.7 that was used in the ga experiments described in the text. It turned out that the ga experiments using 0.7 produced the best results and hence only the results of this set of experiments were included in the text in the comparison against those of the grey-box experiments.

  8. 8.

    A schemata is typically represented in the form, for example, ****01*1***, where * can match 0 or 1. The defining length of a schemata is the maximal distance between bits with deterministic values, and the order of a schemata is the number of bits with deterministic values.

  9. 9.

    These are sometimes called competent genetic algorithms.

  10. 10.

    A co-founder of the field with Fisher and a critic of Fisher’s approach.

  11. 11.

    Similar comparisons between reinforcement learning-based approaches and evolutionary computational approaches do exist in other domains. Further discussions of these comparisons are however beyond the scope of this paper and are not possible due to the space constraint.

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Acknowledgments

Support for this work was provided by PSC-CUNY Award 68800-00 46, jointly funded by the Professional Staff Congress and the City University of New York. The authors acknowledge resources from the computational facility at the CUNY High Performance Computing Center, which is operated by the College of Staten Island and funded, in part, by grants from the City of New York, State of New York, CUNY Research Foundation, and National Science Foundation Grants CNS-0958379, CNS-0855217 and ACI 1126113.

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Niu, J., Parsons, S. (2017). A Genetic Algorithmic Approach to Automated Auction Mechanism Design. In: Ceppi, S., David, E., Hajaj, C., Robu, V., Vetsikas, I. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets. AMEC/TADA AMEC/TADA 2015 2016. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 271. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54229-4_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54229-4_9

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