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A Methodological Problem of Choice for 4E Research

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Situated Cognition Research

Part of the book series: Studies in Brain and Mind ((SIBM,volume 23))

Abstract

The 4E approaches have been frequently linked to the claim that they fundamentally change how we theoretically analyze and empirically investigate cognitive phenomena. Despite this aspiration, the methodology of 4E researchers received surprisingly little attention, although the envisaged change of mainstream cognitive studies presupposes elaborated methodical competencies. This chapter argues that a methodology is necessary for the 4Es. However, several preliminary considerations need to precede a methodological analysis of the branch. It is claimed that methodological analyses of 4E research first need to answer the problem of choice whether to support a version of explanatory pluralism or explanatory unification. The answer to this problem significantly influences how a methodology can be developed. The problem can only be properly met, however, if the different versions of pluralist and unificationist positions are related so that we can understand where exactly they diverge or overlap. Below, the spectrum of integration is introduced, which suggests a relation between pluralist and unificationist views. The spectrum is a provisional guide to a 4E methodology as it invites 4E researchers to place themselves within this spectrum and approach methodological and methodical questions from there.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It is important to note that Miłkowski (2016a) distinguishes between integration and unification in a different manner. While, for him, integration is the process of combining multiple explanations in a coherent manner, unification is the process of develo** general, simple, elegant explanations. His account of integration is therefore different from the one in this article that suggests that the intensity of integration is a measurement for unification.

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  1. Institute of Philosophy, University of Kassel, Kassel, Germany

    Mark-Oliver Casper

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Kassel, Kassel, Germany

    Mark-Oliver Casper

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Kassel, Kassel, Germany

    Giuseppe Flavio Artese

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Casper, MO. (2023). A Methodological Problem of Choice for 4E Research. In: Casper, MO., Artese, G.F. (eds) Situated Cognition Research. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39744-8_2

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