Civil society and compliance with constitutions

Abstract

Should we consider a civil society a relevant factor in the context of executive’s attitude toward a constitution? The essential goal of the study is to investigate the relationship between a strength of a country’s civil society on constitutional compliance of the executive. To do so, we use data for up to 179 countries from a 30-year period on civil society and compliance with constitutions from the V-Dem project. In a series of dynamic panel regressions, we find that civil society is positively associated with constitutional compliance. This evidence suggests that the validity of constitutional provisions in terms of lawfulness of the executive may be strengthened by civil society. The results of our study provide added value in better understanding the decisions of executives in the perspective of respect for the law. We relate our conclusions regarding ties between politics and the law to previous literature, covering the impact of institutional and social surroundings on the shape of politics.

Appendix: Description of variables and data sources

Variable name	Description	Source
constitutional compliance	Continuous variable envisaging the extent up to which members of the executive respect the constitution. The higher the value of variable is, the less members of executive violate the constitution Continuous version of the variable was created from the ordinal variable using the measurement model. The ordinal variable envisages the responses to the following question” Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?”. Possible responses: 0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences 1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions 2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences 3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges 4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution	Coppedge et al. (2020)
civil society index	Continuous variable envisaging how robust civil society is. The higher the value of variable is, the more robust is civil society in a given country. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for governmental control over entry and exit of CSOs into public life, CSOs’ repression and CSO participatory environment. The construction of the abovementioned indices is presented below	Coppedge et al. (2020)
governmental control over entry and exit of CSOs into public life	Continuous variable envisaging the extent up to which the government achieves control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life. Continuous version of the variable was created from the ordinal variable using the measurement model. The ordinal variable envisages the responses to the following question “To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?”. Possible responses:  0: monopolistic control,  1: substantial control,  2: moderate control,  3: minimal control,  4:unconstrained	Coppedge et al. (2020)
CSOs’ repression	Continuous variable envisaging the extent up to which the government attempts to repress civil society organizations (CSOs). Continuous version of the variable was created from the ordinal variable using the measurement model. The ordinal variable envisages the responses to the following question “Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?”. Possible responses:  0: severely,  1: substantially,  2: moderately,  3: weakly,  4: no	Coppedge et al. (2020)
CSOs’ consultation by policymakers	Continuous variable envisaging the extent up to which the major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members.). Continuous version of the variable was created from the ordinal variable using the measurement model. The ordinal variable envisages the responses to the following question “Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?”. Possible responses:  0: no,  1: to some degree,  2: yes	Coppedge et al. (2020)
regulatory quality	Continuous variable including measures of the incidence of market unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development	Coppedge et al. (2020)
regime	Discrete variable classifying political regime of a country considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles into one of the following categories:  0: closed autocracy,  1: electoral autocracy,  2: electoral democracy,  3: liberal democracy	Coppedge et al. (2020)
judicial independence	Continuous variable expressing how often judges' decisions in cases that are salient to the government merely reflect government wishes regardless of judges' sincere view of the legal record. The higher the value of variable is, the less judges’ decisions reflect government wishes. Continuous version of the variable was created from the ordinal variable using the measurement model. The ordinal variable envisages the responses to the following question “When judges not on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?”. Possible responses:  0: Always  1: Usually  2: About half of the time  3: Seldom	Coppedge et al. (2020)
international autonomy	Continuous variable envisaging the extent to which the state is autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy. The higher the value, the more autonomous the state is. Continuous version of the variable was created from the ordinal variable using the measurement model. The ordinal variable envisages the responses to the following question “Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?”. Possible responses:  0: Non-autonomous  1: Semi-autonomous  2: Autonomous	Coppedge et al. (2020)
political power distribution	Continuous variable envisaging the extent to which political power is distributed according to socioeconomic position? The higher the value, the more equally the power is distributed Continuous version of the variable was created from the ordinal variable using the measurement model. The ordinal variable envisages the responses to the following question “Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?”. Possible responses:  0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence  1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence  2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people  3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power  4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is	Coppedge et al. (2020)
ln gdp pc	Log of gross domestic product per capita	Coppedge et al. (2020)