Changes of sex ratio at birth and son preferences in China: a mixed method study

Abstract

In 2020, China’s sex ratio at birth (SRB) stood at 111.3, still exhibiting a notable bias. Son preference ranks as the most essential and fundamental reason for the skewed SRB. This study, using a mixed-methods approach, seeks to address what the temporal changes and regional differences in SRB and the gender preferences are in China, whether and why son preference persists, how people practice such preferences and how they relate to the persistently high SRB in the Chinese context. Analysis of data from five national sample surveys finds that son preference is waning and daughter preference is gaining momentum, consistent with significant downward trends in SRB. The study also reveals that value shifts and intergenerational relations have a strong influence on gender preferences and their translation into reproductive behavior. Additionally, this study highlights the challenges that are hindering the decline in son preference, suggesting that more efforts are needed to empower women and to change social norms.

1 Introduction

China's sex ratio at birth (SRB) has been skewed since the early 1980s and reached a peak of 121.18 in 2004 before it gradually dropped to 111.3 in 2020 and eventually 108.3 in 2021, yet it is still above the normal range of 103–107. Regional disparities remain one of the key attributes of China’s SRB (Gietel-Basten, 2012; Gu & Roy, 1995; Poston, et al, 1997; Zhu et al., 2009).

An urgency imposed by reduced family fertility, a strong preference for sons and the spread of sex selection technology are three indispensable preconditions, which together determine the emergence of skewed SRB and the extent to which it is skewed (Guilmoto, 2009). Among the three main preconditions, son preference is the most essential and fundamental. Male-oriented patriarchal family systems lead to the persistence of son preference in China, Korea and India, which generate strong incentives to raise sons (Das Gupta et.al.,

Fig. 3

Changes in the ideal sex ratio among children in the seven provinces with the highest SRB in 2020

4 Why son preferences decline but still persist in certain provinces

4.1 Decline of son preference and rise of daughter preference and gender indifference

The findings of the qualitative research confirm the results of the quantitative analysis, indicating a decline in son preference and a rise in daughter preference and gender indifference. Most interviewees expect to have both a son and a daughter. The trend of son preference is decreasing, while both daughter preference and gender indifference are becoming more prevalent.

Qualitative research shows the bottom line of having a son is no longer the family norm. The majority of interviewees, regardless of their educational attainment, place of residence or occupation, expressed a willingness to accept either a son or a daughter. As one interviewee, LKX3, a 30-year-old pregnant urban female government employee, stated, ‘Having a baby is like opening a gift box. Either having a son or having a daughter, each has its benefits.’

Higher educational attainment and occupational status are associated with a decreased likelihood of gender preference among women. Urban female interviewees exhibit more gender indifference or daughter preference. These findings align with those of quantitative research.

After giving birth to their first child, many interviewees expressed a desire for a second child of the opposite sex in order to have both a son and a daughter. However, some who had already had a son were concerned about having another son and hoped for a daughter instead (Shi & Yang, 2021). It was common for them to stop having children after having a son, rather than continuing to try for more sons. Having a daughter as the first child increases the probability of having a second child, as having two daughters or one son and one daughter are both acceptable.

Postnatal discrimination against girls has almost disappeared. In sympathy with the improvement of material conditions, young parents basically have no palpable preference for son over daughter in parenting their children, with some parents even being harder on their son(s) than their daughter(s) in a bid to help their son(s) develop a different temperament from their daughter(s). "Whether it's a son or a daughter, the expenses are the same—they drink the same brand milk, go to hospital in case of illness, and receive high education."(LHQ1, a 26-year-old male kindergarten teacher with a son and a daughter). This is a significant improvement compared with excess mortality rate of baby girls in the 1980s and 1990s (Attané, 2009; Li & Zhu, 1996). Parents would generally accept the fact of having a daughter and raise her indiscriminately. Some individuals have come to appreciate the unique and excellent qualities of daughters and have abandoned the notion of desiring a son.

However, there are significant intergenerational differences in gender preference. According to the interviews conducted, most parents born in the 1950s and 1960s preferred baby boys, often requesting at least one grandson or even more. This preference is particularly strong among those who live in rural areas and have less education. “My father-in-law has said in front of us many times that a certain family is so lucky and blessed to have ten grandsons. What he means is that only a family with all sons is blessed—that is, the more grandsons the better.” (ZCX2, a 41-year-old urban woman with a pigeon pair).

Son preference of the previous generation has been internalised as a belief. "My mother's generation was keen on having a son. As a matter of fact, they probably didn't think that much. Sometimes they didn't know why they wanted to have a son. They just knew that they had to have a son as they lived in the countryside."(LKX06, a 31-year-old social worker with two sons).

4.2 Changing but still prominent patrilineal practices, familism culture and gender stereotypes

4.2.1 Patrilocal coresidence and continuing the family lineage

In China, patrilineal descent, patrilineal succession, and patrilocal residence are all concrete manifestations of patriarchy in China (Li, 2012). According to Xu (2013), the tradition of patrilocal coresidence has eased in society due to modernisation, fertility decline and increased mobility. With the increasing population migration, most young people do not live with their parents or parents-in-law after settling down in cities. A new phenomenon is emerging where young couples sometimes live with both sets of parents. “After marriage, the young couple can live in the husband's family or in the wife's family, whichever has better financial conditions. One of the two children takes their father's surname and the other takes their mother's surname."(LHQ3, a remarried woman age 37). The high volume of circular migration in China not only accelerates the diffusion of new norms but also decreases patrilocal coresidence, which contributes to weakening son preferences (Das Gupta et al., 2009).

However, patrilocal coresidence is much more prevalent than other residence arrangements in contemporary China (Xu, 2013). Patrilocality remains the main organising principle for social and economic life for both male and female migrants (Eklund, 2015).

In the past two decades, it has become more common to include the names of daughters and their children in genealogies and for women to inherit family land and wealth even in rural areas. However, it is still considered natural for sons to carry on the family lineage and be given priority in inheriting the family's property. “My father said to me ‘I will leave most of my property to my son. Giving it to my daughter is like giving it to someone else’” (ZCX8, a 36-year-old housewife with a son). Southeastern provinces such as Guangdong and Fujian have a higher concentration of private enterprises and family businesses. This, coupled with the need for inheritance of family assets, contributes to the perpetuation of son preference (Shen & Chen, 2007).

In these provinces, ‘having a son is preferable to having a daughter’ has become an unspoken consensus. There are many hidden manifestations of son preference. For example, when guessing at the sex of fetus, people always say it must be a boy. This is because everyone believes that the answer of a boy will please the pregnant woman and her whole family. If the fetus is found to be a boy through fetal sex determination, the family of pregnant woman will also give the doctor a thicker red packet.

Patriarchal customs that prioritise having a son can put tremendous pressure on families without a male child, particularly in rural areas. “In villages like ours, if you give birth to a son, you will be freed from all the gossip; if you have only one child and it happens to be a girl, people will tirelessly persuade you to have a son”. (LKX06, a 31-year-old woman living in a village and with two sons). In this social environment, a woman's value is often measured by her ability to bear a son (Li & Lavely, 2009).

Interviews reveal that the stress of not having a son, particularly prevalent in rural communities, diminishes in urban areas. Additionally, autonomy and familial support have been found to positively impact women experiencing such stress. “My husband also don't want me to be totally drained for having a second child, so he helps me bear all the pressure. To be honest, I won't be able to handle it without my husband”. (TJ6, 35 -year-old woman living in Guangxi and with a daughter).

4.2.3 Gender stereotypes

Social norms and folk customs define the different roles played by men and women in public spaces and private domains, determining their respective family and social positions (Sangwha, 1999). Women often face disadvantages in accessing resources due to persistent stereotypes that portray them as less competent, particularly in these provinces. ZCX2 (a 41-year-old woman with a pigeon pair) mentioned she once drove a car to his husband's hometown in Jiangxi Province and surprised the locals. “‘Wow, you women from Hunan can drive?' I was surprised too. Isn't it normal for women to drive a car? So, I observed carefully and didn't see any women driving a car there. In my hometown, more than half of women should be able to drive a car.” It is unfortunate that driving was once considered a male-only trait. The act of women driving a car is often viewed as a challenge to traditional gender roles. The locals' surprise at this phenomenon reflects their adherence to gender stereotypes.

In regard to traditional gender roles in the family, the husband is responsible for feeding the family, whilst the wife is responsible for doing housework and taking care of children. Gener stereoty** has decreased significantly in youner generations. However, older generations still hold onto traditional gender roles and view anything different as shameful. Even if the wife has a higher income than the husband and the husband is better at taking care of children, other people probably never know this fact. “It is generally accepted that the wife must do the laundry for her husband and I had a dispute with my mother-in-law on this matter. I earn more than my husband. She said that I don't have to do the laundry, but I must never tell other people. She doesn't want me to convey the idea of ‘my husband being homemaker and I being breadwinner’. They're afraid that I might embarrass their son…They think it is natural for a man to earn more than his wife.” (LHQ2, a 21-year-old woman with a son).

4.3 Differences in the rearing costs and benefits of son and daughter

In contemporary times, parents tend to show no difference in raising and educating their sons and daughters, resulting in almost equal childrearing and education costs for both genders. However, the most significant disparity lies in the expenses associated with marriage. Typically, when a son gets married, he is expected to prepare the housing and pay a substantial amount of bride price, which is primarily covered by his parents. As a result, a son’s marriage has become a crucial method of intergenerational resource transfer. Due to the long-standing skewed SRB, the marriage squeeze has resulted in a continuous rise in bride prices over the past few decades. In fact, the marriage of two sons can consume all of their parents’ savings (Wei & Zhang, 2011). This greater burden of having a son contributes to the fear of having two sons, which undermines son preference to some extent.

Many interviewees believe that parents have a duty to assist in their son's marriage, but only need to support their daughter within their abilities. This tradition is linked to patriarchy because the son is seen as the primary family member and investing in the son is seen as equivalent to investing in the family or in the parents' old age. TJ4 (a 29-year-old woman with a daughter) said: “If you have a son, you will need to help him out when he grows up. You will have to prepare a house for him and help him look after his children after his marriage. It costs more to have a son than a daughter and you will probably have more worries. Still, you can't completely ignore your daughter. If conditions allow, you should also give your daughter some necessary support.” In the past decade, a popular saying has emerged that suggests ‘having a daughter brings wealth, while having a son requires spending a fortune’.

The expectation that a son will provide financial support in old age is strongly associated with son preference especially when there is no pension or social security system in place (Li & Lavely, 2009). Upon the universalisation of endowment insurance, parents’ high expectation for their son's support on old-age care are waning gradually (Ebenstein & Leung, 2010). In both urban and rural areas, interviewees expressed a reluctance to rely on their children for old-age care. “In the past, people in their 60 s had no fixed income when they got old and had to count on the support from their children. Now we all have social security, so we won't have to worry about how to feed ourselves in the future.” (LKX3, a 30-year-old pregnant woman). The dwindling demand for son's support on old-age care is conducive to weaken son preference.

The decreasing price-performance ratio of sons is accompanied by the increasing cost-performance ratio of daughters. This implies that raising a son is a less cost-effective investment than raising a daughter. According to interviews on elderly care needs, respondents expressed a preference for daughters due to their perceived higher levels of empathy and caregiving ability, which can provide more emotional and caring support to their parents (Chun & Das Gupta, 2021; Shi, 2009). "In rural areas, there is a saying like 'having a son makes you proud, but having a daughter makes your life way easier."(LKX6, a 31-year-old woman with two sons and living in a village). Interviewee LKX8, who was a social worker, shared her experience of looking after elderly parents. "When looking after the elderly, I found that they turned to their daughters more often than to their sons for help. Although some elderly people have many sons, they tended to seek assistance from their daughters, because daughters are more attentive, while sons are often busy with work. They feel that a daughter is more reliable than a son."

The increase in women's educational attainment has led to greater social participation, and the income gap between men and women is narrowing in non-agricultural industries. This trend is also likely to weaken son preference (Qian, 2008). However, it should be noted that women's educational attainment is still relatively low in these provinces with higher SRB. With the exception of Guangdong Province, where the percentage of women aged 15 and over with a college diploma or higher is higher than the national average, the other six provinces fall below the national average (Appendix 1). In Guangdong and Fujian provinces, where the market economy is thriving, couples enter the market through family-based operations and production. In family-based operations, the husband typically assumes the role of a leader while the wife often serves as an assistant. This can result in the undervaluation of the wife's labor.

5 Translating preferences into reproductive behaviors

5.1 Having a son is a responsibility to parents

Historically, China was governed and held together by families and clans, leading to a prevalent ‘family-centric’ familism culture. China's intergenerational culture emphasises the ‘harmonious coexistence’ between parents and children, as well as the traditional ‘filial piety’ culture.

Due to the deep-seated traditional family ethics and filial piety in these provinces, reproduction has become a matter of great importance for the family lineage. Not only does the previous generation attach importance to the reproductive behaviors of their offspring, but the current generation also values the opinions of the previous generation. Intergenerational differences in gender preference have led to conflicts between parents' desire for grandsons and their adult children's reproductive autonomy. Reproduction has become a source of tension between the two generations, resulting in varying outcomes based on their interactions.

For example, after LKX9 (a 37-year-old woman with two daughters and a son) gave birth to two daughters, her parents-in-laws adopted a carrot-and-stick approach. At first, her parents-in-laws threatened not to help take care of her daughters and LKX9 angrily fought back by saying they should not expect her to take care of them when they get old. LKX9 chose to be a stay-at-home mom. Her parents-in-laws later changed their tactic and expressed their willingness to help her take care of her second child, so that she could be relieved from the childcare burden and prepare for new pregnancy as soon as possible.

The conflict between the two generations regarding reproduction ended with the daughter-in-law’s compromise. Due to her parents-in-law's modest approach, she relented and was recommended an effective folk remedy for conceiving a son. As a result, she began preparing for pregnancy and eventually gave birth to a son, making her parents-in-law happy.

Most interviewees expressed a strong desire for a specific ideal scenario: giving birth to a son first, in order to avoid being pressured into having a second child and to have a say in the decision to have another child, when to have it and how many more to have. This partially explains why China's sex ratio at birth for first-borns remains high (Jiang et al., 2016). The interviewees viewed having children as a life task and a responsibility to their parents.

5.2 A dilemma to implement son preference: sex selection or having more children

Fetal sex determination and gender selection techniques are available in these provinces. For instance, in Guangdong Province, which is adjacent to Hong Kong, people send the blood samples of pregnant women to Hong Kong in order to determine the sex of the baby. It is important to note that these conduits have existed for a long time and do not charge much.

Ultrasound is also used in both private clinics and even public hospitals to determine the sex of fetuses (Chu, 2001). Some doctors may not disclose the information directly, instead, they tend to communicate the fetal sex cryptically. In some cases, the family of the pregnant woman may offer a 'red packet' to show their gratitude. The availability of ultrasound determination of fetal sex is even higher in relatively remote townships. Like fetal sex determination, sex selective abortion is not difficult to have either. Not only are there private clinics, but women can also travel to Hong Kong for abortion.

Some interviewees reported pressure from their parents to have a grandson or a desire for a son as reasons for resorting to such techniques. Among the 42 interviewees with children or being pregnant at the time of the interview, eight had undergone fetal sex determination and three couples had done so twice. Others cited the need to know the baby's gender for practical reasons, such as buying clothes.

Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has implemented a series of laws and regulations to prohibit the use of technology for fetal sex determination and sex-selective abortion and has launched severe crackdowns. However, there is still a discrepancy between the actual and anticipated effects (Tang, 2020). Local government officials acknowledged that gender-based discrimination is difficult to investigate due to covert tactics and lack of evidence. An official from local government said: "These are highly lucrative services. We definitely can't stop the illegal practices, but the crackdowns certainly help with our SRB governance".

Aside from sex selection, having more children has become another option to achieve desired gender preference. Reproduction has become an autonomous decision within the family due to the lifting of external policy restrictions since 2013. The conflict between son preference and the number of children still remains, but it has shifted from an external to an internal one. Couples are increasingly making rational decisions regarding reproduction due to the rising costs of childbearing, childrearing and education. Family income, time and childcare resources are significant constraints that lead to having fewer children. A recent study shows son preference no longer has a significant effect on fertility potential in China (Yu et. al., 2018).

6.3 Changes in gender preference are driven by a combination of period and cohort effects

Contemporary China features a society in transition. Socio-economic development, social norm and value change, advance of sex selective technology, together with the development of governance measurements, were period changes. Notably, the post-80 s and post-90 s generations have become the primary group for childbearing. They grew up in a new era of development and have different views towards family size and desirable sex composition of children compared to their parents. The disparities between the two cohorts highlight the differences in life background and personal experiences against the backdrop of social transition. Changes in their attitudes and preferences are typically driven by their cohort (Yoo et. al., 2017). When the younger cohorts gradually replaced the older ones as the main forces of childbearing in China, son preference decreased and gender indifference eventually increased at the aggregate level (Lin, 2009).

6.4 A shift from behavioral to conceptual expression of son preference

The resistance to induced abortion has effectively contributed to the decline in fetal sex selection. Although a preference for sons still exists, sex-selective abortion is no longer considered a desirable option for achieving an ideal gender composition of children. Therefore, even if a preference for sons exists, it may not lead to sex-selective abortion. Sex-based stop** patterns may be an alternative for couples who have the time and resources to care for more children. The resistance to induced abortion has also led to a trend of having more children in case of unwanted pregnancy, regardless of fetal sex concerns.

In this sense, the existence of gender preference may contribute to the fertility rebound. If people only have an emotional preference for sons without physically seeking fetal sex selection or discriminating against daughters after birth and if they have more children to practice their gender preferences, it can actually help boost fertility and bring the skewed sex ratio at birth back to the normal range. This is a win–win situation that the Chinese government hopes for in a low fertility regime. The ultimate objective should be to eliminate the persistent gender inequality, address the prevalent bias towards sons and encourage a shift towards 'daughter preference' or 'gender indifference'.

6.5 Implications for gender imbalance in the future

Although son preference is weakening, it remains pronounced in several provinces. This study reveals the challenges that slow down the weakening of son preference in these provinces. Son preferences are still rooted in the value of life and have a great influence over realistic rationality. Traditional gender roles have had a lasting impact on social and family life, with no indication of fundamental change. The remaining patriarchy and familism culture are the main causes that still carry tremendous clout in these provinces.

There are also positive signs. Women are not only victims of son preference and fetal sex selection, but they also make decisions about and bear the brunt of fetal sex selection, as well as take on childbearing and childcare responsibilities. The gender identity and autonomy of young women are important determinants of whether gender preference translates into sex selection. Women who are well-educated and economically independent tend to have weaker son preferences. They generally have a relatively high status in the family, dare to insist on their own viewpoints and are adept at tactically countering their parents-in-law (Wang et. al., 2013). Additionally, they prioritise their own health and are opposed to unprincipled sex-selective abortions. These findings suggest that efforts to empower women have been successful and should be strengthened.

The disparity between urban and rural areas in terms of patriarchy family structure and gender-specific customs and practices is significant. However, this gap is likely to narrow over time due to rapid urbanisation and the spread of modern lifestyles in China. According to this research, young couples in both urban and rural areas show little difference in gender preferences. As a result, the urban–rural difference in the sex ratio at birth has almost disappeared as of 2020.

Regional divergence will continue to be a prominent feature in many aspects of Chinese society for the foreseeable future due to uneven economic and social development, as well as differences in cultural backgrounds. As the change of gender preference has yet to filter through to behavior and there are a large number of newborns in these provinces with persisting son preference, they are holding back the speed with which the national-level SRB can return to normal. Nevertheless, according to Guilmoto’s (2009) theory of sex ratio transition, the sex ratio falls when the patriarchal system is undermined and son preference is weakened. This study clearly provides some reason for optimism about the future return of China’s SRB to normal. The demographic transition trajectories of China and South Korea are becoming increasingly similar in terms of changes in fertility and gender preferences.

6.6 Implications for future research

Our study has limitations and suggests directions for future research. Firstly, the quantitative data, although drawn from nationally representative samples, have significant shortcomings. Not only are the questions inconsistent, but there may be differences in reporting errors. This makes the quantitative results less intuitive and unambiguous. More data from different sources will need to be analysed in the future to further confirm the changes in gender preferences. Secondly, the number of qualitative interviews was relatively small and interviews were conducted online. Interviews conducted online do not allow for a deeper understanding of the real-life situation of the interviewee, who may try to present only the socially acceptable side of the story. Thirdly, the rise of SRB in these provinces was the earliest and has been the longest. More systematic efforts are needed to discuss the reasons specific to these provinces.

Despite these limitations, our study provides a unique insight into recent changes in gender preferences in China as it transitions from low to extremely low fertility. Cultural factors are increasingly important in determining gender preferences. Given that cultural change takes time, China’s SRB faces the risks of decelerating decline. Sustained government efforts are particularly needed in the areas of women's empowerment and social norm change.