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EIOPA, Unit-linked Insurance and Polish Product Intervention: A Silent Regulatory Revolution?

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Abstract

When the Polish financial market supervisor Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (KNF) notified its intention to prohibit certain unit-linked insurance products marketed in Poland, it created an unprecedented situation: for the first time, a financial market supervisor decided to trigger Chapter III of the PRIIPs Regulation and adopt product intervention measures in the insurance sector. If adopted, these measures would regulate not only the investment strategies of unit-linked insurance products offered in Poland, but also their cost structure and terms and conditions. Is such far-reaching product intervention in compliance with the requirements of the PRIIPs Regulation? The European Insurance and Occupation Pensions Authority (EIOPA) tried to answer this question in its opinion on the justification and proportionality of the notified measures. The aim of this contribution is to critically analyse EIOPA’s opinion and explain the legal and practical ramifications of its findings. In particular, this article argues that despite its soft law nature and weaknesses of some of its findings, EIOPA’s opinion constitutes a major regulatory development in the insurance sector and raises several fundamental questions about the place of product intervention in the EU system of investor protection.

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Notes

  1. For examples from different jurisdictions, see FinCoNet (2021).

  2. MiFIR Regulation, Arts. 40(1)(b) and (41)(1)(b); PEPP Regulation, Art. 65(2); PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 16(1)(b). Unlike the MiFIR Regulation and the PRIIPs Regulation, the PEPP Regulation does not allow product intervention measures that target a financial activity or practice (see PEPP Regulation, Art. 65(2) a contrario).

  3. Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 [2014] OJ L 173/84.

  4. Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937 [2023] OJ L 150/40.

  5. Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) [2014] OJ L 352/1.

  6. Regulation (EU) 2019/1238 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on a pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP) [2019] OJ L 198/1.

  7. MiCA Regulation, Art. 104(1); MiFIR Regulation, Arts. 40–42; PEPP Regulation, Arts. 63 and 65; PRIIPs Regulation, Arts. 16–17.

  8. Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC [2010] OJ L 331/12, Art. 9(5); Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC [2010] OJ L 331/48, Art. 9(5); Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC [2010] OJ L 331/84, Art. 9(5).

  9. MiFIR Regulation, Arts. 40–41; PEPP Regulation, Art. 65(2); PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 16.

  10. For an overview of adopted product intervention measures, see European Securities and Markets Authority (undated).

  11. MiFIR Regulation, Arts. 40 and 42. See, for example, European Securities and Markets Authority Decision (EU) 2018/795 of 22 May 2018 to temporarily prohibit the marketing, distribution or sale of binary options to retail clients in the Union in accordance with Article 40 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council [2018] OJ L 136/31, which was adopted under Art. 40 of the MiFIR Regulation, and the Besluit van 30 juni 2021, houdende beperkingen aan het in Nederland op de markt brengen, verspreiden of het verkopen van turbo’s aan niet-professionele cliënten in verband met Verordening (EU) nr. 600/2014 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 15 mei 2014 en de Wet op het financieel toezicht (Besluit beperkingen aan turbo’s), Stcrt. 2021, 34,416, which was adopted by the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) under Art. 42 of the MiFIR Regulation.

  12. European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, Opinion of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority on the proposed product intervention measure of Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego of Poland, 23 March 2021, EIOPA-BoS-21/204 (hereinafter ‘Opinion’), para. 1.6.

  13. European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, Opinion of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority on the proposed product intervention measure of Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego of Poland, 23 March 2021, EIOPA-BoS-21/204.

  14. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 18(2): ‘After receiving notification under Article 17 of any action that is to be imposed under that Article, EIOPA shall adopt an opinion on whether the prohibition or restriction is justified and proportionate.’

  15. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 18(3).

  16. Unit-linked insurance products are a popular type of insurance-based investment product (IBIP). They constitute a hybrid financial product that consists of an investment component and a life insurance component (the insurance premium is wholly or in part used to purchase units in an investment fund). Unless the product is offered with a guarantee, the investor (policyholder) bears the investment risk. For more information, see Rokas and Siafarika (2019), pp 4–16.

  17. European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2021c).

  18. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(2), first sentence.

  19. For a comprehensive overview of all conditions, see Colaert (2020), pp 107–109.

  20. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(2)(a).

  21. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904 of 14 July 2016 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to product intervention, L 295/11, 29.10.2016, Art. 2.

  22. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904, Art. 2(2)(a) and (c).

  23. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904, Art. 2(2): ‘The factors and criteria to be assessed by competent authorities to determine whether there is a significant investor protection concern or a threat to the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to the stability of whole or part of the financial system within at least one Member State shall include the following …’.

  24. Busch (2017), pp 139–140. See also Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1904, Rec. 2, last sentence.

  25. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(2)(c) and (e).

  26. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(2)(b).

  27. Colaert (2020).

  28. Financial Conduct Authority (2022).

  29. Overall costs of Polish unit-linked insurance products, measured as reduction in yield (RIY) at the recommended holding period, were the highest in the EEA. In 2018 and 2019, the average RIY for Polish products amounted to 3.3% and 3.7% respectively, as opposed to the EEA average of 2.3% and 2.5%, respectively. According to a market study done by KNF, the average return on these insurance policies was negative between 2018 and 2019, ranging from − 1.6% to − 6.7%. See Opinion, para. 2.5, last sentence, and para. 2.12. For further information, see the yearly EIOPA Costs and Past Performance Reports, which present data on the cost and performance of IBIPs in the time period 2013–2021, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (undated).

  30. Opinion, para. 1.10.

  31. Opinion, paras. 1.12 and 1.15.

  32. Opinion, paras. 1.13 and 1.15.

  33. Opinion, para. 1.13. See also Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS), Arts. 50(1)−(2), 51(3) and 52(1).

  34. Opinion, paras. 1.14–1.15.

  35. Opinion, para. 5.1.

  36. Opinion, paras. 5.3, 5.6 and 5.7.

  37. Opinion, paras. 5.3, 5.6 and 5.7. See also paras. 3.14, 3.17, 3.22 and 3.27.

  38. Opinion, para. 2.49.

  39. Some of these institutional and legal differences are evidenced in EIOPA’s reports. See, for instance, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2022b), pp 50–52, Annex VIII and attached country-by-country reports, or European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2021e), para. 3.2.

  40. Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance distribution [2016] OJ L 26/19.

  41. Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) [2009] OJ L 335/1.

  42. By way of an example, IDD rules on product governance set out duties of product manufacturers and distributors and the IDD and PRIIPs rules on customer disclosures require insurers and insurance distributors to provide customers with specified pre-contractual information. See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2358 of 21 September 2017 supplementing Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to product oversight and governance regulatory requirements for insurance undertakings and insurance distributors, Chapters II and III, IDD, Art. 29(1), and PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 8.

  43. Opinion, paras. 2.21–2.30.

  44. Opinion, paras. 2.36–2.37.

  45. Opinion, para. 2.39.

  46. Opinion, para. 2.41.

  47. Solvency II Directive, Art. 185(7).

  48. Solvency II Directive, Art. 185(4).

  49. Opinion, paras. 2.21–2.23.

  50. IDD, Art. 17(1).

  51. IDD, Art. 17(2).

  52. Opinion, para. 2.27 [emphasis added].

  53. See Opinion, paras. 2.27 and 5.7: ‘Regarding the risks arising from the manner of presenting fees and commissions in insurance contracts, EIOPA is of the opinion that the scope of pre-contractual disclosure could be extended to any fees and commissions related to asset management services under [the IDD] by other supervisory measures the KNF is empowered to use’.

  54. Opinion, para. 2.30 [emphasis added].

  55. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 18(2) in conjunction with Art. 17(2)(b).

  56. Opinion, paras. 3.8–3.9.

  57. Opinion, para. 5.3.

  58. Opinion, paras. 3.8–3.9.

  59. Opinion, para. 3.8.

  60. The consultation culminated in a supervisory statement on the assessment of value for money of unit-linked insurance products under the IDD product governance rules (November 2021) and a methodology for this assessment (October 2022). See European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2021b); European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2021d); and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2022a).

  61. Opinion, para. 2.20.

  62. Opinion, para. 2.19. See also PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 6.

  63. Opinion, para. 2.18. See also PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 8(3)(f) a contrario, and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/653 of 8 March 2017 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) by laying down regulatory technical standards with regard to the presentation, content, review and revision of key information documents and the conditions for fulfilling the requirement to provide such documents [2017] OJ L 100/1, Art. 5 and Annex VII.

  64. On this topic, see Colaert (2016), pp 212–216 and 219–220.

  65. See the concept of ‘customer’ in the IDD, which encompasses all clients of insurance distributors, and the concept of ‘retail client’ under Art. 4(6) of the PRIIPs Regulation, which refers to Art. 4(1)(11) of the MiFID II Directive. Accordingly, all clients that are not considered to be ‘professional clients’ (i.e., mostly institutional investors and large companies) are viewed as retail clients.

  66. See, for instance, UCPD, Art. 2(a), or Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts Art. 2(b).

  67. See case law cited in Sect. 3.3.3 below.

  68. See, for instance, the product intervention measures taken by ESMA and European national supervisors vis-à-vis contracts for differences (CFDs), turbos and binary options.

  69. Solvency II Directive, Annex II, class III. in conjunction with Art. 2(3). See also PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 4(2), which specifies that the insurance component of an IBIP must offer a maturity or surrender value (none of which is offered by non-life insurance policies), and Rokas and Siafarika (2019), pp 13 and 15–16.

  70. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) [2005] OJ L 149/22. The UCPD applies to the marketing and sale of financial services and products as lex generalis, i.e., it fully applies unless more specific financial services legislation (e.g., the IDD or the PRIIPs Regulation) regulates the same issue differently (see UCPD, Art. 3(4)).

  71. Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L 95/29. The UCTD applies to a wide array of standard (i.e., not individually negotiated) contractual terms concluded with a consumer.

  72. Opinion, paras. 3.26–3.27.

  73. Opinion, para. 3.26: ‘… EIOPA disagrees with the KNF’s conclusion that existing requirements under Union law do not provide any regulation regarding terms and conditions of insurance contracts’ (EIOPA then proceeds to introduce the UCTD and the UCPD).

  74. Opinion, para. 3.26.

  75. For an overview of national authorities responsible for the enforcement of EU consumer protection legislation, see European Commission (undated).

  76. See, for instance, Art. 3.1 Wet handhaving consumentenbescherming, which grants such powers to the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM).

  77. UCTD, Art. 7.

  78. As Rott points out, consumers’ willingness to enforce their rights is tied to the design of the local legal framework and culture (e.g., the average length of court proceedings or the availability of contingency fees). See Rott (2012), pp 68–75.

  79. Opinion, para. 3.26. See also UCTD, Art. 3(1), which lays down the general unfairness test.

  80. To this effect, see Case C-415/11 Aziz [2013] EU:C:2013:164, para. 68; Joined Cases C‑537/12 and C‑116/13 Banco Popular Español [2013] EU:C:2013:759, para. 65; Case C‑421/14 Banco Primus [2017] EU:C:2017:60, para. 59; Case C-226/12 Constructora Principado [2014] EU:C:2014:10, paras. 21–23; Case C‑342/13 Katalin Sebestyén [2014], EU:C:2014:1857, para. 27; Case C‑621/17 Kiss and CIB Bank [2019], EU:C:2019:820, para. 51; and Case C‑212/20 M.P. and B.P. [2021] EU:C:2021:934, para. 66.

  81. See C-415/11 Aziz [2013] EU:C:2013:164, para. 69; Joined Cases C‑537/12 and C‑116/13 Banco Popular Español [2013] EU:C:2013:759, para. 66; Case C‑342/13 Katalin Sebestyén [2014], EU:C:2014:1857, para. 28; Case C‑421/14 Banco Primus [2017] EU:C:2017:60, para. 60; Case C‑186/16 Andriciuc [2017] EU:C:2017:703, para. 57; Joined Cases C‑776/19 to C‑782/19 VB and Others [2021] EU:C:2021:470, para. 98; and Case C‑609/19 BNP Paribas Personal Finance [2021] EU:C:2021:469, paras. 65–66.

  82. UCTD, Art. 5, first sentence. Technically, the provision only applies to contractual terms that are provided in writing and have not been individually negotiated (for a definition, see UCTD, Art. 3(2)). In the financial sector, it is standard practice to provide contractual terms and conditions in writing. At the same time, financial products are subject to highly standardised, preformulated contractual terms and conditions, which have been drafted in advance without the involvement of the customer. Virtually all contractual terms will thus fall within the scope of Art. 5 of the UCTD.

  83. UCTD, Art. 4(2).

  84. UCTD, Art. 4(2) and Rec. 19. See also Case C‑26/13 Kásler [2014] EU:C:2014:282, para. 61; and Case C-143/13 Matei [2015] para. 72.

  85. Joined Cases C‑419/18 and C‑483/18 Profi Credit Polska [2019] EU:C:2019:930, para. 57: ‘… the assessment of whether that provision and the promissory note agreement are unfair will have to take into account both the requirement relating to a significant imbalance and the requirement of transparency which flows from Article 5 of Directive 93/13’; and Case C‑621/17 Kiss and CIB Bank [2019], EU:C:2019:820, para. 49: ‘… the transparent nature of a contractual term, as required under Article 5 of Directive 93/13, is one of the elements to be taken into account in the assessment of whether that term is unfair, which is for the national court to carry out pursuant to Article 3(1) of [the UCTD]’. See also Case C‑609/19 BNP Paribas Personal Finance [2021] EU:C:2021:469, paras. 61–62.

  86. Opinion, paras. 2.14–2.41 a contrario.

  87. Opinion, para. 3.27.

  88. UCPD, Arts. 3(9) and 4.

  89. Case C-265/12 Citroën Belux [2013] EU:C:2013:498, paras. 21–27.

  90. UCPD, Art. 5(5).

  91. Opinion, para. 2.49, first sentence.

  92. Opinion, para. 2.49, last sentence.

  93. Opinion, para. 2.49, second sentence.

  94. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(2)(e).

  95. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(2)(c): ‘the likely effect of the action on investors’.

  96. Opinion, para. 3.1.

  97. Lenaerts et al. use the term ‘indispensability’. See Lenaerts et al. (2011), p 143.

  98. Lock (2019), pp 2251–2254; and Borowsky (2014), p 681. For an analysis of the case law of the CJEU, see Peers and Prechal (2021), pp 1633–1639.

  99. Opinion, para. 3.2 et seq.

  100. Opinion, para. 3.12.

  101. Opinion, para. 5.3.

  102. Namely Solvency II Directive, Arts. 133(3) and 185(7); IDD, Art. 29; Directive 2005/29 and Directive 93/13.

  103. Opinion, paras. 3.18–3.20 and 3.23–3.27 in conjunction with paras. 5.6–5.7.

  104. Opinion, para. 5.2.

  105. See Sects. 3.2.2, 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.

  106. Arts. 49 and 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contain a wide prohibition of all restrictions which are liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the exercise of the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, even if they apply indistinctly of the service provider’s origin (see, for instance, Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, para. 12; Case C‑205/99 Analir [2001] ECR I‑1271, para. 22; and Case C-265/12 Citroën Belux [2013] EU:C:2013:498, para. 35).

  107. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/47, Art. 114(4) and (5).

  108. In the field of services, see, for instance, Case C-322/01 Deutscher Apothekerverband [2003] ECR I-14,887, para. 64, and Case C-265/12 Citroën Belux [2013] EU:C:2013:498, para. 31.

  109. Joined Cases C-34/95, 35/95 and 36/95 De Agostini [1997] ECR I-3843; Case C-410/96 André Cambry [1997] ECR I-7875; and, more recently, Case C-265/12 Citroën Belux [2013] EU:C:2013:498.

  110. See, for instance, IDD, Arts. 9, 22, 24(7), 29(3) and 30(3); UCTD, Art. 8; UCPD, Art. 3(9).

  111. Case C-265/12 Citroën Belux [2013] EU:C:2013:498, para. 38, and case law cited therein.

  112. Note, however, that due to the principles of mutual recognition and home country control, commonly used in EU financial law, more protective national rules will in principle not apply to economic operators from other Member States unless they constitute general good rules (by way of example, see IDD, Arts. 4,6, 9 and 11(1)).

  113. ESMA is a great example of a European supervisory authority the regulatory influence of which has captured the attention of legal scholars (see, for instance, Moloney (2018). See also Case T-122/15 Landeskreditbank [2017] ECLI:EU:T:2017:337 and Case C-911/19 Fédération bancaire française [2021] EU:C:2021:599, which discuss legal actions that were brought against the supervisory activities of the European Central Bank and EBA on the basis that they fall outside of their respective legal mandates).

  114. Iglesias-Rodríguez (2021), pp 641–645 and 654–658.

  115. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(2)(b): ‘existing’ regulatory ‘requirements’.

  116. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, COM(2011) 652 final, p 11, which inspired the product intervention provisions in the PRIIPs Regulation.

  117. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/47, Art. 2(2) in conjunction with Art. 4(2)(a) and (f)), Art. 2(2) and Protocol (no. 25), annexed to the TEU and TFEU, on the exercise of shared competence [2010] OJ C83/307.

  118. Customer detriment is not only a personal tragedy for those who are affected by it but also a liability for the financial system and society at large (see Campbell (2016), pp 2–4, and it can lead to a loss of trust in the financial system (see, to this effect, Guiso et al. (2008). Moreover, when financial institutions engage in mis-selling or other illegal practices, they expose themselves to legal and financial risks (such as lawsuits, fines, loss of income, etc.) (see European Banking Authority (2015), p 4).

  119. Namely, its findings on IDD product governance rules (IDD, Art. 25), IDD rules on customer disclosure (IDD, Arts. 22 and 29(1)) and the duty of care (IDD, Art. 17(1)). See Sect. 3.2.3 and Opinion, paras. 2.21–2.27.

  120. Opinion, paras. 2.26, 3.24. 3.27 and para. 2.22, respectively.

  121. Opinion, paras. 2.21–2.30.

  122. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ 1 326/391, Art. 51(1).

  123. The concept of ‘implementing Union law’ is interpreted extensively by the CJEU as any Member State activity that falls ‘within the scope of EU law’ (see, to this effect, Case C‑617/10 Åkerberg Fransson [2013] EU:C:2013:105, paras. 19–20 and 24–27), including situations where the Member State derogates from free movement rules (see Case C-390/12 Pfleger [2014] EU:C:2014:281). To determine whether a particular act or action of a Member State is caught by the EU Charter, the CJEU assesses its connection to EU law, considering, inter alia, the nature of that act/action, whether it is intended to implement a provision of EU law, whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law and whether there are specific rules of EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it (see Case C‑206/13 Siragusa [2014] EU:C:2014:126, paras. 24–30 and case law cited therein).

  124. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(2)(c).

  125. Opinion, paras. 3.3, 3.18, 3.20, 3.23, 5.6 and 5.7.

  126. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(6) in conjunction with Art. 17(2).

  127. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(2)(2) specifies the conditions under which such precautionary product interventions can be adopted.

  128. Opinion, para. 2.5.

  129. E.g., Opinion, para. 5.6.

  130. Opinion, para. 4.3.

  131. KNF, however, refused to follow EIOPA’s suggestions to limit the scope of the profitability measure to retail investors and to change the definition of ‘unprofitable’ products that are banned. See Decyzja Komisji Nadzoru Finansowego z dnia 15 lipca 2021 r. (sygn. DNM-DNMZWP.6065.79.2021) w przedmiocie zakazów wprowadzania do obrotu, dystrybucji i sprzedaży ubezpieczeniowych produktów inwestycyjnych – umów ubezpieczenia na życie, jeżeli są związane z ubezpieczeniowym funduszem kapitałowym (interwencja produktowa) (Dz. Urz. KNF z 2021 r. poz. 16) and Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (2021).

  132. Urząd Komisji Nadzoru Finansowego (2022).

  133. On 16 August 2023, the Polish Sejm adopted an amendment to the Act on Insurance and Reinsurance Activities, which empowers the Minister of Finance to regulate how insurance companies invest client funds under life insurance contracts where the investment risk is borne by the client. The amendment will enter into force on 30 May 2024. See Ustawa z dnia 16 sierpnia 2023 r. o zmianie niektórych ustaw w związku z zapewnieniem rozwoju rynku finansowego oraz ochrony inwestorów na tym rynku (Dz. U. z 2023 r. poz. 1723), Art. 29, para. 11) and Art. 73, para. 6).

  134. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(2)(b).

  135. PRIIPs Regulation, Art. 17(6) in conjunction with (2)(a), (b) and (c).

  136. European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (2021c), paras. 3.5–3.8.

  137. Under the Lamfalussy legislative procedure, EU financial regulation consists of 4 levels of measures, among which guidelines, Q&As, recommendations and other common implementation standards issued by the ESAs (see Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (15 February 2001), p 6).

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Funding

This research was funded by the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek – Vlaanderen (FWO) as part of its Fundamental Research Fellowship programme (fellowship number 11B7223N).

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  1. PhD Researcher (FWO Fellow), Faculty of Law, Jan Ronse Institute for Company and Financial Law, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Lucie Škapová

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Correspondence to Lucie Škapová.

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Until September 2021, the author was employed by the Czech National Bank as a financial market supervisor and represented her employer on the EIOPA Committee on Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation (CCPFI). The author declares that the opinions stated in this article are purely her own and do not reflect the position of her past or present employers or that of the CCPFI.

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Škapová, L. EIOPA, Unit-linked Insurance and Polish Product Intervention: A Silent Regulatory Revolution?. Eur Bus Org Law Rev (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-023-00302-5

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