Abstract
In a recent paper, Firt, Hemmo and Shenker argue that Hempel’s dilemma, typically thought to primarily undermine physicalism, is generalizable and impacts mind-body dualism and many other theories equally. I challenge this view and argue that Hempel’s dilemma admits of at least two distinct construals: a general-skeptical construal, underpinned by historically driven arguments such as the pessimistic induction, and a non-skeptical construal, driven by the specific puzzles and volatility of current physics. While the general-skeptical construal applies to all changeable deep-structure theories, the non-skeptical construal primarily targets volatile theories which harbor exclusionary ambitions. As a result, dualism largely evades both construals due to the stability of theories of the mental and their lack of exclusionary ambitions. Conversely, physicalism is uniquely susceptible to both construals due to its strong commitment to deep-structure realism, inherent exclusionary ambitions, and the volatility of certain branches of fundamental physics. The paper ultimately concludes that Hempel’s dilemma is not universally problematic, but presents a unique challenge to physicalism while being relatively congenial to dualism.
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Notes
Erez Firt et al. (2022) canvass this literature in Sect. 2.3.
This distinction is developed in Einstein (1919).
First proposed by Laudan (1981).
Hempel (1969) argues that current physics is a significant distance away from accomplishing the conceptual reduction of less fundamental disciplines hoped for by many of his contemporaries. As such, reductionist physicalism itself entails that physics must undergo radical change. However, these anticipated radical changes threaten to render physicalism vacuous.
The alleged direct observability of our mental states is also challenged on empirical grounds, as some experimental results cast doubt on the reliability of our self-ascribed mental states. For more, see Shenker (2020).
I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for bringing this issue to my attention.
The premier argument for physicalism, the argument from causal closure, hinges on the assumption that mental events are immediately perceivable and causally efficacious. See Stoljar (2001a, § 6).
Most scientific branches of psychology can also be considered principle theories, insofar as they strive to uncover patterns and regularities governing “ordinary” mental states and behaviors.
Note that I do not assert that folk psychology is inherently a dualistic theory (whatever that assertion implies). Instead, I argue that folk psychology equips the dualist with the necessary vocabulary to articulate their position in a manner that remains impervious to the challenges posed by historically driven scientific skepticism.
This should not be taken to imply that reduced theories are necessarily empirical or non-theoretical. Undoubtedly, some non-fundamental theories include numerous theoretical postulates, which, in turn, aim to further reduce or explain even less-fundamental theories. My claim, however, is specifically limited to ordinary mental states and the theories that systematize them, such as folk psychology. If the eliminativist materialist is wrong, then the entities populating these theories are immune to historically driven scientific skepticism as rocks and trees.
Building on Montero (1999), Erez Firt et al. suggest that identifying states such as pain as paradigmatically mental is tantamount to assuming that pain is not physical. I disagree: if physicalism is true, pain is both paradigmatically mental and fundamentally physical, just as alkaline phosphatase is both paradigmatically biological and (presumably) fundamentally physical.
I thank anonymous referees of this journal for bringing this distinction and the ensuing discussion to my attention.
See for instance Child (1992).
I thank an anonymous reviewer of this journal for this comment.
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Buzaglo, D. Two construals of Hempel’s dilemma: a challenge to physicalism, not dualism. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 14, 26 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00590-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00590-9