Abstract
There is a debate among moral error theorists. It concerns what is to be done with moral discourse once it is believed to be systematically false or untrue. It has been called the ‘now what’ problem. Should error theorists abolish morality or insulate themselves in some way from this nihilistic consequence of belief in error theory? Assertive moral abolitionism aims to have error theorists avoid any insulation and abolish morality altogether. Revolutionary moral fictionalism aims for insulation by having error theorists start treating morality as a useful fiction. There are certain problems with assertive moral abolitionism and revolutionary moral fictionalism, however. This paper argues for a hybrid view that combines the best parts of both views. I call this position ‘reactionary moral fictionalism.’ It says it might be wise for certain individual error theorists to abolish morality in most cases, but remain quiet about their abolition. It also says that these error theorists should use morality as a fiction in those situations where it would be practically detrimental not to use moral discourse. In such situations, the error theorist should employ moral fictionalism. A fictionalist approach should thus be used only as a passive reaction to contexts where it cannot be avoided. The advice offered to certain individual error theorists by reactionary moral fictionalism is thus ‘abolish morality when one can, but use morality as a fiction when one has to.’ It is argued that this solution to the ‘now what’ problem offers superior therapeutic benefits for these individuals and could possibly serve as a compromise between assertive moral abolitionism and revolutionary moral fictionalism.
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Notes
I would like to emphasize again that the solution of ReactMF offered below is based on an individualist criterion of a solution to the ‘now what’ problem, as presented in Section 1. Insofar as AMA and RevMF are solutions to the ‘now what’ problem based on a more social or collectivist criterion, my claim is that the arguments offered above against AMA and RevMF are also arguments for taking an individualist criterion of a solution to the ‘now what’ problem more seriously. Since AMA and RevMF fail on their own terms as collectivist solutions, perhaps taking a step back and considering a different criterion for solving the ‘now what’ problem is in order on the part of abolitionists and fictionalists. While my personal motivation for believing the error theory and using the individualist criterion is confessedly primarily therapeutic, assertive abolitionists and revolutionary fictionalists might like to find out first what they, as individual error theorists, would like to get out of coming to believe the error theory before they start recommending certain behaviors to other error theorists, other metaethicists, or just other people in general. If whole-scale abolition or revolution proves to not be feasible, which seems to be the case, abolitionists and fictionalists might like to consider a different, more individualist, solution to the ‘now what’ problem. Indeed, they might like to discover that an individualist solution to the ‘now what’ problem is the only one that is feasible, and that the most feasible individualist solution is a relaxed and highly modified combination of both their views, which is precisely what ReactMF has to offer. So, not only do collectivist solutions likely fail, but their likely failure can serve to motivate a consideration amongst error theorists that only a individualist solution should be of interest to them, and, moreover, ReactMF should be of utmost interest to hopefully former assertive abolitionists and revolutionary fictionalists, for it might be the only way they can partially retain their views. Thank you to an anonymous referee for requesting greater clarity on this point.
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Dockstader, J. Reactionary Moral Fictionalism. Philosophia 48, 519–534 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00106-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00106-3