SpringerLink
Log in

Fallible reasons on behalf of fallibilism

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper I introduce a problem regarding whether there are good reasons to accept fallibilism about justified belief. According to this species of fallibilism, one can be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of reasons that do not justify certainty. Call such reasons “fallible reasons.” The problem is this: can one justifiably believe fallibilism on the basis of fallible reasons? To do so would seem to beg the question. If you are undecided as to whether you should accept anything on the basis of fallible reasons, then you should also be undecided as to whether you should accept fallibilism on the basis of such reasons. In this paper I consider several possible responses to this problem. I argue that the most appealing is to grant that good but fallible reasons on behalf of fallibilism are possible, and that this shows that one’s basic rational commitments cannot be defended in a non-circular fashion.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
EUR 32.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or Ebook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Reed (2012) is a useful introduction to fallibilism about knowledge. Brueckner (2005) provides a unified fallibilist account of both knowledge and justification.

  2. Tienson (1974), Unger (1975), BonJour (2010), and Dodd (2011) defend infallibilism about knowledge. The contemporary discussion of fallibilism about knowledge has been primarily concerned with the question of whether the oddness of concessive knowledge attributions—claims of the form, “I know I will not die of a heart attack this week but I might be wrong,”—is best explained by infallibilism. See Stanley (2005), Dougherty and Rysiew (2009), and Dodd (2011).

  3. Recent defenses of epistemic circularity include Alston (1993), Sosa (1997), Van Cleve (2003), Bergmann (2004) and (2009), Lemos (2004), Schmitt (2004), and Alexander (2010). Recent criticisms include Fumerton (1995), Vogel (2000) and (2008), and Cohen (2002).

  4. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility.

  5. See Reed (2002) for an overview.

  6. Again, see Reed (2002).

  7. For two useful discussions of this issue, see Turri (2009) and McCain (2014, pp. 31–55).

  8. Turri (2009, p. 491) provides several examples.

  9. For examples of this standard rationale see Cohen (1988, p. 91) and Reed (2012, pp. 585–6).

  10. For this standard presentation of the problem of induction, see Feldman (2003, pp. 130–140).

  11. Is Hume’s problem of induction a problem for all non-deductive reasoning? If so, Hume’s worries about whether we can be justified in believing on the basis of inductive reasons would extend to worries about abductive reasons. This is a difficult issue. While it is plausible that inductive reasoning relies on the assumption that the future will resemble the past—or more generally, that unobserved cases will resemble observed cases—it is far from obvious that abductive reasoning relies on such an assumption. In addition, if Hume’s problem concerns all non-deductive reasoning, then attempts to provide an abductive vindication of induction such as the one provided by BonJour (1998, pp. 187–216) would be clear non-starters. But again, that is far from obvious.

  12. See Alston (1993) and Greco (2008).

  13. See Goldman (1979).

  14. I have defended these claims elsewhere. Specifically, in Alexander (2013) I have argued that if you justifiably withhold belief as to whether you are justified in believing P, then you are not justified in believing P. There is currently a healthy debate about these issues concerning the relation between higher-order justification and first-order justification. I cannot possibly do justice to them here. For further discussion see Christensen (2007b, 2010), Feldman (2005, 2009), Kelly (2005, 2010), and Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, 2014).

  15. For discussion of whether our doxastic attitudes should be represented in terms of degrees of belief or flat-out belief, see Christensen (2007a) chapter 2, as well as Foley (2009), Frankish (2009), and Hawthorne (2009).

  16. An anonymous referee raised two interesting questions about DB. First, what is the nature of the support relation? In particular, does accepting DB commit you to objective relations of support between evidence and propositions? DB is non-commital. You might hold that support involves some objective relation of entailment or making probable. But you might also hold a more subjective account. For example, you might hold that one’s evidence supports a proposition insofar as one believes that the evidence entails or makes probable that proposition. For further discussion, see Conee and Feldman (2008, pp. 94–98) and McCain (2014, pp. 56–83). Second, what relation does DB have to Lewis’s Principal Principle, according to which your degree of belief in P ought to match what you believe to be the objective chances of P being true? This is a complicated matter. If your belief regarding the chances of P being true is justified, then a proponent of DB will hold that this justified belief is part of your evidence, in which case your degree of belief in P should match your belief about the chances of P being true—assuming the absence of other evidence. But what if your belief regarding the chance of P being true is unjustified? In that case, it is less clear that the belief deserves to be considered part of your evidence. If so, a proponent of DB need not hold that your degree of belief in P ought to fit your belief about the chances of P being true, contrary to Lewis’s principle.

  17. Note, however, that this is not to say that whenever one believes upon the basis of reasons, one must in fact consider those reasons good. Such a requirement would invite a regress. The proposed requirement is weaker. It is not that one should not believe on the basis of reasons that one does not consider good. Instead, one should not believe on the basis of reasons that one should not consider good. For additional defense of this claim, see Alexander (2012, 2013).

  18. BonJour (2001) and Vogel (2005) claim that beliefs about the external world are abductively justified. In contrast, Pryor (2004) and Huemer (2007) hold that such beliefs are non-inferentially justified by experience directly.

  19. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this possibility.

  20. For further defense of the fallibility of a priori justification, see BonJour (1998, pp. 110–115).

  21. Beyond the fact that it involves an attitude towards a proposition, what is the nature of withheld belief? Like the complementary question about the nature of belief, this is a substantive question in its own right that I will not attempt to address here. For further defense of the claim that withholding belief is an attitude towards a proposition, see Friedman (2013).

References

  • Alexander, D. (2010). In defense of epistemic circularity. Acta Analytica, 26(3), 223–241.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alexander, D. (2012). Inferential internalism and reflective defeat. Philosophia, 40(3), 497–521.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alexander, D. (2013). The problem of respecting higher-order doubt. Philosophers’ Imprint, 13(18), 1–12.

  • Alston, W. (1993). The reliability of sense perception. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann, M. (2004). Epistemic circularity: Malignant and benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(3), 709–727.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann, M. (2009). Justification without awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • BonJour, L. (1998). In defense of pure reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • BonJour, L. (2001). Toward a defense of empirical foundationalism. In M. DePaul (Ed.), Resurrecting old-fashioned foundationalism (pp. 21–40). New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • BonJour, L. (2010). The myth of knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1), 57–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brueckner, A. (2005). Fallibilism, underdetermination, and skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71(2), 384–391.

    Google Scholar 

  • Christensen, D. (2007a). Putting logic in its place. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Christensen, D. (2007b). Does Murphy’s law apply in epistemology? Self-doubt and rational ideals. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 2, 3–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Christensen, D. (2010). Higher-order evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81(1), 185–215.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, S. (1988). How to be a fallibilist. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives 2: Epistemology (pp. 92–123). Ridgeview: Atascadero.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, S. (2002). Basic knowledge and the problem of the problem of easy knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2), 309–329.

    Google Scholar 

  • Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (1985). Evidentialism. In E. Conee & R. Feldman (Eds.), Evidentialism: Selected essays in epistemology (pp. 83–107). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2008). Evidence. In Q. Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: New essays (pp. 83–104). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dodd, D. (2011). Against fallibilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 665–685.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dougherty, T. (2011). Fallibilism. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 131–143). New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dougherty, T., & Rysiew, P. (2009). Fallibilism, epistemic possibility, and concessive knowledge attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78(1), 123–132.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, R. (1981). Fallibilism and knowing that one knows. The Philosophical Review, 90(2), 266–282.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, R. (2003). Epistemology. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, R. (2005). Respecting the evidence. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, 95–119.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, R. (2009). Evidentialism, higher-order evidence, and disagreement. Episteme, 6(3), 294–312.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foley, R. (2009). Beliefs, degrees of belief, and the Lockean thesis. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of belief (pp. 37–48). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankish, K. (2009). Partial belief and flat-out belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of belief (pp. 75–93). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, J. (2013). Suspended judgment. Philosophical Studies, 162(2), 165–181.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fumerton, R. (1995). Metaepistemology and skepticism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldman, A. (1979). What is justified belief? In G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge (pp. 1–23). Dordrecht: Ridel.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greco, J. (2008). Skepticism about the external world. In J. Greco (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism (pp. 108–128). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haack, S. (1979). Fallibilism and necessity. Synthese, 41(1), 37–63.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hawthorne, J. (2009). The Lockean thesis and the logic of belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of belief (pp. 49–74). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hetherington, S. (2005). Fallibilism. The Internet encyclopedia of philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, http://www.iep.utm.edu/. June 2, 2014.

  • Huemer, M. (2007). Compassionate phenomenal conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1), 30–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelly, T. (2005). The epistemic significance of disagreement. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1, 167–196.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelly, T. (2010). Peer disagreement and higher order evidence. In A. Goldman & D. Whitcomb (Eds.), Social epistemology: Essential readings (pp. 183–217). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2010). Unreasonable knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives, 24(1), 1–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2014). Higher-order evidence and the limits of defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88(2), 314–345.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lemos, N. (2004). Epistemic circularity again. Philosophical Issues, 14(1), 254–270.

    Google Scholar 

  • Locke, J. (1689). An Essay concerning human understanding. Edited and abridged by Winkler, K.P. Indianapolis: Hackett.

  • McCain, K. (2014). Evidentialism and epistemic justification. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pryor, J. (2004). What’s wrong with Moore’s argument? Philosophical Issues, 14(1), 349–378.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reed, B. (2002). How to think about fallibilism. Philosophical Studies, 107(2), 143–157.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reed, B. (2012). Fallibilism. Philosophy Compass, 7(9), 585–596.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1948). Human knowledge: Its scope and limits. New York: Simon and Schuster.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt, F. (2004). What is wrong with epistemic circularity? Philosophical Issues, 14(1), 379–402.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sosa, E. (1997). Reflective knowledge in the best circles. The Journal of Philosophy, 94(8), 410–430.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanley, J. (2005). Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions. Analysis, 65(2), 126–131.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tienson, J. (1974). On analyzing knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 25(4), 289–293.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turri, J. (2009). The ontology of epistemic reasons. Nous, 43(3), 490–512.

    Google Scholar 

  • Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance: A case for skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Cleve, J. (2003). Is knowledge easy-or impossible? Externalism as the only alternative to skepticism. In S. Luper (Ed.), The skeptics: Contemporary essays (pp. 45–59). Hampshire: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogel, J. (2000). Reliabilism leveled. The Journal of Philosophy, 97(11), 602–623.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogel, J. (2005). Can skepticism be refuted? In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 72–84). Malden: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogel, J. (2008). Epistemic bootstrap**. The Journal of Philosophy, 105(9), 518–539.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Versions of this paper were presented at Iowa State University, the University of Iowa and the annual meeting of the Iowa Philosophical Society. I would like to thank audience members at these events for their feedback. For additional discussion I would like to thank Stephen Biggs and Clark Wolf. Two anonymous referees provided extensive invaluable feedback on this paper—to both I am very grateful. Finally, thanks to Lucy for the long walks that generated the ideas that went into this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Iowa State University, 433 Catt Hall, Ames, IA, 50011, USA

    David Alexander

Authors
  1. David Alexander
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to David Alexander.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Alexander, D. Fallible reasons on behalf of fallibilism. Synthese 198, 3979–3998 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1452-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1452-6

Keywords

Search

Navigation