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A Deconstructive and Psychoanalytic Investigation of (Corporeal) Law Enforcement

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Abstract

In this paper, I elaborate a Derridean deconstruction of law through the lens of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Derrida only focuses on jurisprudential law enforcement in his famous ‘Force of Law’ lecture, leaving corporeal law enforcement untouched. In turn, I explore the irresolvable conceptual tensions within corporeal law enforcement from the standpoints of (a) individuals rationalizing their obedience to law enforcement and (b) the legal system rationalizing its circumscription of acceptable law enforcement. To support my analysis, I examine landmark court cases and their deleterious effects on accountability for law enforcers. In particular, I track the progression from the legal standard of ‘shock of conscience’ (i.e., established by Rochin v. California (1952)) to that of ‘objective reasonableness’ (i.e., established by Graham v. Connor (1989)), which reinforces the legal protections for and libidinal features of police brutality. In this sense, I seek to clarify the dimensions of the libidinal economy belonging to policy brutality, namely its components of sadism and superegoic enjoyment.

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Notes

  1. To be clear, the something that always-already escapes conceptual gras** differs between Derridean deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis. For the former, the ‘trace’ – the overflowing character of signification built into the semiotic structure of différance as simultaneously differing and deferring meaning – evades firm conceptual capture (Derrida 1982, p. 26). For the latter, the ‘Real’ – the psychic register that exceeds and fundamentally challenges efforts at symbolization – evades firm conceptual capture (Lacan 2006, p. 324). Such a similarity in acknowledging the insufficiency of any discrete, finite apparatus of language, most likely, emerges from a common commitment to Saussurean structural linguistics between Derrida and Lacan.

  2. Some forms of natural law jurisprudence build upon this fundamental assumption, namely the law, as an intrinsically moral enterprise constituted by practical reason, should enable rational agents to procure the basic public goods of the social order: ‘It is … practical reasonableness itself … that directs us towards, and oversees, the pursuit of (and respect for) all the … basic human goods’ (Finnis 2017, p. 19). This assumption will be challenged.

  3. Two potential misunderstandings should be addressed posthaste. First, I am not contending that the relevant rulings possess a metaphysical force beyond their interpretation in socio-historically mediated contexts. In other words, they do not carry effects beyond their interpretation in concrete, particular courts of law. Nevertheless, the transition in jurisprudential reasoning between these rulings reflects a shift in how law enforcers on-the-bench justify and legitimize the actions of those law enforcers in-the-streets (i.e., how they circumscribe the domain of state-sanctioned violence). I concern myself with this symbolic shift primarily. Second, however, I contend that there are material implications for this transition in jurisprudential reasoning. Corporeal law enforcers, more often than not, do not familiarize themselves with the historical trajectory of constitutional precedent on police brutality, but judicial law enforcers do. In the judicial enforcement of law with respect to the corporeal enforcement of law (i.e., juridical cases concerning police brutality), the underlying jurisprudential reasoning baked into the historical trajectory of constitutional precedent on police brutality achieves reality in the assessment of individual cases. Such a (dialectical) movement in jurisprudential reasoning, therefore, ought to be highlighted for its potential and actual impacts.

  4. Rationality, here, signifies the sublation (i.e., assimilation and preservation) of the individual into the universal: ‘To begin with … Reason is aware of itself merely as an individual … [t]hen, however, its consciousness having raised itself into universality … becomes universal Reason’ (Hegel 1977, p. 211). The opposites, through dialectical mediation, become unified in a speculative action.

  5. St. Thomas Aquinas, an oft-cited advocate and proponent of natural law, formulates his division between human (positive) law and natural law as follows: ‘I answer that, As Augustine says, that which is not just seems to be no law at all. Hence the force of law depends on the extent of justice’ (Aquinas 1948, p. 649). For Aquinas, without conforming to natural (i.e., divine/moral/virtuous) law, human law falls short of its mark and does not deserve the label of ‘law.’.

  6. Niklas Luhmann, in A Sociological Theory of Law (1985), theorizes law as a third-party mechanism for reducing, limiting, and constraining the contingency and complexity of modern society (i.e., regulating and controlling possibility in any given interaction – to cognitively and normatively simplify intersubjective dynamics).

  7. The conviction of Derek Chauvin on all three charges for the murder of George Floyd serves as an exception to the rule (Graham 2021). Notably, though, Chauvin’s defense team employed the rudimentary arguments in accordance with the ruling in Graham, they pursued a dual strategy for acquitting Chauvin: (1) indicate alternative factors that caused Floyd’s death and (2) demonstrate the necessity of Chauvin’s use of force due to Floyd’s resistance (ibid). The latter factor, albeit prima facie unpersuasive, still constituted an essential aspect of the defense’s strategy.

  8. Earlier, I cited Justice Hugo Black’s concurring opinion in Rochin v. California (1952). To maintain the general meaning of law enforcement as inclusive of jurisprudential and corporeal dimensions, I would like to mention Justice Black’s membership in the Ku Klux Klan, from which he resigned in 1925.

  9. Aside from the libidinal or psychoanalytic comparison, a comparison in self-defense laws between Florida and Georgia sheds light on (a) the increased likelihood of conflict escalation between law enforcer and suspect while also clarifying (b) the rationalization of the law enforcer’s actions. Both states enacted ‘stand your ground’ laws in the 2000s, allowing those who perceive a threat to respond with lethal force even when the possibility of retreat exists (Sproul 2013).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank a few professors who actively cultivated my understanding and deployment of Derridean deconstruction and Lacanian psychoanalysis, namely Dr. Steven Crowell, Dr. Iain Thomson, and Dr. Adrian Johnston. Additionally, I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their clarifying commentaries on the direction and scope of this paper.

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Correspondence to Jason Barton.

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Barton, J. A Deconstructive and Psychoanalytic Investigation of (Corporeal) Law Enforcement. Law Critique 34, 21–39 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10978-021-09312-z

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