Abstract
In the present paper we model the Navya-Nyāya analysis of Vedic and secular injunctions and prohibitions by means of Giordani’s and Canavotto’s system ADL (“Action Deontic Logic”) of dynamic deontic logic. Navya-Naiyāyikas analyze the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions by reducing them to plain indicative statements about certain properties whose presence or absence in the enjoined or prohibited action serves as a criterion for the truth or falsity of the “inducing” or “restraining knowledge”, a kind of qualificative cognition instilled in the recipient of an injunction or prohibition. Thus, Navya-Naiyāyikas have found their own way to solve Jørgensen’s Puzzle concerning the very idea of a deontic logic as a tool to analyze arguments based on sentences which do not seem to be truth-apt. The teleological aspect of the Navya-Nyāya characterization of an enjoined or prohibited action can also give a clue to solutions of other puzzles and paradoxes which have beset the development of deontic logic in the West. A specific contrary-to-duty puzzle from the Indian tradition is related to the śyena, a malefic sacrifice meant for harming one’s enemy. The Vedic injunction to perform such a sacrifice runs counter to a religious practitioner’s duty not to harm a living being. In the present paper we examine the cogency of the very different solutions to this dilemma suggested by the Mīmāṃsaka Prabhākara on the one hand and the Navya-Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa on the other hand.
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Notes
The section on vidhi in TS is quite short (cf. TS, p. 65f). SM contains a comprehensive account of the Navya-Nyāya theory of injunctions, which is included in a chapter on sukha, duḥkha, icchā and dveṣa (cf. SM, p. 467f and the translation of the commentary on Bhāṣāpariccheda 145-152 in Mādhavānanda 1954, p. 240f).
Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya specifies the cause of the wish to take action (cikīrṣā) in the following way: lāghavena balavadaniṣṭānanubandhīṣṭasādhanatve sati kṛtisādhyatājñānasya tatra hetutvāt. (SM, p. 476)—“Because the cause of that (wish to take action) is simply the knowledge of the feasibility by effort, while [the action] is a means to something desirable which is unattended by something not desirable of greater weight.”
“Intuitively, 1 is the action type instantiated by any action whatsoever; α̅ is the action type instantiated by any action which does not instantiate the type α; α ⊔ β is the action type instantiated by any action which instantiates either the type α or the type β or both; α ⊓ β is the action type instantiated by any action which instantiates the types α and β in parallel; α;β is the action type instantiated by any action which instantiates the types α and β in sequence. We assume that an individual action can instantiate different action types. Accordingly, when we say that an action is a token of ai we do not exclude the possibility that it is also a token of a different type aj.” (Giordani and Canavotto 2016, p. 84)
“The other connectives and the dual modal operators, ⃟φ, 〈α〉φ, 〈↑〉φ, are defined as usual. The intended interpretation of the modal formulas is as follows: ʻ⃟φʼ says that φ holds in any possible world; ʻ[α]φʼ says that φ holds in any world that can be accessed by performing action α, i.e., that φ holds as a consequence of α; ʻR(α)ʼ says that the state which is the result of action α is realized; ʻ[↑]φʼ says that φ holds in all the best worlds that can be accessed by performing some action; and, finally, ʻIʼ says that the ideal of deontic perfection is realized. It is worth noting that, since 1 is the action type instantiated by any action, ʻ〈1〉φʼ says that φ can be realized by doing an action. Hence, the crucial distinction between what is possible and what is realizable is captured by the distinction between ⃟φ and 〈1〉φ.” (Giordani and Canavotto 2016, p. 84)
Group 0 is not mentioned in Giordani and Canavotto (2016). But it is surely meant to be included in the axiomatic system.
The justification for each line is given in parenthesis at the end of the line. An application of a rule ℜ to a line (n) or to lines (n) and (m) is indicated by means of “((n) x ℜ)” or “((n), (m) x ℜ)”, respectively. If ℜ is a derived PL-rule, we just write “((n) x PL)” or “((n), (m) x PL)”, respectively, without explicitly stating the rule.
Unlike before, aniṣṭa is meant here in the sense of “[↑]¬” (“undesirable”), not in the sense of “¬[↑]” (“not desirable”). Since the agent is supposed to be induced to avoid φ, no performance of an action should finish in a possible world which is among the agent's contingent best options and which satisfies φ.
According to Mathurānātha “limitor” is meant here in the sense of a limitor of the property of being a cause of the desire to do that by which one reaches one's aim: avacchedakam upāyacikīrṣākāraṇatāvacchedakam. (TC, Vidhivāda, p. 144). Moreover, Mathurānātha explains that Gaṅgeśa regards the property of being a means to a desired end as a limitor, insofar as it is not accompanied by anything not desirable of greater weight: iṣṭasādhanatvam iti balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitve satīṣṭasādhanatvam ityarthaḥ. (ibid.) As a mere qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) of the property of being a means to a desired end, the property of being accompanied by anything not desirable of greater weight should not be regarded as an object of knowledge which causes the desire to do that by which one reaches one's aim, because that would be cumbersome. Mathurānātha characterizes the alternative cumbersome limitor in the following way: na tv iti na tu balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitve satīṣṭasādhanatājñānaviśiṣṭatvam ityarthaḥ. (ibid.)—“The meaning of ‘But [the limitor is] not …’ is: But [the limitor is] not the property of being qualified in the knowledge of the property of being a means to a desired end, insofar as it is not accompanied by anything not desirable of greater weight.” (ibid.) Mathurānātha expicitly assigns the function of a mere qualifier to the property “not being accompanied by anything not desirable of greater weight” by expressing it in the form of a locative absolute (balavadaniṣṭānanubandhitve sati), which complements iṣṭasādhanatā.
According to the formalization of the Chisholm quartet in Giordani and Canavotto (cf. 2016, p. 91) the third proposition can alternatively be formalized as (CIII)': [↑](R(κ) → R(σ)). (CI), (CII) (CIII)' and (CIV) also entail that [I]¬R(σ) ∧ [↑]R(σ). In a private communication Alessandro Giordani told me that the paper he co-authored with Ilaria Canavotto contains a typo (cf. ibid.): The formalization of the violation of the primary obligation in the Chisholm quartet should be a wff with the operator [1] in front, as in (CIII) and (CIV). Moreover, following Giordani and Canavotto (cf. ibid.), (CIII) might be prefixed with the operator ⃞ in order to ensure that (CIII) is not logically dependent on ¬[1]R(κ), since, intuitively, there is no logical dependence of the third proposition in the Chisholm quartet on the negation of the violation of the primary obligation. We are following here the standard way of formalizing the third proposition instead, i.e., without the operator ⃞ (cf. McNamara 2010). Since ¬[1]R(κ) is not a part of the Chisholm quartet, the present formalization is at least not afflicted with any counterintuitive internal logical dependence.
Note that according to the present rendering of the śyena-versions of Chisholm's paradox and Forrester's paradox (CI) = (FI), (CIII) = (FII) and (CIV) = (FIV). (CII) and (FIII) have different modal operators ([I] and [↑]), while the wffs within the scope of these operators are equivalent.
“Apūrva (same as adṛṣṭa or the unseen result) is the potential good or evil result of an action. It afterwards fructifies as the attainment of heaven or hell.” (Mādhavānanda 1954, p. 249)
The term hiṃsā is here obviously used in the narrower sense of “a forbidden case of killing”.
From the Siddhāntin's point of view the perpetrator of the wounds is a killer, but the reason is not that there is no intervention by anybody else involved, as the opponent has argued.
From 〈1〉I and Giordani's and Canavotto's theorem (8), viz. [1]φ → [α]φ (cf. Giordani and Canavotto 2016, p. 88), we can conclude that 〈α〉I for any action type α, i.e., the agent referred to is so virtuous that any course of action she might pursue can finish in a deontically perfect world.
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Guhe, E. Killing Gently by Means of the śyena: The Navya-Nyāya Analysis of Vedic and Secular Injunctions (vidhi) and Prohibitions (niṣedha) from the Perspective of Dynamic Deontic Logic. J Indian Philos 49, 421–449 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09465-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09465-2