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State-owned enterprises and industrial land reform in China

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Abstract

In order to promote the optimal allocation of land, China began market-oriented reform of industrial land in 2007. The actions of state-owned enterprises during this reform can reflect the effect of reform. Therefore, this research takes state-owned enterprises as the core object of research, and uses industrial enterprise land purchase data to carry out research from the perspective of land purchase opportunity and purchase price. The results show that: the advantage of state-owned enterprises to purchase high-quality land parcels has been weakened, and a more market-oriented land market has been gradually established. As for land purchase price, the advantage of state-owned enterprises to purchase land at a low price has been gradually weakened. The distortion of industrial land price has been mitigated. These findings show that market-oriented reform of China is effective. State-owned enterprises have gradually integrated into the environment of market-oriented allocation of industrial land. The allocation of land has become more open and efficient.

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Fig.1

Source: China Statistical Yearbook of Urban and Rural Construction. (Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development of the People's Republic of China(MOHURD) http://www.mohurd.gov.cn/xytj/tjzljsxytjgb/jstjnj/index.html)

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Notes

  1. http://www.landchina.com/

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Acknowledgements

This research was funded by The National Social Science of Foundation of China “Industrial upgrading effect, mechanism optimization and policy innovation of industrial land market reform” (grant number 20BGL184).

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Correspondence to N. Edward Coulson.

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Appendix

Appendix

In the first part of this Appendix, we provide the results of the multinomial logit model in Sect. 5.1(Tables

Table 14 Mlogit results of HKMT enterprises

14,

Table 15 Mlogit results of foreign enterprises

15,

Table 16 Mlogit results of state-owned enterprises

16). It can be found that these results are consistent with the marginal effects.

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Zhang, L., Coulson, N.E., Liu, Y. et al. State-owned enterprises and industrial land reform in China. Ann Reg Sci 72, 255–286 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-022-01197-9

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