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Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first program
Mark Schroeder’s Reasons First is admirable in its scope and execution, deftly demonstrating the theoretical promise of extending the reasons-first...
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Moral Reasons
Normative ethics is concerned with reflection on moral problems. It does so through the analysis of moral reasons. In this chapter we explain what a...
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Inferring Reasons. Internal and External Reasons in Practical Cognition
Morality is the effort to guide one’s conduct by reasons, that is, to do what there are the best reasons for doing. From a cognitive perspective,...
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A range of reasons
Daniel Whiting’s excellent new book, The Range of Reasons (2022), makes a number of noteworthy contributions to the philosophical literature on...
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How Reasons-Focused Is the Categorical Imperative?
According to Pauline Kleingeld’s account of Kant’s prohibition on using others merely as means, A uses B merely as a means if and only if (1) A uses...
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Reply to Reasons Latesters
It is an honor to receive such careful and attentive criticism. In this response, I attempt to put the criticisms of the reasons latesters into the...
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The weight of reasons
This paper addresses the question of how the ‘weight’ or ‘strength’ of normative reasons is best understood. We argue that, given our preferred...
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The ranges of reasons and creasons
In this discussion, we look at three potential problems that arise for Whiting’s account of normative reasons. The first has to do with the idea that...
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In defence of object-given reasons
One recurrent objection to the idea that the right kind of reasons for or against an attitude are object-given reasons for or against that attitude...
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Incoherence and the balance of evidential reasons
Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that...
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Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing
Philosophers have often noted a contrast between practical and theoretical reasons when it comes to cases involving equally balanced reasons. When...
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Reasons, intentions, and actions
Several theorists maintain that a consideration is a reason to ϕ (where ϕ -ing is an act-type) if and only if that consideration is a reason to intend...
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The Relation Between Moral Reasons and Moral Requirement
What is the relation between moral reasons and moral requirement? Specifically: what relation does an action have to bear to one’s moral reasons in...
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Access to collective epistemic reasons: reply to Mitova
In this short paper, I critically examine Veli Mitova’s proposal that social-identity groups can have collective epistemic reasons. My primary focus...
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The Efficacy of Reasons
Our account of practical reason is corroborated by the lifeworld practice of giving and taking reasons and claims to systematize this practice. Our...
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Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons
Intellectual courage requires acting to promote epistemic goods despite significant risk of harm. Courage is distinguished from recklessness and...
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Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart
In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative...
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Précis of Reasons First
This is an overview of the main themes and theses of Reasons First for a book symposium, and intended to be read alongside the other contributions to...
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Empathy, Motivating Reasons, and Morally Worthy Action
Contemporary literature criticises a necessary link between empathy and actions that demonstrate genuine moral worth. If there is such a necessary...
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Good reasons are apparent to the knowing subject
Reasons rationalize beliefs. Reasons, when all goes well, turn true beliefs into knowledge. I am interested in the relationship between these aspects...