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Reflective Awareness, Phenomenal Conservatism, and Phenomenal Explanationism
According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P...
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Russellian Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and Revelation
This paper responds to an argument from Botin which claims that Russellian physicalism is committed to the view that either (i) our phenomenal...
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Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character
Two important questions arise concerning the properties that constitute the phenomenal characters of our experiences: first, where these properties...
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Capacitism and Phenomenal Character
According to Susanna Schellenberg’s Capacitism, the employing of perceptual capacities constitutes the phenomenal character of experience. This...
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Phenomenal character and the epistemic role of perception
Naïve Realism claims that the Phenomenal Character of perception is constituted by the mind-independent objects one perceives. According to this...
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Reductive Representationalism and the Determination of Phenomenal Properties
Reductive representationalism offers a promising route to an intelligible account of phenomenal consciousness. However, reductive representationalist...
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Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong
Russellian physicalism is becoming increasingly popular because it promises to deliver what everybody wants, realism and physicalism about...
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The Phenomenal Quality of Complex Experiences
This paper makes and defends four interrelated claims. First: most conscious experiences are complex in the sense that they have discernible...
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What Does Phenomenal Particularity Commit Us to?
The phenomenal particularity thesis maintains that perceived external, mind-independent particulars are constituents of perceptual phenomenal...
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Naïve Realism and the Relationality of Phenomenal Character
Naïve realism (also called ‘relationalism’ or ‘object view’) is becoming increasingly popular, but the specific outline of its commitments remains...
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Phenomenal transparency, cognitive extension, and predictive processing
I discuss Clark’s predictive processing/extended mind hybrid, diagnosing a problem: Clark’s hybrid suggests that, when we use them, we pay attention...
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Capacitism and Phenomenal Variance
In this chapter, I focus on one challenge to Schellenberg’s capacitism, which can be straightforwardly captured by the following trilemma:...
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Schellenberg’s Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence and the Alien Experience Problem
This paper focuses on Schellenberg’s Capacitism about Phenomenal Evidence, according to which if one is in a phenomenal state constituted by...
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Phenomenal transparency and the extended mind
Proponents of the extended mind have suggested that phenomenal transparency may be important to the way we evaluate putative cases of cognitive...
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How agency is constitutive of phenomenal consciousness: pushing the first and third-personal approaches to their limits
Husserl characterizes sleep with the idea of “the relaxation of the will.” One finds a similar approach in the work of Maine de Biran, who explains...
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Phenomenal properties are luminous properties
What is the connection between having a phenomenal property and knowing that one has that property? A traditional view on the matter takes the...
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Internal constraints for phenomenal externalists: a structure matching theory
We motivate five constraints on theorizing about sensory experience. We then propose a novel form of naturalistic intentionalism that succeeds where...
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Phenomenal roles: a dispositional account of bodily pain
In this paper I argue that bodily pain, as a phenomenal property, is an essentially and substantial dispositional property. To this end, I maintain...
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Dualism all the way down: why there is no paradox of phenomenal judgment
Epiphenomenalist dualists hold that certain physical states give rise to non-physical conscious experiences, but that these non-physical experiences...
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How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness
Illusionism is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Many opponents to the thesis take it to be...