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Pragmatic encroachment and justified group belief
The theory of pragmatic encroachment states that the risks associated with being wrong, or the practical stakes, can make a difference to whether...
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Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence
It is widely held that our beliefs can be epistemically faultless despite being morally flawed. Theories of moral encroachment challenge this,...
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The structure of moral encroachment
According to moral encroachment facts about epistemic justification can vary with moral factors that are unrelated to the truth of the belief. Most...
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Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling
Some claim that moral factors affect the epistemic status of our beliefs. Call this the moral encroachment thesis . It’s been argued that the moral...
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Against zetetic encroachment
Proponents of zetetic encroachment claim that certain zetetic or inquiry-related considerations can have a bearing on the epistemic rationality of...
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Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment
This paper defends the claim that pragmatic encroachment—the idea that knowledge is sensitive to the practical stakes of believing—can explain a...
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Moral encroachment and the epistemic impermissibility of (some) microaggressions
A recent flurry of philosophical research on microaggression suggests that there are various practical and moral reasons why microaggression may be...
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Belief, credence, and moral encroachment
Radical moral encroachment is the view that belief itself is morally evaluable, and that some moral properties of belief itself make a difference to...
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Pragmatic infallibilism
Infallibilism leads to skepticism, and fallibilism is plagued by the threshold problem. Within this narrative, the pragmatic turn in epistemology has...
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Legal proof: why knowledge matters and knowing does not
I discuss the knowledge account of legal proof in Moss (
2023 ) and develop an alternative. The unifying thread throughout this article are reflections... -
Moral Disagreement, Self-Trust, and Complacency
For many of the moral beliefs we hold, we know that other people hold moral beliefs that contradict them. If you think that moral beliefs can be...
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The Moral Duty Against Dogmatism
In this paper, I argue for a (pro tanto) moral duty against dogmatism : I argue that the social costs of a disagreement can give those who are party...
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Toward an Ethics of AI Belief
In this paper we, an epistemologist and a machine learning scientist, argue that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI – the...
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Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums
This article attempts to do justice to two conflicting positions in current public debates. On the one hand, it defends a strong version of...
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Defending Pure Moral Deference: an Argument from Rationality
Pessimists about moral deference argue that there is something special about moral beliefs which make it impermissible for agents to defer on moral...
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Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind
According to the view that there is moral encroachment in epistemology, whether a person has knowledge of p sometimes depends on moral...
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In defence of object-given reasons
One recurrent objection to the idea that the right kind of reasons for or against an attitude are object-given reasons for or against that attitude...
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Change the People or Change the Policy? On the Moral Education of Antiracists
While those who take a “structuralist” approach to racial justice issues are right to call attention to the importance of social practices, laws,...
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Is Radical Doubt Morally Wrong?
Is radical skepticism ethically problematic? This paper argues that it is. Radical skepticism’s strong regulation of our doxastic economy results in...
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Problems with purely pragmatic belief
Rinard (Philos Stud 176(7):1923–1950, 2019) brings to our attention the fact that, typically, the questions What should I believe? and What should I...