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Showler’s Pragmatic Approach to Moral Status
This commentary critically evaluates Showler’s pragmatic approach to moral status, which integrates moral individualism and moral relationalism to...
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The Moral Status of Social Robots: A Pragmatic Approach
Debates about the moral status of social robots (SRs) currently face a second-order, or metatheoretical impasse. On the one hand, moral...
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Anthropological Crisis or Crisis in Moral Status: a Philosophy of Technology Approach to the Moral Consideration of Artificial Intelligence
The inquiry into the moral status of artificial intelligence (AI) is leading to prolific theoretical discussions. A new entity that does not share...
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Dimensions of Consciousness and the Moral Status of Brain Organoids
Human brain organoids (HBOs) are novel entities that may exhibit unique forms of cognitive potential. What moral status, if any, do they have?...
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Introducing Complexity in Anthropology and Moral Status: a Reply to Pezzano
Pezzano has offered some relevant considerations to my recently published article Anthropological crisis or crisis in moral status . He advocates for...
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Degrees of Moral Status: The Problem of Relevance and the Need for a Threshold
To provide a theoretical basis for the common view that moral status comes in degrees, many philosophers endorse ‘two-factor’ accounts of the...
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Putting the Pragmatic Account of Moral Status to Work: a Reply to Gordon
In a recent commentary, John-Stewart Gordon points to the need for further elaboration of the pragmatic approach to moral status that I have...
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Universalism, Pluralism, and the Moral Status of Social Robots: a Reply to Jecker
This reply address two issues raised by Nancy Jecker’s commentary, “Robots With and Without Sophisticated Cognitive Capacities: Are They Persons?”....
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Wrongful Discrimination Without Equal, Basic Moral Status
Many theorists think that discrimination is wrongful because it involves treating discriminatees as if they have a lower moral status than others...
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The Moral Status of AI Entities
The emergence of AI is posing serious challenges to standard conceptions of moral status. New non-biological entities are able to act and make...
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Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status
In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that...
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Why the Epistemic Objection Against Using Sentience as Criterion of Moral Status is Flawed
According to a common view, sentience is necessary and sufficient for moral status. In other words, whether a being has intrinsic moral relevance is...
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The Moral Status of Pecuniary Externalities
Pecuniary externalities—costs imposed on third parties mediated through the price system—have typically received little philosophical attention....
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Utilitarianism and the Moral Status of Animals: A Psychological Perspective
Recent years have seen a growing interest among psychologists for debates in moral philosophy. Moral psychologists have investigated the causal...
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Defending a Relational Account of Moral Status
For the more than a decade, I have advanced an account of what makes persons, animals, and other beings entitled to moral treatment for their own...
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Moral Facts Do Not Supervene on Non-moral Qualitative Facts
It is very natural to think that if two people, x and y, are qualitatively identical and have committed qualitatively identical actions, then it...
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Moral Disagreement and Moral Education: What’s the Problem?
Although initially plausible, the view that moral education should aim at the transmission of moral knowledge has been subject to severe criticism....
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Moral Difference and Moral Differences
The idea that human beings have a distinct moral worth—a moral significance over and above any moral worth, such as that may be, possessed by other...
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Metz’s Relational Moral Theory and Environmental Ethics
Metz’s contribution to environmental ethics is a novel theory of moral status, which he argues explains the intuition that although we have direct...