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Intentionality as Tendency and Intentionality as Consciousness-of
In this paper, I argue that according to Edmund Husserl “tendency” does not designate a specific class of intentional experiences but rather, on par...
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Intentionality
This chapter explores what we find in the phenomenological field—intentional consciousness. It discusses the structures of intentional consciousness...
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The Structure of Intentionality
The aim of this chapter is to further reconstruct Searle’s theory of Intentionality. By proposing his principle of psychological reduction and the...
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Intentionality
Here, I build up a reading of the phenomenological concept of intentionality, using my own examples. The chapter aims to introduce a...
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‘Blind but Oriented’: Intentionality as Tendency
In their descriptions of the life dynamics of tendencies as “blind but oriented,” both Scheler and Husserl outline an alternative model of...
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From Speech Act to Intentionality
In the Introduction, I have sketched the proposal that social consciousness, as a concept inherited from Karl Marx’s historical materialism, could be...
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Intentionality and performance: the phenomenology of gait initiation
When Husserl discussed the phenomenology of willing, he concluded that the sole theoretical foundation of the intentionality of consciousness is...
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Gesture, meaning, and intentionality: from radical to pragmatist enactive theory of language
The article argues in favour of a pragmatist enactive interpretation of the emergence of the symbolic and contentful mind from a basic form of social...
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Intentionality, pointing, and early symbolic cognition
Concepts such as “symbolism” and “symbolic cognition” often remain unspecified in discussions the symbolic capacities of earlier hominins. In this...
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Not thinking about the same thing. Enactivism, pragmatism and intentionality
Enactivism does not have its primary philosophical roots in pragmatism: phenomenology (from Husserl to Jonas) is its first source of inspiration...
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Explaining the Cultural Evolution of large-scale Collaboration: Conventionality as an Alternative for Collective Intentionality
The scalar notion of collective intentionality has been used to characterize the evolution of largely uncollaborative apes to highly collaborative...
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A lineage explanation of human normative guidance: the coadaptive model of instrumental rationality and shared intentionality
This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology....
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What could come before time? Intertwining affectivity and temporality at the basis of intentionality
The enactive approach to cognition and the phenomenological tradition have in common a wide conception of ‘intentionality’. Within these frameworks,...
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Husserl on shared intentionality and normativity
The paper offers a systematic reconstruction of the relations that, in Husserl’s work, bind together our shared social world (“the spiritual world”)...
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Husserl on the Normativity of Intentionality and Its Neutralization
In this paper, I explore Husserl’s view on the normativity of intentionality and its neutralization. Husserl reaches his mature,...
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Husserl, hallucination, and intentionality
There is currently no consensus about a general account of hallucination and its object. The problem of hallucination has de facto generated...
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Intentionality and Machines
This text discusses aspects of Human-Machine Interaction from the perspectives of an engineer and a philosopher. Machines are viewed not so much as...
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Joint Attention as the Base of Common Knowledge and Collective Intentionality
I argue that joint attention solves the “base problem” as it arises for Schiffer’s and Lewis’s theories of common knowledge. The problem is that an...
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Individual and Collective Intentionality: Elaborating the Fundamentality-Question
This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is more fundamental. I call it the...
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Collective Intentionality and Methodological Individualism
Collective intentionality (CI) designates a form of intentionality that cannot be understood in a summative way. For example, two persons who make a...