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Ideal rationality and the relation between propositional and doxastic justification
In this paper, I explore how the ideal rationality-based account of propositional justification impacts our understanding of the relation between...
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Acceptance and Certainty, Doxastic Modals, and Indicative Conditionals
I give a semantics for a logic with two pairs of doxastic modals and an indicative conditional connective that all nest without restriction....
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A Non-alethic Multi-agent Doxastic Logic as a Solution to Epistemic Conflicts
The non-alethic systems N 1 of da Costa and A of Grana are both paraconsistent and paracomplete. Based on them, a multi-agent doxastic logic N A DK can...
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Towards a logic for ‘because’
This paper explores the connective ‘because’, based on the idea that ‘ C because A ’ implies the acceptance/truth of the antecedent A as well as of the...
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Completeness and Doxastic Plurality for Topological Operators of Knowledge and Belief
The first aim of this paper is to prove a topological completeness theorem for a weak version of Stalnaker’s logic KB of knowledge and belief. The...
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Inquiry, reasoning and the normativity of logic
According to the traditional view in the philosophy of logic facts of logic bear normative authority regarding how one ought to reason. Usually this...
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A note on Williamson’s Gettier cases in epistemic logic
In a recent series of papers, Timothy Williamson argues that one can reach Edmund Gettier’s conclusion that the justified-true-belief (JTB) theory of...
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Getting some (non-classical) closure with justification logic
Justification logics provide frameworks for studying the fine structure of evidence and justification. Traditionally, these logics do not impose any...
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Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism
Logical realism is the metaphysical view asserting that the facts of logic exist and are mind-and-language independent. McSweeney argues that if...
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Logical abductivism on abductive logic
Logical abductivism is the epistemic view about logic according to which logical theories are justified by abduction (or Inference to the Best...
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Logic-Sensitivity and Bitstring Semantics in the Square of Opposition
This paper explores the interplay between logic-sensitivity and bitstring semantics in the square of opposition. Bitstring semantics is a...
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On the pure logic of justified belief
Justified belief is a core concept in epistemology and there has been an increasing interest in its logic over the last years. While many logical...
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Degrees of Doxastic Justification
This paper studies degrees of doxastic justification. Dependency relations among different beliefs are represented in terms of causal models....
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An Evidence Logic Perspective on Schotch-Jennings Forcing
Traditional epistemic and doxastic logics cannot deal with inconsistent beliefs nor do they represent the evidence an agent possesses. So-called...
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The Logic of Action and Control
In this paper I propose and motivate a logic of the interdefined concepts of making true and control , understood as intensional propositional...
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Probabilistic epistemic logic based on neighborhood semantics
In the literature, different frameworks of probabilistic epistemic logic have been proposed. Most of these frameworks define knowledge or belief by...
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Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms
Is logic normative for belief? A standard approach to answering this question has been to investigate bridge principles relating claims of logical...
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The Logic of Framing Effects
Framing effects concern the having of different attitudes towards logically or necessarily equivalent contents. Framing is of crucial importance for...
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Tracking probabilistic truths: a logic for statistical learning
We propose a new model for forming and revising beliefs about unknown probabilities. To go beyond what is known with certainty and represent the...
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Conciliatory views, higher-order disagreements, and defeasible logic
Conciliatory views of disagreement say, roughly, that it’s rational for you to become less confident in your take on an issue in case you find out...
