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In search of doxastic involuntarism
Doxastic involuntarists, as I categorize them, say that it’s impossible to form a belief as an intentional action. But what exactly is it to form a...
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Involuntarism impugned?
Blake Roeber argues that examples of a certain neglected kind cast doubt on the following piece of epistemological orthodoxy: your acquisition of a...
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Are We Pre-Theoretically Committed to Doxastic Voluntarism?
Much of the force behind doxastic involuntarism comes from our pre-theoretical judgement that any effort to form a belief simply by intending to form...
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Do Your Homework! A Rights-Based Zetetic Account of Alleged Cases of Doxastic Wronging
This paper offers an alternate explanation of cases from the doxastic wronging literature. These cases violate what I call the degree of inquiry right ...
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Permission to believe is not permission to believe at will
According to doxastic involuntarism, we cannot believe at will. In this paper, I argue that permissivism, the view that, at times, there is more than...
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Toward an Ethics of AI Belief
In this paper we, an epistemologist and a machine learning scientist, argue that we need to pursue a novel area of philosophical research in AI – the...
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Epistemic Responsibility: An Overview
When are we responsible for undesirable beliefs such as racist or sexist ones? Several factors make this question difficult. For one thing, ignorance...
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Adversarial Argument, Belief Change, and Vulnerability
When people argue, they are vulnerable to unwanted and costly changes in their beliefs. This vulnerability motivates the position that belief...
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Agent-centered epistemic rationality
It is a plausible and compelling theoretical assumption that epistemic rationality is just a matter of having doxastic attitudes that are the...
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Can the Epistemic Basing Relation be a Brain Process?
There is a difference between having reasons for believing and believing for reasons. This difference is often fleshed out via an epistemic basing...
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Acceptance and the ethics of belief
Various philosophers authors have argued—on the basis of powerful examples—that we can have compelling moral or practical reasons to believe, even...
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism
Epistemic deontology maintains that our beliefs and degrees of belief are open to deontic evaluations—evaluations of what we ought to believe or may...
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Can There Be Epistemic Responsibility?
Assuming some beliefs are actually undesirable, are we responsible for the undesirable beliefs we hold? This depends on whether we are responsible...
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On the role of knowers and corresponding epistemic role oughts
The claim that epistemic oughts stem from the “role” of believer is widely discussed in the epistemological discourse. This claim seems to stem from...
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A new problem for internalism
I will argue that internalism about justification entails the apparently absurd conclusion that it is possible to know specific facts about the...
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Asking before Arguing? Consent in Argumentation
Arguments involve, at minimum, attempts at presenting something that an audience will take to be a reason. Reasons, once understood, affect an...
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A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager
Epistemic permissivism is the thesis that the evidence can rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. Pascal’s wager is the idea...
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The Humean theory of motivation: much ado about nothing?
According to the Humean theory of motivation, desire is identified as the primary source of motivation, while cognitive states like beliefs are...
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons
It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is...