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Pooling Time-Series of Cross-Section Data
For the general linear model y = Xβ + u with E(uu′) = Ω, a necessary and sufficient condition for OLS to be equivalent to GLS is given by...
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Social Networks and the Labor Market
This chapter surveys recent literature on social networks and labor markets, with a specific focus on develo** countries. It reviews existing...
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Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks
I build on Bandiera et al. (Quarter. J. Econ. 120(3):917–962, 2005) and propose a novel mechanism whereby the structure of social network within an...
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Does vertical integration increase product quality?
Numerous product quality scandals are caused by low-quality inputs. When input quality is not perfectly observed by downstream firms, upstream firms...
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Auctions with resale and risk aversion
This paper provides necessary conditions of an equilibrium for a first-price auction with resale when one of the two bidders participating in the...
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Fritz John’s equation in mechanism design
We show the role that an important equation first studied by Fritz John plays in mechanism design.
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On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals
We compare information design, or Bayesian persuasion, by an uninformed principal (who has no information about the state of the world when making...
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Equilibrium existence in two-player contests without absolute continuity of information
We prove the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, without assuming absolute continuity of information, in two-player...
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Reorganizing a partnership efficiently
We modify the partnership dissolution model pioneered by Cramton et al. (Econometrica 55:615–632, 1987) to consider the possibility that each partner...
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Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions: a case of tacit collusion
We analyze Stackelberg leadership in a first-price auction. Leadership is induced by an information system, represented by a spy, that leaks one...
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Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication
Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated “folk theorems” have been proposed for...
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Polit-ökonomische Aspekte des Berichts zur Lage der Verbraucher:innen
For the first time, the German Advisory Council for Consumer Affairs (SVRV) has published a comprehensive report on the position of consumers in...
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An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus...
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Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
We extend the previous work of De Castro et al. (
2017a ,2017b ) into mixed strategies. -
Characterizing priorities for deferred acceptance with or without outside options
In a model of priority-based allocation of indivisible objects where there may not be outside options, we characterize the priority structures under...
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Preventive-service fraud in credence good markets
Preventive dental care and automotive service is intended to preempt problems that, if they materialized, would require costly treatment or repair....
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On the limit points of an infinitely repeated rational expectations equilibrium
We study the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in the framework of a repeated economy. In each repetition agents observe the sequence of...
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Hidden advertisement, signaling, and directed search
This paper studies a directed search model where sellers have limited capacities, and buyers cannot observe the varying number of advertisements each...
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Optimal allocations in growth models with private information
This paper considers a class of growth models with idiosyncratic human capital risk and private information about individual effort choices (moral...
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Auctions with resale at a later date
In this paper, we consider fixed time delays in auctions with resale. The time delay may impact the bidders’ valuations of the object. In particular,...