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Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure
We generalize the notion of Ichiishi (Econometrica 49(2):369–377,
1981 )’s social coalitional equilibrium to a multi-layered coalition structure with parameters... -
Commitment timing in coalitional bargaining
Most multilateral bargaining models predict bargaining power to emanate from pivotality—a party’s ability to form different majority coalitions....
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On the Individual and Coalitional Manipulability of q-Paretian Social Choice Rules
We study the degree of individual and coalitional manipulability of q-Paretian social choice rules under Impartial Culture. Manipulability is defined...
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Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings
In many real world situations, the design of social rankings over agents or items from a given raking over groups or coalitions, to which these...
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Games in Characteristic Form: Applications in OM
In Chap. 7, we discussed games in characteristic form, and important solution concepts for that class of games.
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Games in Normal Form
Chapters 1 and 2 provided the background for the remainder of...
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Games in Characteristic Form
Solution concepts for superadditive games prescribe the division of payoff among the agents in the grand coalition N and can be broadly classified...
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A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games
The paper aims to study a kind of revenue allocation system with a guarantee of basic interests, which integrates the egalitarianism with the...
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Institutional enforceability
We introduce a new coalitional refinement of Nash equilibrium. An institution is defined to include: (i) a collection of active coalitions of players...
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Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
In this paper, we study solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs. we define four kinds of solution concepts, namely the most...
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The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games
Group formation tends to involve peer effects. In the presence of such complementarities, however, coalitional games need not have a nonempty core....
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Movement split: how the structure of revolutionary coalitions shapes revolutionary outcomes
This article investigates the relationship between the coalitional structure of revolutionary movements and revolutionary outcomes. Noting the...
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Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium
It is well known that Nash equilibria may not be Pareto-optimal; worse, a unique Nash equilibrium may be Pareto-dominated, as in Prisoners’ Dilemma....
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New results for multi-issue allocation problems and their solutions
In this paper we present a different perspective than the more traditional approaches to study solutions for multi-issue allocation problems. This...
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The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model
The paper presents a coalitional bargaining model, the Burning Coalition Bargaining Model, having a peculiar type of partial breakdown. In fact, in...
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Two families of values for global cooperative games
A global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games...
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Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium
Strong Nash equilibrium (see Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see Bernheim et al., 1987) rely on the idea that players are allowed...
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NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies
Inspired by Scarf (J Econ Theory 3: 169–181,
1971 ), Zhao (Int J Game Theory 28: 25–34,1999 ), Sandholm (Population games and evolutionary dynamics.... -
Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law
We analyze a legal situation in which a plaintiff suffers the total damage of the cumulative injury that is caused by multiple sequences of...