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When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
This paper analyzes the problem of a principal (she) designing a contract for an agent (he) to form a short-lived partnership to exploit an asset...
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Hierarchy and the size of a firm
In this note, we apply weighted hierarchical games of cooperative game theory to the problem of optimal firm size of the firm. In particular, we...
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The Development of the Theory of Games at Princeton and the Rand Corporation
The chapter deals with the development of the theory of games at Princeton—at the Institute of Advanced Studies, at the department of economics and...
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Analytic Narratives
The expression “analytic narratives” is used to refer to a range of quite recent studies that lie on the boundaries between history, political...
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Cooperative Game Theory
This chapter provides an introduction to cooperative game theory, which complements noncooperative game theory (Chapter 2). Both of these fields...
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A note on the per capita Shapley support levels value
The per capita Shapley support levels value extends the Shapley value to cooperative games with a level structure. This value prevents symmetrical...
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Lab-in-the-Field Experiments
Lab-in-the-field experiments have played a major role in identifying behavioral causes of discrimination and ways to reduce discrimination. Such...
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Asymmetric majority pillage games
We study pillage games (Jordan in J Econ Theory 131(1):26–44, 2006), which model unstructured power contests. To enable empirical tests of pillage...
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Anfal in Practice and Islamic Political Capitalism
In this chapter, I critically examine the formation of Islamic political capitalism under the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) through Anfal’s...
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Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences
A mechanism allocates one unit of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents reporting a number between zero and one. Nash, Pareto optimal Nash,...
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How to choose a fair delegation?
This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and...
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Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games
This paper is concerned with an old question: Will oligopolistic firms have incentives to merge to monopoly and will the monopoly, if the firms...
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Jerry R. Green (1946–)
Jerry Green has a deep and long-standing connection to Harvard University, and in particular with its Economics Department. This paper begins by...
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On stability of economic networks
In the spirit of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (Theory of games and economic behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1944 ), we introduce a...
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The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell’s bargaining set in economies with many commodities
We study the Walrasian objection mechanism in the framework of economies with a measure space of agents and a separable Banach space of commodities...
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IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
Over the past two decades, IAC probability calculation techniques have made substantial progress, particularly through methodological studies that...
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Government debt, European Institutions and fiscal rules: a synthetic control approach
Public debt and its development are key questions of public sector economics and fiscal policy. This paper uses the Synthetic Control Method to study...
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Government debt: the impact of fiscal rules at the European and national level
As Europe and the world surface from the pandemic of 2020–2021, public debt levels have risen substantially, the review of the European Union (EU)...