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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Stable Matching with Multilayer Approval Preferences: Approvals Can Be Harder Than Strict Preferences

    We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are \(\ell \) ℓ ...

    Matthias Bentert, Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger, Tomohiro Koana in Algorithmic Game Theory (2022)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    A Fine-Grained View on Stable Many-To-One Matching Problems with Lower and Upper Quotas

    In the Hospital Residents problem with lower and upper quotas (HR- \({Q}_{L}^{U}\) Q L U ), the goal is to find a stable matching of residents to hospitals where the number of residents matched to a hospit...

    Niclas Boehmer, Klaus Heeger in Web and Internet Economics (2020)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Multidimensional Stable Roommates with Master List

    Since the early days of research in algorithms and complexity, the computation of stable matchings is a core topic. While in the classic setting the goal is to match up two agents (either from different “gende...

    Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Dušan Knop, Rolf Niedermeier in Web and Internet Economics (2020)

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    Chapter and Conference Paper

    Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage

    We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several “desirable” manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a give...

    Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Rolf Niedermeier in Algorithmic Game Theory (2020)